A tool that can do everything will never be as good as a tool that is design to do just one task.
Jack of all trades, master of none.
Jack of all trades, master of none.
In all air combat training scenarios, F-35s blow F-16s out of the skies.
Russia still has no meaningful way to interdict F-35. Their 5gen fighter is still early prototype, and the S-400 munition upgrade capable to tackle F-35 is still in development with multiple setbacks.
You may loathe American military industrial complex and point out the cost of the programme, sure, but it's the best aircraft in the skies for now. With some headroom.
F-16s, sure, and we keep hearing about this, but I wonder how they fare against more modern fighters though, such as Rafale, Eurofighter, or whatever.
Rafale had the reputation to be an overpriced, goal-missing† multirole beast, but apparently the U.S.A would not let France take that crown for too long, and boy does it seem they beat the crap out of us on that front now.
† especially when it wasn't able to land on the Charles de Gaulle carrier in early years of development.
(No idea if F-35 were deployed by Israel at all)
How many F-16's? And what block? In order to be great it has to shoot down a LOT of F-16's to motivate the cost. A problem with that being that it can only carry 4 radar guided missiles internally (so while remaining stealthy). If it carries more, then it's just a very expensive non-stealth fighter. If it carries just 4, it's rather vulnerable to
> but it's the best aircraft in the skies for now.
What's the "best aircraft" isn't really an interesting measure. What's most interesting to any buyer is for X billion dollars, and N years of flying, what capability can I get? In such a comparison you have to weigh in the per-hour flying costs, the cost to aquire and train, what investments you get locally (can you manufacture some part locally or would you have to buy from lockheed?) and so on and so forth.
Long term, strategically, cost is important, sure. Prolonged world war, major players scale. Short term, no. And in a conflict, minor players have short term only operational horizon at their disposal.
> What's most interesting to any buyer is for X billion dollars, and N years of flying, what capability can I get?
Norway found the cost manageable, in competition with other bidders. And for comparison, a municipal garage of the parliament in Oslo now stands at the cost of three F-35 acquisitions.
Not sure why that's an argument against the cost effectiveness of something? If you could do X for N dollars or 2xN dollars then it's more cost effective to do it for N dollars assuming the mission can be performed with either.
> Norway found the cost manageable, in competition with other bidders.
I think it's safe to say there was a "political cost" considered here too. That is, what would be the long term cost of not "helping" NATO allies and the other F-35 buyers by pushing the price down through larger sales.
"But while F-22 pilots are confident about the Raptor’s ability to defeat the S-300V4 and the S-400, the Air Force official acknowledged that the stealthy fifth-generation aircraft has never faced off against these next-generation Russian air defenses in actual combat before."
I would not bet my life on it that a current S-400 can't blow an F-35 out of the sky. And considering the Russian habit ob hiding or understating technology, in combination with old Soviet thinking stratagems like the "axe theory", I would say: good luck!
The existing ones are unable to lock on F-22 or F-35. The ground stations under favourable circumstance can possibly see stealth aircraft, but S-300/400 family has active, missile-based guidance, and this is not compensated yet.
Made me look. Found http://militera.lib.ru/research/suvorov12/05.html
"""
The theory is known unofficially in the General Staff as the `axe theory'. It is stupid, say the Soviet generals, to start a fist-fight if your opponent may use a knife. It is just as stupid to attack him with a knife if he may use an axe. The more terrible the weapon which your opponent may use, the more decisively you must attack him, and the more quickly you must finish him off. Any delay or hesitation in doing this will just give him a fresh opportunity to use his axe on you. To put it briefly, you can only prevent your enemy from using his axe if you use your own first.
The `axe theory' was put forward in all Soviet manuals and handbooks to be read at regimental level and higher. In each of these one of the main sections was headed `Evading the blow'. These handbooks advocated, most insistently, the delivery of a massive pre-emptive attack on the enemy, as the best method of self-protection. This recommendation was not confined to secret manuals-non-confidential military publications carried it as well.
"""