Basically: the form of fraud it protects against is very rare in the US, and consumers find memorizing another number painful. Europe adopted chip+PIN not because anyone really wanted it but because it was mandated by law. It’s unclear that it has actually been effective.
At one point, I actually just had a single, combined debit and credit card. It worked for both, so I could use it at an ATM, as well as use it as a CC.
EDIT: IIRC, the Debt-to-Income ratio calculation (if you were to apply for a mortgage, for example), is based on your aggregate credit-card limits (used or not), on the assumption that you could be that exposed. I remember when I were a young lad, I had to kill a card (or two?) that I wasn't even using in order to get the mortgage rate I was looking for because of this effect.
There are certain types of payment which are also classed as a cash advance and sometimes catch people out, such as to gambling sites.
So it's generally a very bad idea to get a cash advance on your credit card, especially a credit card that you also use to charge other purchases.
Assuming you can stomach $50 in the case that you do drop the ball notifying the issuer upon realizing your physical card was physically lost, how do the rules differ appreciably?
Also, how does not having a debit card significantly alter the exposure of a given deposit account (eg through the ACH network), besides just having one fewer network address? It seems like the better option is to get a feed of transactions in a convenient manner, whether tablet notifications or an ofx feed.
(Not that I don't want to stick it to the banks as hard as possible for perpetuating this negligent payment network and tricking customers with terms like "identity theft", but just pragmatically speaking)
So once you assume whatever you use will get stolen, you determine what dealing with a stolen card number will be like. With debit cards it's your own cash locked up in a transaction dispute. With credit cards its the credit card companies credit balance and you have no money locked up.
You generally share your bank account number with a small number of trusted parties: employer, landlord, creditors, utilities, tax man, etc. Exposure is low. When you start swiping a debit card around town, you hand out the same level of access to every merchant you buy anything from, and whomever might be skimming their terminals or stealing their databases.
Credit card fraud adds to your balance, but you don't have to pay it while the investigation is ongoing. Typically they revoke your card number and mail you a new one. During that time, you live off of a different credit card your debit card. Critical payments go straight to your bank account and are unaffected. When the investigation is over, the charges disappear. At no point are you deprived of actual money, you merely have an inflated short-term debt.
Good point about a check bouncing though. I would think your bank should waive any charges (after all, you weren't defrauded nor did you write a bad check), but the recipient might complain about their bank's fee (for essentially a rejected ACH transaction, but I digress). Although speaking of checks, readily handing out a printed withdrawal key seems like a poor idea if your goal is avoiding surprises!
Every second website I buy stuff at has my IBAN.
Looks like it's a vety different situation here in Europe.
Sadly, too many US websites don't allow this, I ended up having to get a CC (and pay for it!) just to deal with US bullshit websites demanding a CC. That CC cost me more in fees than I've ever kost in debit transactions.
I only need it for american services though, all EU services I use accept SEPA pull or push, Sofort, giropay or Paypal with a bank account (strangely enough, some american services in the past declines to accept a paypal account without credit card, weird stuff)
Same goes for any SEPA DD based transactions. Everything else is secured via TAN, which depending on what generator method you choose (SMS, Optical, HBCI or Smartphone App) has varying levels of security (Optical and HBCI are highest atm, then App and SMS last, atleast according to my knowledge and understanding of the implementations).
The only bad part is when paypal fucks you over but that's a given risk when interacting with paypal anyway.
Having had ~US$20K sucked out of my debit card (which was ~$10K more than I had), I can verify that you have essentially no recourse. Why the stupid bank authorized someone to go over by such a yuuge amount still baffles me...
Also my bank issues me temporary debit cards for online purchases.
I can chose if the card is for one purchase or for multiple purchases with the same entity, over a period up to 12 months.
I can set a monthly or a total limit.
I can request as many cards as I wish and they are free. I use a new card for every online purchase.
This is particularly evident in East European countries, e.g. here in Poland credit cards are far less common than debit cards. And so people use them to pay in their grocery store as well as in ATMs.
I for example didn't had a credit card until recently, when I wanted to rent a car, it looks like credit card is (almost) mandatory and I use it only for that purpose.
So it just sits in my drawer until once a year I take it out when I go on vacation and rent a car there.
I recently got a new debit card which has the usual (European) chip and pin - but also annoyingly has contactless payment (aka "leech my money"). Sadly the only way to opt out might be to switch banks...
At least in UK it was a sort of anti-consumer Trojan horse. Theft decreased by 80% or more, but now the responsibility of the remaining part lays on the user instead of the bank. I remember UK consumer groups quite upset about this ~12 years ago.
In both cases, you can dispute transactions with the banks, and in both cases, the banks are going to open their defence with "but how did the thief know your PIN?" but that does not make it clear-cut, nor does it mean the banks will always win their argument.
Chip+PIN (EMV) prevents this because the chip cannot be cloned, and so it completely eliminates this form of fraud. However, banks also used the introduction of Chip+PIN to move liability of any fraud to the customer, whereas before the banks would fully refund any fraud.
With chip and PIN, who is liable for card fraud?
Consumers remain fully protected from the cost of card fraud and are covered under The Lending Code. From 1 January 2005 there was a shift in liability for some types of card fraud from banks to retailers, but this will not affect cardholders in any way. If businesses have chip and PIN terminals in store, they are covered for the cost of card fraud whether customers enter their PIN or their signature, just so long as staff follow the on-screen prompts and carry out the routine checks to ensure cards have not already been reported lost or stolen. Banks will continue to be liable for the cost of card fraud committed on old-style non-chip and PIN cards, so by accepting them businesses are not putting themselves at risk in any way
So in what way has fraud liability shifted on to the customer?
"our systems are foolproof, and as you can only withdraw money with your PIN, you must have given your PIN out, so it's your problem"
this was mostly ineffective against people that knew the law
Juries are rarely told, and bank officials would hardly volunteer that big frauds often involve a bank insider, and sometimes even an insider the bank has since caught and fired. You won't get the money back from an insider who was taking 10% but you can make a victim of the individual account holder rather than eat the loss at your multi-billion dollar bank. And all you have to do is pretend systems you know are all too fallible are instead perfect.
Ross Anderson has written about some of this on Light Blue Touchpaper
As I've quoted from the website, there was no change to the consumer protection in the introduction of the chip. Your description applies equally well to court cases before and after the technology changed.
Er, no?
I guess it's possible you've actually forgotten what changed here.
It's 1995, I have stolen a VISA card issued to a nice old lady who lives across the street. I walk into a PC wholesaler which allows walk-in purchases, I hand over the card in the name "C. Smith" and walk out with two month's salary worth of Pentium CPUs that can be sold easily for almost their RRP. Did I know a PIN? Nope, just squiggled something that might be "C. Smith" on both the card and the receipt.
When her bank tells her she bought all those Pentiums, she's going to freak. And when she calms back down she'll say she never received that card. Has no idea where it is. Give her back her money.
The bank will of course insist that it's her card and surely she bought all those CPUs. But Ms Smith's lawyer doesn't need a Computer Science degree to understand what happened, and neither does the jury. Smart suit or not, "Her card was simply stolen from the post" is an easy argument to understand and she'll prevail.
Not so when the bank says her PIN was used. Who else could know her PIN? Those are secret. Aren't they?
Why didn't the store want a PIN back in 1995? Because they had no way to validate it, it would be useless to them. Only the _chip_ enables offline PIN verification, and in 1995 even some _ATMs_ were still doing offline transactions.
The transactions are not routinely On Line. Yes, I know, you had to wait 5 minutes the other day in an antique store because their card machine used a dial-up modem. Very annoying. And also quite possibly bogus, there's a good chance that wait was a charade. But why doesn't it have to be online, surely that's unavoidable?
Time for another brief lesson, this time not about history though, this all still true today:
Payment card transactions are really _two_ transactions, the banks make no real effort to correlate the two, and one is done entirely on the honour system.
1. Authorization: Does the card holder authorize this transaction? This is the one that has tightened up considerably due to fraud. But this doesn't move any money anywhere, and doesn't involve any real time interaction with a bank at all. Once upon a time this involved a machine that used carbon paper to take an "impression" of the 3D credit card, and collecting a signature. Today it's "Chip and PIN".
2. Settlement: Who should get paid, and how much, by who? This moves the actual money to the merchant. It's done entirely on the honour system, banks and merchants both routinely screw up, if your country's laws make them they'll eat the cost of fixing that, otherwise they'll probably blame you and make you suck it up. Hooray.
The first one has loads of serious technology thrown at it. Anti-replay for example. If I authorize one $14.99 payment, you can't just show that again to authorize another one.
And the second, which moves the money, undoes every benefit of the first, for example you needn't replay the authorization, just do settlement again for the extra $14.99 without any authorization at all. The bank will hand it over, the customer loses the money, unless they remember to explicitly complain about having $14.99 stolen you can just keep it. If they do complain, say it was a "mistake", you lose the $14.99 but so long as you don't do it too often you'll just get a slap on the wrist and can try ripping off other customers.
What on earth do you want banks to do? Make their systems less secure, so it’s easier for people to convince a court that their disputed transaction was fraudulent?
It’s natural and predictable that banks will argue that security improvements make it more difficult for thieves to make fraudulent transactions, but since these systems aren’t 100% secure, people will always be able to dispute these events and win their challenges.
To use an analogy, it would be like if you improve the reliability of a product you make, then start saying those who RMA your product must have damaged or mishandled it for it to be broken, and deny them their warranty.
This shifting of burden ultimately comes back to the consumer in higher costs and fees, and is just a cost of business for the merchants. The credit card company beneifts because they make money regardless of fraud, and they’ll make increased money from the detachment of the feedback loop from the consumer. Merchants don’t pursue fraud because they simply increase costs to cover it.
In this scenario merchants lose, consumers lose, credit card companies win from increased usage.
Who pays for fraud, in the end? Well, the customers pay, of course, since they are ultimately the only source of funds. Regardless of whether or not the merchant or bank eats the fraud, they are going to recoup the cost through their charges to customers.
It's also pro-consumer in that it lets you use your debit cards without much fear of fraud -- if I were liable for fraudulent charges, I would be _much_ more reluctant to use it anywhere (especially as the bank may not be as incentivised to provide as good a fraud protection), drastically reducing its utility.
I think a sensible solution is to split the liability between the merchant and consumer. Hiding it from the consumer hides it from the one party that would even care about prosecuting fraud.
Apparently a lot of cards are dropping the requirement anyway. [1]
[1] - https://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/signatures-soon...
Moreover, if you think that retailers are making you sign a piece of paper because they want to hassle you and make you take your money elsewhere, you need to rethink the situation.
Just like sometimes you get a clerk who won't take a $2 bill. Nothing will ever trump human ignorance.
Not in my experience (Europe). Signature must match the one in the card, and cashiers check it most of the times.
I don't know a single person with more than one credit card. Why would you even need more than one credit card?
For everyday purchases I use one card for restaurants and gas, another card for groceries and yet another for everything else. Then two other of my cards have rotating bonus categories, so I may use one of those for gas one quarter and for restaurants next quarter.
And, at minimum, you should always have a backup, like a sibling comment points out. Especially when travelling, you don't want to be in the middle of nowhere trying to buy meal only to find out your card has fraudulent transactions and the new one has to be mailed to your house.
Wow. I'm taking it you don't have to pay an annual fee for having a credit card in the US.
Some cards waive the annual fee the first year and some don't. It's whatever the card issuer decides makes them the most money.
Personally, I pay two annual fees and have a third one waived for now. Some of the cards I have I've downgraded to the less benefits no annual fee version of the card after collecting the annual fee version benefits for a year.
Credit cards with an annual fee simply for the privilege of having a credit card, are mostly gone, chased out of the market much like the takeover of free checking.
1) Every day IRL use
2) Backup
3) Restaurants. This is the only use-case where my card is out of my possession, and I try to isolate that.
4) MOST on-line purchases (Except for #5 below)
5) Online subscriptions. These are things like DO or AWS or month-to-month Jetbrains or Safari. This makes it easier to visually scan the statement for things that should not be there, or are wrong. (Billing mistakes are not infrequent).
6) Business expenses. This makes either submitting expenses and/or taxes easier, because it's all in one place.
Chip+sig is so stupid. What is the sig supposed to be helpful for?