Experts dissect FIU bridge collapse, but can't identify cause
miamiherald.com
miamiherald.com
It's a slow motion photogrammetry of the dashcam video of the collapse showing the bridge clearly failing first at the left side. At least one of the two is probably coincidence, but the point of failure on the lower deck seems to be at the same location that the transporter truck was modified to use, and on the upper canopy at the location where they were doing the tensioning.
It's a nice accompaniment for the eng-tips thread linked from the article: http://www.eng-tips.com/viewthread.cfm?qid=437029
[0] http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/w...
It's kind of like batteries. It used to be that you'd want to discharge battery cells completely before recharging them. This was true for Ni-Cad cells. With newer Li-ion cells, doing this is actually dangerous. It's not necessarily the chemistry's fault when an over-discharged cell starts a fire later on, but if you substitute a new design, you'd better cover the new rules with the implementation people.
[1] - https://slate.com/business/2018/03/the-florida-bridge-collap...
Now, there’s dead load, live load, wind, etc, and they’ve all got different uncertainty factors. Resistance factors are assigned based on the variability of the material, concrete more than steel, and fracture critical higher than redundant.
LRFD puts a 1.2-1.6 multiplier on loads (and at time less than 1 for cases where you're relying on it for balance), and resistances are in the .8-.9 range.
I never did a whole lot with the Factor of Safety era codes, but they were generally in the same range once you multiply out all the factors. (As you'd expect, the newer codes tended to hit about the same design point, with some deviations.)
There are two main things to keep in mind here:
* A factor of safety is for normal variability in loads and normal variability in material/connection strengths. It doesn't cover you for blunders.
* The loads that are calculated are the extreme loads on the system, not the normal loads. 1.4 DL + 1.6 LL + 1.2 WL is often the design envelope, and that's... a lot. Add a huge factor of safety on that and you're into physically impossible cases. Like, people are being crushed to death if you get more than 300psf of human load over a significant area, but the typical Live Load is in the range of 100psf. (Now books on a reference library moving shelf system? That's 300psf)
From what I've seen of this bridge, there was no live load at the time, so it's unlikely that it was overloaded as designed. If I was doing failure analysis, I'd be looking at a combination of factors, and the ones I'd start with are the shop drawings vs. the engineer's plans and the quality of the concrete materials, placement, and curing.
IIRC, AvE thought it was basically negligence by the installers. One of the mobile supports was kind of near a curb, which was going to make the bridge a pain to install. The engineers installing it decided to move the support, and moved it to a bad spot. Putting the weight of the bridge there caused a bunch of damage. The engineers should have caught it, but they went ahead anyway.
As a pedestrian and a cyclist, the last thing I want to do on your new bridge over a busy six-lane road is stick around on a bench perusing the wifi.
Compare with the Millennium Bridge in London, which is also modern and ugly, and was also originally faulty, but was fixed before it could kill anyone: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Bridge,_London