Do you want software development to turn into healthcare, where every developer needs millions of dollars of malpractice insurance? Because shit like this will turn it into a healthcare like system real quick.
But there are many industries where civil liabilities are required. In fact, any software independent consultant is civilly liable for their work, but it’s not specific to software.
IEEE has a section in their member toolkit that goes into why professional liability insurance is needed, https://m.ieee.org/membership_services/membership/discounts/...
The costs aren’t that high or at least they weren’t 15 years ago when I purchased it for less than $1k/year for $1M in coverage. Most people need this even if they think they are safe. If you’re the one who wrote the deployment script that erased $1M in data, it won’t be entirely mitigated that the script made it through qa.
Also interesting is that the engineer who wrote the Uber software is currently liable for criminal negligence, like pretty much everyone else. But you would have to prove culpability. I can’t find any examples of software engineers convicted so it’s hard to tell who goes to jail-developer, qa, or executive.
More info on criminal/civil negligence- https://www.theblanchlawfirm.com/?practice-areas=criminal-ne...
Almost all employees have the possibility of criminal negligence based on their work. For programmers, this could mean that if you fuck up the code for a pacemaker and someone dies, you could go to jail. That’s a big risk and I can’t find any programmer who has been found culpable for someone’s death. This is the current law in the US.
If Uber was negligent in its code, then the programmers could go to jail. They have programmers and they work and assume this extremely low risk.
Now maybe you’re arguing that some special law should or should not exist for Uber drivers.
How else to interpreted that? When a single bug can cause loss of life, and given that this in a thread about Uber, it’s hard to draw other conclusions. By all means though, offer another perspective on how regulating industries with significant number of lives on the line can’t manage regulation. While you’re doing that, I’d point to the aerospace sector which seems capable of both innovation and regulation.
For example: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues
Although the NTSB investigated the accident, it was unable to conclusively identify the cause of the crash. The rudder PCU from Flight 585 was severely damaged, which prevented operational testing of the PCU.[3]:47 A review of the flight crew's history determined that Flight 585's captain strictly adhered to operating procedures and had a conservative approach to flying.[3]:47 A first officer who had previously flown with Flight 585's captain reported that the captain had indicated to him while landing in turbulent weather that the captain had no problem with declaring a go-around if the landing appeared unsafe.[3]:48 The first officer was considered to be "very competent" by the captain on previous trips they had flown together.[3]:48 The weather data available to the NTSB indicated that Flight 585 might have encountered a horizontal axis wind vortex that could have caused the aircraft to roll over, but this could not be shown conclusively to have happened or to have caused the rollover.[3]:48–49
On December 8, 1992, the NTSB published a report which identified what the NTSB believed at the time to be the two most likely causes of the accident. The first possibility was that the airplane's directional control system had malfunctioned and caused the rudder to move in a manner which caused the accident. The second possibility was a weather disturbance that caused a sudden rudder movement or loss of control. The Board determined that it lacked sufficient evidence to conclude either theory as the probable cause of the accident.[2]:ix[3]:49 This was only the fourth time in the NTSB's history that it had closed an investigation and published a final aircraft accident report where the probable cause was undetermined.[4]
Second:
In 2004, following an independent investigation of the recovered PCU/dual-servo unit, a Los Angeles jury, which was not allowed to hear or consider the NTSB's conclusions about the accident, ruled that the 737's rudder was the cause of the crash, and ordered Parker Hannifin, a rudder component manufacturer, to pay US$44 million to the plaintiff families.[16] Parker Hannifin subsequently appealed the verdict, which resulted in an out-of-court settlement for an undisclosed amount.
I have no problem "piercing the veil" for egregious issues. I'd have no problem holding a developer liable for failing to secure a project but just continuing on rather than quit. But "Let's just hold all the engineers criminally liable all the time!" is a bad idea and it is not already done for a reason.
Software isn't like civil engineering where you can mathematically prove that a design is sound.
All we have in engineering (non-software) is something like safety factors and confidence, and this is done with (usually) rigorous mathematical models as well as loads and loads of testing to fill in the gaps of mathematics (think unknown constant/parameters, assumptions, etc).
None of this is impossible to do for software. There are systems that enable one to do easy/entry level verification (such as something like TLA+), to much more complicated reasoning (something like COQ). This will allow the system designers to gain confidence in if the system will work and gain understanding about under what scenario they will fail. Contrast this with the existing software landscape, which is mostly, at least from my perspective, just let me write some stuff until things do approximately what I want. Even at the top of the ladder, I feel the tests conducted are "adhoc" at best and with none of the rigours that you associate with traditional engineering fields.
I'm going to cauterize the off-topic debate about the US healthcare system by pointing out that OP was talking about the expense to doctors of malpractice insurance, not about costs to the patients or medical outcomes.
Malpratice liability varies widely by country, but it's a non-trivial expense for doctors everywhere, and significantly higher in states with strong tort liability for doctors.
It's hard to imagine a world with criminal liability (or tort liability) for software engineers that doesn't ultimately end up with a system of insurance for engineers, roughly analogous to the medical malpractice insurance system for physicians.
That healthcare in other countries is able to achieve this in spite of the medical malpractice insurance system points to the fact that such a system is not certain have to have the deleterious effects you confidently assume.
Whether it is a burden for engineers is another question. But the article and the discussion aren’t about the inconveniences faced by the engineers who programmed this system.
Which, as someone else noted, exists and is probably a good idea if you're an independent consultant or possibly a professional (i.e. licensed) engineer who signs off on drawings or other documents for clients or regulators.
It's up to the product (the collective of individuals that deliver the product) to address and mitigate the risk it creates, that's not solely on the shoulders of individual software contributors.
If A writes a generic computer vision algorithm and open sources it, B integrates that into a "is this a bomb or not" product with a white paper outlining its failure rate in a specific situation, then C sells that product to D who uses it in an entirely different situation and E gets blown up... who gets sued? It definitely should be somebody, there should certainly be a liability and incentive to avoid such a liability but I it probably lies somewhere in C-D space, not A-B space.