What about after general anesthesia?
You only know you are you because of your memories. The future brain will have the memories, so it will think it's you, just like you think today that you are the same you that were awake 3 days ago and 10 years ago.
Are you afraid of nonexistence when you fall asleep, and envy the tommorow's you that he will live in your body and get to see what the future brings?
I don't think there's much difference between these scenarios - the conciousness is interrupted in both cases.
Programming wise, I'm an instance of an object, not a class.
So, if the original me has to die for the clone to be created... unless my consciousness somehow jumps to the clone, I experience a death which I do not come back from.
You don't have conciousness when you sleep (at least during some parts of it). Your conciousness disappears every night for several hours and is recreated every morning. Why is it not a problem, but when there is 2 of you - it suddenly becomes a problem?
If you were sleeping while someone made a clone - would that make it OK? If no - why?
There's no evidence of anything external that has to "jump".
So, a copy of your consciousness (if such a thing is possible) is different than sleeping. No matter how much the clone believes it is me, it will never be me. I still die in my scenario, even though the other feels differently about it.
To add to that, asking "who am I" is a philosophical question, and I'm not a strict empiricist, so I don't categorically dismiss the idea that there exists an "I" outside of my natural body.
I don't see how you can distinguish "different brain-states that are still me", and "different brain-states that are not me" other than by looking at the data in these brain-states. If the data is the same - what makes it ok to say "these 2 brainstates are the same person, and these 2 are not"?
> We don't say people become no one, or someone else when they sleep.
We say a lot of things that are wrong or simplified, it's not an argument anymore than the word "sunrise" is an argument for geocentrism.
> I don't categorically dismiss the idea that there exists an "I" outside of my natural body.
I agree that existence of souls would change things, but it's untestable and unnessesary to explain all phenomena we experience, so I consider it a waste of time to discuss these.
As a thought experiment, imagine you were magically replicated during sleep such that, at the time of replication, both "you"s were completely physically identical. Both would wake up thinking that they are the same person that went to sleep, but now there are two of them. Are either/both/none of them "you"?
My answer would be that they both are, and don't think there's anything special about our physical selves, nor any reason that we're limited to being singletons (to give a code analogy). The combination of our physical self and our cumulative experience and memories are what defines "us". Thinking of identity in possessive terms and the desire to think of ourselves as unique is a quirk of psychology, I think.
They're basically saying killing them in their sleep is not a problem. That's where that logic goes. Because you die when you go to sleep.
So you tell me why it's a problem, but it seems, I may go to sleep all I want, but when I wake up the next day, all my problems are still my own. I doubt that if someone makes a clone of me, and I go to sleep, that I'm going to wake up as them and that other clone. How would that even work if there's two of us? There's only one of "me" to go around.
Oh, it's very awkward, yes, because it implies there's something else going on here that is required to hold this information, but we're all supposed to think that's impossible...
Or you can decide the leave everything and become a monk. I don't see how that's an argument one way or another.
> There's only one of "me" to go around.
Why? It seems to be the crux of your argument, but you don't justify it in any way.
You seem to have missed what I said.
I mean that, if I don't wash the dishes today, and I go to sleep, it's still me who's going to have to wash those dishes tomorrow. It's not someone else. It's me. That "me" is the question. I can't just not wake up as "me" tomorrow. If continuity wasn't a thing then the concept of "me" shouldn't exist at all, so there would be no responsible party in the first place, but every morning I find that I need to wake up, go to work, and then sometimes wash the dishes.
Of course, the entire experience of "me" can be falsified by a 3rd party, sure, but the world itself could also be falsified, neither of these beliefs are particularly actionable. But "the person who didn't wash the dishes and the person who then suffers the consequences is a continual entity" is actionable, it means I should wash my dishes.
> Why? It seems to be the crux of your argument, but you don't justify it in any way.
Because I can't wake up and control two people at the same time. That doesn't even happen in the case of multiple personality disorder.
You sure can. You could have a stroke and change personality completely. The fact that it's still considered "you" by society and the future you doesn't mean it's true.
> "the person who didn't wash the dishes and the person who then suffers the consequences is a continual entity"
This only requires you to believe that the future you is you, it doesn't require it to be true. It's similar to arguing "There must be a God, because why else would I pray". Well you can simply be wrong.
> If continuity wasn't a thing then the concept of "me" shouldn't exist at all
Why? There's a lot of concepts out there that exist contrary to facts. Free will probably doesn't exist. Absolute time doesn't exist yet people use it routinely as their model of reality.
> I can't wake up and control two people at the same time. That doesn't even happen in the case of multiple personality disorder.
You could make a device that controls muscles of another body basing on your neural impulses. Would that change your opinion about identity and consciousness? I doubt it. If I'm right, then that's not your real argument.
Give me your real argument, please.
If I tortured you, then healed you and removed your memories you would be none the wiser as well. Does that mean I weren't torturing you, but someone else?
If I cloned you, tortured your clone and killed it while you were asleep, then merged his memories to you - was it you who I was torturing or not? Why is the difference meaningful?
Programming isn't very good analogy, because there is no definition of conciousness, so even if we recreate the problematic situations in some programming model - we still don't have any answers. Example:
You can serialize an instance of a class, delete the instance, then deserialize it. The memory address will be different, the == operator in some languages will return true, in many others - false, but there's no one answer if the object is the same or not when it comes to conciousness. There is no clear analog of pointer identity in real world. If we had evidence of souls that would be it, but we don't :)
Some GC languages can move objects in memory when the application is running. Is this the same object? What does this say about conciousness? Nothing IMHO.
When GC moves object in memory and updates all references to it - is this the same object, or a different one? What if it created a pool of objects, serialized object at address 1, loaded a different object there, and deserialized old object from address 1 to address 2? Is the object at address1 or the object at address 2 the old one? The pointer equality isn't very useful here.
> for whatever definition of me that I have, it involves this particular instance of conscious experience
Then sleeping is the same as death.
If I merged the bash logs where I nuked rm -rf / on a given computer into the logs of one where I have not ran that command, the result is not the same.
> You can serialize an instance of a class, delete the instance, then deserialize it.
This would not be the same object since you can do that, but not delete the object.
Programming is a great analogy. I think the answer for identity/consciousness, even in programming involves an uninterrupted flow of unique locations in time/space that has continued existing as a cohesive whole.
> Some GC languages can move objects in memory when the application is running. Is this the same object?
In general, if there can be "two" instances simultaneously utilizing a given approach (like mind transfer), then it is not the same "one." But this is a flow, so ship of theseus alterations like you propose do not change identity, they are part of the flow.
> Then sleeping is the same as death.
I can't rule that out, actually, although I seem to be conscious some of it, so there's that.
What if you had 2 git repositories, and merged changes from one to another? Or 2 disk images?
Why would memories be logs and not contents of the repository in this analogy? And if you care about changes to the brain state that aren't memories - just add these changes to the brainstate. You argue that no matter how perfectly we merge these brainstates, it's still not "me" after the merge. I argue - if there's no difference after the split, then the question is meaningless.
> This would not be the same object since you can do that, but not delete the object.
So what? Why would existence of a copy change anything? In programming it doesn't, yet you seem to argue it does.
You can make a clone of a disk or a memorydump, and restore it on another computer. Why would the uniqueness matter? You can run 100 copies on 100 computers and use that for redundancy.
When a program is running on modern CPU it executes code predictively, going both ways on some ifs. Does that split identities into 2 and immediately kills one of them?
Let's say for a moment that universe is a simulation, and there is a backup. Does that make "us" suddenly not "us" because there is a copy? Why?
Because of all these corner cases I don't think programming is a good analogy.
It isn't the copy that changes things. It is the potential of a copy that makes it glaringly obvious that the result is not the same instance. If there is some process that makes a second me, I don't have access to the copy of me's thoughts. This proves second me isn't actually me because I'm still here, and we are trying to define what I am, and at-minimum, my definition of my consciousness does not include other consciousnesses which I don't have access to.
> Does that split identities into 2 and immediately kills one of them?
Yes.
While I think programming isn't perfect as an analogy, there is no other vein in which people think that has as many good metaphors for this. On the contrary, I think these corner cases are where you can actually refine your reasoning about these things. I think many of your corner cases are really useful because it is entirely conceivable that many could leave the realm of silicon and enter the world of flesh and blood (like memory merges, etc).
Then who is it?
It remembers being you.
My suspicion is that most people suddenly realize they prefer the instance of their consciousness they are inhabiting.
The question is, which one you prefer I terminate. You, the one I'm talking to, or the other person in the other room. The preference most people have is "the other one" which pretty much lays bare that these two instances are not, in fact, equivalent because they are "in" one of these consciousnesses, and not the other.
I agree.
For me, this implies divergence, even divergence of location (which happens automatically on a copy) is a change of identity, and so true identity must be inextricably linked to a continuity of location through time. Because of this, I reason that any copy operation, even a destructive one, is a change of identity and not-me, because it is really just a creation of a second instance and as mentioned, I would prefer this instance keep running over another if faced with my murderous thought experiment.
If merged into me, I agree it could become part of new-me.
Well for me the potential for a copy doesn't make anything obvious or impossible.
Even if memories are structural, network theory tells us that all parts of a network are not necessarily visible or accessible from all points at all times. The "You" making an executive decision could only be seeing a subset of your entire memory structure.
This difficulty can be even more clearly expressed by looking at the how neural networks even work. It's not just structure that determines output. It's a combination of structure and sigmoid function, spread out over time as results of previous computations fine tune the network.
You'd have the hardware to run your person on, but you'd have no information on the full informational state stored by which circuits are firing, which are building up to fire, and how fast each one is building up.
Even if you did, you'd lack a "reboot" harness capable of generating that state on demand across the entire brain that could both physically share the same space the brain is occupying AND not interfere with the mechanisms by which it operates.
What you haven't realized is that your conception of identity has been fine tuned since birth through your use of language to represent "You". Whatever woke up after the theoretical reboot would NOT be the "You" that went into it. It would be "You" to itself. Little more, little less.
If you sit down and think it through, you should be able to realize that even if you could build something to do this theoretically, practically implementing it would be a fool's errand courtesy of physics. Namely sensitive dependence on initial conditions, and the Pauli Exclusion Principle.
Nevermind the Engineering considerations. How do you measure a successful reboot? What is your error tolerance?
Or the sociological/ethical implications. Can the environment/society support you? Could you adapt? Would you even be able to assimilate? Would you bring some sort of toxic ethic or moral taint that the society has considered taboo?
Hell, we have kids based on a natural drive endemic to our biology. Now you're talking about placing on our descendants the literal decision of "Should we let this one exist to influence us?"
> You'd have the hardware to run your person on, but you'd have no information on the full informational state stored by which circuits are firing, which are building up to fire, and how fast each one is building up.
You just include that in the brainscan.
> It would be "You" to itself.
Yes. And I think this is enough. Current me would be a stranger to me 20 years ago.
> How do you measure a successful reboot? What is your error tolerance?
There was a sci-fi story where people had backup chips in their brains that measured all activity and learned over years to simulate that activity. If the simulated and real activity agreed to 99.999% over a long period of time the biological brains were euthanized and the chip took over the body.
IMHO it's quite good standard for error tolerance. If all measurable effects are the same for a long period of time (let's say a year).
I'm not persuaded Pauli Exclusion Principle is making this impossible, it depends on how sensitive our brains are to quantum effects, and I don't think we have data one way or another (do correct me if I'm wrong).
It might be impossibly high standard, but even then - if my future decisions depend on quantum fluctuations that will be simulated differently on a different hardware - my current identity isn't built on these future decisions YET. If we're really throwing dice making some decisions - I don't consider these dice or these results to be part of my identity now. If I reverted time and got a different decision the second time - I'd still think of that person as me, just in a different mood.
As for disruption of society, economy, etc - sure, these are big concerns. But we're talking philosophy here, not sociology.
The "is it still me?" question pops up over and over throughout the game. It's incredibly thought provoking.
"Consciousness Explained" should really have been titled "Consciousness Explained Away".
CGP Grey has a good look at the question wrt Star Trek teleportation[1].
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus [1] https://youtu.be/nQHBAdShgYI
I've yet to come across any evidence of a "self" that exists outside a brain.
> Is this a solved philosophical problem for which literature exists?
It's a problem that was hypothesized (and not solved) by philosophy, but as far as I know there's no evidence the problem exists.
You can hypothesize any number of problems but if there isn't any evidence they exist, there's not much urgency in solving these problems.
What if invisible monsters are breeding all around us and building up numbers before they wipe out the human race? There's equal evidence that this could be happening, and the consequences are more immediately dire, so perhaps we should discuss that first?
See also, the germ theory of disease.[0] I think we have this covered already...
Inventing the scientific method doesn't mean you get a carte blanche to call invalid everything you haven't gotten around to understanding with it.
This is not a solved problem and if someone gets this tech it's going to become an issue. A political issue, not a scientific one, because this one is in the region of politics, science doesn't know what's going on here.
Whether people are okay with an idea has very little relation to whether it's true.
> this topic is older than the concept of science itself
On the contrary, what makes science important is that it doesn't just exist in the imaginations of humans, it exists in reality. Incidentally, reality predates humans.
> it's the #1 thing that gives anything around here any meaning whatsoever.
I derive meaning in my life from curiosity, from beauty, from relationships with other people, from fun. Incidentally, all of these things clearly exist, and aren't so fragile that I feel threatened if someone on the internet says they don't exist.
Just because you have chosen to base the meaning of your life on a belief in self existing outside the brain doesn't mean anyone else is obligated to pretend that exists.
I'd argue that the underlying reasons you think the idea of a human self outside the human brain is meaningful is that you associate it with community (religion) anyway. Beliefs aren't necessary to have that.
> This is not a solved problem and if someone gets this tech it's going to become an issue.
I didn't say it was a solved problem; I said it's a nonexistent problem.
> A political issue, not a scientific one, because this one is in the region of politics, science doesn't know what's going on here.
The facts of whether a human self exists outside of the human brain is totally within the region of science.
Whether we as a society try to force your beliefs on people is within the region of politics. I would like to see some evidence that the problem exists before we start making laws to solve it.
It has a relation to what degree of evidence people will find satisfactory. Science alone is not sufficient for most people to carry on their lives, and this is one of those topics. This is not an argument for it being true or false, it's an argument against waving it away as a problem on the basis of "well we don't have any proof of it". Of course you don't have any proof of it.
There's no solid proof that solipsism isn't true, either, but that doesn't mean I am going to start believing people around me aren't real and don't feel, just because there's no evidence. Science also doesn't have any concrete evidence that being a dick is not a good idea, should I drop that, too?
> I derive meaning in my life from curiosity, from beauty, from relationships with other people, from fun. Incidentally, all of these things clearly exist, and aren't so fragile that I feel threatened if someone on the internet says they don't exist.
None of these exist if there's no "you" to speak of. Who's curious? If you die every time you go to sleep, curiosity doesn't strike me as a very meaningful concept. That's what I mean by meaning. Basically all the things you list here rely on a stable concept of "you".
> The facts of whether a human self exists outside of the human brain is totally within the region of science.
I am not talking about a "human self", there's nothing human about it since it's not tied to a specific body or a body at all in the first place. Sometimes I wonder if the problem is that people are still talking about the old concept of "soul", complete with consciousness and memories. I'm not talking about that, I'm talking about an address.
> Whether we as a society try to force your beliefs on people is within the region of politics. I would like to see some evidence that the problem exists before we start making laws to solve it.
People using devices that upload their minds or break continuity is absolutely going to get political I guarantee it, and I can completely imagine people being forced and coerced to use such devices because it's convenient to someone else and because "well the evidence doesn't say there's a problem". Because if you go with that belief, you're not doing anything bad, and the person thinking you're murdering them is just ignorant in your eyes.
Hopefully we'll have a more flexible reasoning system by then that didn't completely throw philosophy in the dumpster because we're too smart for it.
I'm waving it away because problems which exist are more important to me than problems that don't exist. You can't rationally expect me to care as much about fantasy as I care about reality.
For someone who admits they don't have proof for their viewpoint and thinks proof isn't needed, it does seem like you tried surprisingly hard to provide proof.
> There's no solid proof that solipsism isn't true, either,
Maybe not in a meaningless hypothetical sense, but there's strong evidence that solipsism isn't a constructive theory. Try this experiment: see how long you can go pretending nobody else exists. I'll be impressed if you make it a day.
> None of these exist if there's no "you" to speak of. Who's curious? If you die every time you go to sleep, curiosity doesn't strike me as a very meaningful concept. That's what I mean by meaning. Basically all the things you list here rely on a stable concept of "you".
Not really. There has to be a me to experience these things, but that "me" doesn't have to be stable in any way really. In fact, I've changed pretty drastically over my lifetime.
> I am not talking about a "human self", there's nothing human about it since it's not tied to a specific body or a body at all in the first place. Sometimes I wonder if the problem is that people are still talking about the old concept of "soul", complete with consciousness and memories. I'm not talking about that, I'm talking about an address.
Okay, that's significantly more reasonable, but that was not at all clear from what you said previously.
> People using devices that upload their minds or break continuity is absolutely going to get political I guarantee it,
Obviously politics of the future will involve discussing this. I'm not sure how you concluded that I thought otherwise.
This should not be mistaken for thinking that politics results in a better understanding of our reality. Consciousness doesn't exist outside of hardware (brains or computers) even if a judge or congress says it does.
> and I can completely imagine people being forced and coerced to use such devices because it's convenient to someone else and because "well the evidence doesn't say there's a problem".
Well, if that happens I'll be against it. But maybe keep your imagination on topic, since nobody is proposing that as a good idea.
> Because if you go with that belief, you're not doing anything bad, and the person thinking you're murdering them is just ignorant in your eyes.
If a human self doesn't exist outside the human body, then ending the functioning of the human body is absolutely ending the human self. So I'm not sure how you draw this conclusion from anything I said.
If it's done without consent, obviously that's murder. But if that's done without consent, it's not murder. The problem here is consent, not human continuity. We weren't talking about consent until you just now brought consent in by saying we might force people to use this technology (which I would not). The technology being described is clearly not something we should be forcing on anyone, and I don't appreciate you accusing me of saying otherwise.
Sure it is, people handwave it away all the time, since it's exactly the same problem as temporal continuity of the self in a changing body.
- general anesthesia is definitely, to some extent a discontinuity of consciousness. You lose time.
- more extremely, Deep hypothermic circulatory arrest actually (temporarily) causes brain death by cooling the body to between 10˚C and 20˚C. All brain activity ceases for the duration of this deep hypothermia.
Are there risks to these practices? Definitely. Some may argue that someone who undergoes general anesthesia isn't the same person. But I would argue that it is, despite the discontinuity, and despite some risk of personality changes.
The you that is now, pre-preservation, will be dead.
The you that is then, post-restoration, will be alive and believe and behave as if they are you.
It's convenient that this process (as described) kills you, because that simplifies things quite a lot. Scanning is more complicated, and I suspect if technology ever arrives that allows for it we will treat such scans as "heirs of the body" -- meaning they will only have such assets as you give them, although of course the IRS will still find a way to get them to pay your taxes.