* data is not tampered
* signing certificate was time valid at signing time: signing time is within signing cert's validity
* Neither certificate was revoked before signature generation
* both, signing and timestamp certificates chain up to trusted root CAs (regardless of their time validity, just must be in trust store).
That doesn't make sense to me: If the certificates are compromised, an attacker could backdate the timestamp to whatever he wanted and sign anything.
What's the thinking here?
That's not how I read it. The "lifecycle table" doesn't mention the case of both signing and timestamping certificates going bad at the same time, only what happens if one of them expires or is revoked. The only mention about both certificates going bad is in the text below the table:
> But timestamped signature remains considered as a valid even if all certificates in the signing and timestamping chains are expired.
Note that it doesn't say anything about certificates being revoked.
Of course this sorta falls apart if you consider large bad actors could have legit timestamp certs over a period of time and then use those historic certs on backdated servers to counter-sign a stolen signing cert. It would appear as a legit signed and counter-signed cert done when the signing certs were valid.