Assuming they work correctly the benefits are clear.
If they can ever be made secure, it's what I wanted to know from the researchers.
If they can ever be made secure, it's what I wanted to know from the researchers.
Anyone who's been involved in counting votes has seen more vote count fraud than they could possibly try to explain to others. Everybody used to be involved in that, from the people counting who didn't want to be there and would do anything just to get over with it, to the party delegates, to the people in charge of the sections.
I understand all the criticism and I praise your work in pushing for a more secure and auditable stack but it's hard to argue that the previous system was better in any way.
A potentially better approach would be to have the systems themselves publicly auditable and somehow have the live ballot devices verifiable.
I can't parse your last sentence, sorry.
PS: Yes, I would prefer to redesign the whole thing from scratch and tightly integrate physical and electronic records, as in an optical scanner, but this is very unlikely to happen anytime soon.