> The Harvard kid who was the only Tor user on Harvard’s network at the time that he sent his bomb threat.
> The Freedom Hosting and Silk Road hacks (problems with the web apps that were hosted as Tor hidden services, not with Tor itself).
> Exit node sniffing (an issue with people using plaintext protocols on the internet; people are just as vulnerable when using airport wifi, though perhaps they’re less likely to have an attacker on their network than to be using a malicious exit node).
As you can see those are problems that Tor can't solve. Micah wasn't talking about some inherent flaws in Tor's design.
> If your threat model includes state actors, then Tor's current shortcomings are non-trivial and should be treated as such.
Doesn't change the fact that Tor is the best low-latency anonymity system currently and using it is better than not.