How Big Deals Kill Companies
blog.ycombinator.com
blog.ycombinator.com
I'd also point out that this can be a massive benefit for a startup. Consider this: Microsoft would not be where they are today if they didn't take advantage of IBM not caring about exclusive rights to MS-DOS. Microsoft correctly banked on the idea (whether they fully knew it or not, I don't recall) that IBM did not have a firm grasp on their technology, and that IBM clone PCs would soon take over the world.
Another example. George Lucas was able to convince 20th Century Fox to give up merchandising rights to Star Wars. 20th Century Fox and IBM both had different priorities at the time, allowing the small player to win big.
The trick, it seems, is to make a deal that seems like a Small Deal with the corporation (they will readily agree with it) that is actually a Big Deal if the startup has a way to leverage it.
it's hardly examples applicable to the real world, and both of those most likely involved some sort of insider winning something on the side. one have to be very naive to attribute this to good negotiations.
> Beyond the Seattle area, Gates was appointed to the board of directors of the national United Way in 1980, becoming the first woman to lead it in 1983. Her tenure on the national board's executive committee is believed to have helped Microsoft, based in Seattle, at a crucial time. In 1980, she discussed her son's company with John Opel, a fellow committee member and the chairman of International Business Machines Corporation (IBM). Opel, by some accounts, mentioned Mrs. Gates to other IBM executives. A few weeks later, IBM took a chance by hiring Microsoft, then a small software firm, to develop an operating system for its first personal computer.
Weta was not in a holding pattern ignoring their profitability hunting for a white whale that would make their business make sense. They created a business that made sense, built a reputation, and were then positioned to take on a larger project that catapulted them. Without the large deal they would still be a business, a profitable entity, and their interests would be aligned with their customers.
An apples to apples comparison would be if Weta had ignored Xena because they were flirting with Disney hoping to land an exclusive Star Wars contract.
Once upon a time, in a far far Canada, there was a "Smart LED lighting module" startup. They had plan A and plan B: A - find a freaking huge buyer for the product, and forego all normal sales and marketing till late stage, B - start building up sales from scratch through a regular marketing/sales push.
At the start, both plans were given go. Sales through plan B were going up, but a "big name salesman" from plan A camp also scored a kill - one of the biggest lighting supplies distributor in USA. Upon hearing that, happy C levels completely wrapped up all further product development/marketing/bd and waited for them to obediently sign a cheque.
But, not so easy! That sale was just for their trial run, which would've taken few month, and they wanted changes, and the company simply can't pull out half million units from a Chinese contractor on a minute notice.
They eagerly put a bond for goods and dished out some cash for company's equity.
Half a year later, they come and say: "Ah we have kinda lost interest in that experimental thingy, and since we are in a financial crisis now, we have to wrap up all nonessential developments." They paid the bond, got their goods, and threw them into garbage and to liquidators. C-levels, investors, and the big distributor co. are still suing each other since 2014.
Morale of the story - all eggs in one basket is bad.
Been there, seen that.
I would love to see a lot more articles about the pitfalls of a new company investing too much in landing a big client and all that can go wrong with it. I regularly see questions on HN where a small company is basically under the thumb of a larger one and asking for advice on how to be even more of a doormat. They imagine they can't say no. They imagine if they are sufficiently cooperative they will finally have it made in the shade. The reality is they are often well on their way to going from frying pan to fire.
I think this is a huge, huge pitfall that small companies face. There needs to be a great deal more education, not only about the fact that this is a serious problem, but also about how to cope more effectively with large clients while you are still a small fry. So many new companies feel thrilled and flattered when a large company takes interest in them when they really ought to be much more concerned about the ways this can go badly for them.
There is an African saying: When elephants fight, it is the grass that gets trampled. Far too many small companies fail to recognize that behemoth companies are threatening to trample them under foot. It is the business version of "winning the lottery."
The large company or large client you choose has the ability to completely wreck everything so the smaller fish bends over backwards to do everything to keep the big deal. If you are lucky with timing and a good large client it can be massively good, and that is the attraction to that, but ultimately it can also fundamentally change your mission or ability to get and handle other large deal/clients.
This is similar to the service/contracting industry where you have a handful of large clients or go product development where you have many small customers, the latter always seems to have more lasting power because the loss of a handful of customers in a sea of them is less than the handful or one large client that controls your destiny. The product company that is selling as a service or subscription doesn't need to constantly make sure the large client is happy, just most of their customers. Both types pull you in directions and change you but products with many smaller customers have more stable market support, however the latter takes more time to build.
Self-awareness is critical here.
One place I worked at locked in over half of the big fish in the NA market and never made money off them. We would have been much better scaling up on smaller contracts.
Though, at that point at least, Veeva was basically a salesforce reseller.
If you feel you must pursue such a deal against this advice, one way to counteract the negative effects is to bake in a break up fee in the evaluation/trial phase (don't call it that, though).
Most 'Big Deals' will come with such a trial / prototype phase. One way to structure a 'break up fee' is to say: the trial will cost 10% of the final annual contract value - if we close, this will be counted as a rebate against the final price, if we fail to close, startup will keep the 10% to cover their costs of the phase.
The article is correct in that doing a deal with a big customer will largely make you beholden to that customer. You'll probably become what is basically a service company.
But if the price tag is high enough, and you're the majority owner, who cares? Maybe you end up selling your company to your customer a few years down the road for a sum that's small to a VC but big to you. We live long lives, if you enjoyed the journey you can then go start another company. Even if you don't get an exit, you can still make nice money just servicing the contract for years.
For a founder who'd be happy to have $1M or $10M in the bank and doesn't necessarily need to make $100M or $1B (yet....), doing a big deal (or preferably a few) and focusing your company on them is a lower risk strategy than trying to be the next Dropbox, and it can still yield great rewards.
If the only outcomes that will make you happy are a huge company or a huge exit, though, then Aaron's advice is right on the money. I also agree that you have to be very careful about the terms of the deal and have a way out if things go south. I don't think an inexperienced founder's first deal should be a big one--a scenario which worked out well for us was to do several smaller deals with bigger companies and then grow those relationships over the years. Once you have a solid internal champion at a company who owes part of their career success to you, they'll handle most of the politics.
I wouldn't be surprised if they aimed for large deals; this may be an excuse for how they're surviving without them.
That said, surviving without large deals is likely good advice for small startups; just don't confuse the message with the medium here.
Is it sensible to turn your head at a big deal asking the company for a smaller one as opposed to avoiding them entirely?
I think that big deals are always a good thing. Any misfortune that people might encounter after they've won a big deal can only be blamed on themselves.
Most people never get any big deals and have to build a company the hard way. Just slow painful progress.
Companies built on slow painful progress inevitably have a broad customer base, customers that were acquired through slow painful progress (although they probably have a few whales still). They're less likely to have the loss of one deal/customer sink the whole ship.
But most startups have to focus on the product and that's hard to do when dealing with a large company who's priorities are generally misaligned with the broader market's values.
That's also true for more-established companies, who often are just column fodder so that the procurement people can say that they've done their due diligence.
Basically tell them why its not worth your while to respond.
I believe that in a couple of cases, this may have caused the customer to rethink and then come back again later with an easier RFP.
in retrospect the effort wasnt worth it. the deal consumed many months of our focus and work (plus as a bonus a neverending worry on our minds, because of continuous small requests), during which we werent able to advance our product.
at the end of the day, it is all about creating a great product, which will then sell itself.
in contrast to that, closing a big deal has often more to do with 1-2 senior people at a big company thinking that they need this product for their customers. those senior people may be wrong, because they dont have a good feel about what new technology is attractive to people. and the kicker: no matter how big the deal, once no benefits materialize for the big company, they will kill the cooperation quickly (and usually have ensured enough fineprint to be able to do so).
my summary: there is no free lunch :)
So the article is asking us to work on our own mental habits in order to turn that number into infinity.