Napoleon’s Equine Strategy in 1813 (2013)
napoleon-series.org
napoleon-series.org
The French forces largely relied on foraging an pillaging for supplies when operating in the Iberian Peninsula, which initially gave them a strong advantage, being able to operate inland without support. But eventually it also became a problem.
As they went deeper into Spain and then into Portugal, the lack of well established and guarded supply routes meant that messengers and envoys had to cross enemy territory filled with partisans, resulting in the birth of the guerrilla.
When they invaded Portugal and headed for Lisbon, matters became far worse. Wellington had secretly fortified the peninsula leading to Lisbon with a massive set of three line of hill forts (the Lines of Torres Vedras), and used scorched earth tactics to wipe out any resources beyond the lines, while Lisbon was well supported by the British Navy (that had complete control of the waters after Trafalgar).
As the French forces approached, they were utterly surprised to find the heavy fortifications, and the barren land meant they had no resources to maintain themselves, as there was no supply chain.
Running out of food and unable to break into any of the fortifications, they were forced to withdraw completely after a month going back to Spain and losing 1/3 of its men in the process due to the harsh winter.
The Peninsular War by Esdaile is a great book about this front, and the Sharpe series by Cornwell complement that with a historical novel aspect, and astonishing attention to detail.
Among the problems the French had in the peninsula, it seems Napoleon underestimated the poverty of the countryside and the poor quality of the roads. An army could live off the land just fine on the banks of the Danube, not so much on the high plain of Castile. The marshals would get orders as if a line on the map was an actual road, then find themselves marching tens of thousands of men over a glorified goat track through barren and almost uninhabited hills. Add in the guerrieros and you've got a big problem.
I suppose for us it's a reminder to not mistake the map for the territory.
This quote in particular resonates:
"All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when we are able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must appear inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near." Ch1, verse 18
If you liked this sort of thing, you'll love that book. It usually stuffs you full of numbers, like this article. But mostly it just tells the stories really well. It has several detailed accounts of Napoleon's battles, including the reversal at Moscow and the final stand at Waterloo. It goes up through the Iraq war.
With the Old Breed: https://www.amazon.com/Old-Breed-At-Peleliu-Okinawa/dp/08914...
I can't help but mention this one, even though it's not at all what you were asking for. It's just worth reading. It's unrelated to logistics, but it walks you through the terrifying perspective of a single foot soldier.
I loved the glimpse of innovative American culture in those times: individuals with no experience building warships developing vessels capable of standing toe to toe(and in some cases, defeating!) the otherwise dominant British navy.
The 1993 Gulf War supposedly lasted 7 months, only the last six weeks of which were active combat (“Desert storm”).