If you make your fake video after the event, the location and time will be obviously off.
It would be basically the macOS Developer ID software model applied to photos.
It boils down to trust, not whether the original video was real or not.
To put it another way, reputable news organizations already go to great lengths to ensure that their stories are well sourced. At the end of the day, they are putting their reputation on the line.
In other words, 2 main stereoscopic sensors, each recording their cryptostream to their storage. In addition to that, you have 2 UV sensors doing the same thing, and 2 IR sensors as well?
The idea being that it's much, much harder to fake something if you have to take IR and UV into account.
Isn't this also where something like a blockchain is useful? Where data is dumped into it realtime by this mythical secure camera, with all its associated metadata.
Then you can ask: "does the time the data was added agree with the time the camera says the data was recorded?" "Does the blockchain agree that the data hasn't been modified after it arrived?"
Add to that the possibility that there are multiple cameras all recording this incredibly detailed video from different angles, and the evil counterfeiters will (hopefully) have a dickens of a time faking all this.
Although with all this wonderful processing, networking and storage power to enable this secure camera, you can probably create a faking system too.
Philosophically though, I think it's a good thing that many are learning not to trust information from self-proclaimed authorities :-)
If there are no known exploits, a signed video, marked as having a network based timestamp, is at a minimum incrementally more reliable than a video without such metadata.