Maybe they’re referring to the fact some of these bugs are present on other chipsets but that seems weird in an Intel article. Am I missing something?
Maybe they’re referring to the fact some of these bugs are present on other chipsets but that seems weird in an Intel article. Am I missing something?
But Spectre cannot break kernel memory. Its more of a "new class" of bug, similar to how "Buffer Overflows" don't describe a particular attack, but a methodology that hackers will use to exploit new bugs.
Spectre affects virtually every high-performance computer in the world. Smartphones, SPARC, PowerPC, Intel, AMD, ARM. All of these designs use out-of-order execution, and in theory, a rogue Javascript would be able to read the rest of process memory if a programmer isn't careful about how things work.
Meltdown took it one step further: and showed that code could read Kernel memory. That was an Intel-specific mistake.
EDIT: Having done a little reading, I can't find an instance of a notable (even marginally so) smartphone using an M-series chip.
It's all in ARM Ltd. report and whitepaper.
See http://infocenter.arm.com/help/index.jsp?topic=/com.arm.doc....
>>Instruction prefetch and branch prediction >> >>The Cortex-M4 processor:
>> prefetches instructions ahead of execution
>> speculatively prefetches from branch target addresses.It's not out-of-order execution, it's speculative execution (all forms of branch prediction) plus the ability to affect the cache state during speculative execution.
It allows you to attack any security domain you can "call out" on the local host, whether it is some other process, another security domain in the same process (e.g., a JIT running JavaScript) or the kernel.
The authors used JavaScript and cross-Hyperthread/process disclosures as their primary examples probably because at leas the former is especially devastating given the ease of running JavaScript remotely when someone visits a malicious website, and because it differentiates it from Meltdown (which is mostly only about reading kernel memory) - but executing either variant is even easier against kernel syscalls (no need to attack across the JIT layer).
The huge amount of work been done on kernels to mitigate Spectre is evidence of this.