And it is worse than that, you have to have physical access to the machine. If you give a hacker physical access to a machine it's pretty much toast.
Am I missing something or is this just clickbait?
And it is worse than that, you have to have physical access to the machine. If you give a hacker physical access to a machine it's pretty much toast.
Am I missing something or is this just clickbait?
Let's say you're at a hotel with your laptop. It has full device encryption enabled and the BIOS is protected with a password and it has all the shebangs to protect your laptop -- so you should be safe, right?
Someone distracts you for 30 seconds while an accomplice backdoors your laptop with this vulnerability.
Five minutes later while you're happily browsing Hacker News with your laptop using the hotel WIFI, the attacker has full and unrestricted access to your laptop via the very same hotel WIFI.
And here the issue is, as I understand it, I would have had to have left that AMT part in place with a default password. I get that it is geeky and maybe there should be a process where when you buy a new laptop they set the password to some unique thing and give you a sticky note with the password on it. I get that a lot of people won't know to change the management password, but that's an educational issue, just like people had to be taught to not use "1234" or "admin" as their login password.
Still seems like an over hyped issue but I guess that is part of the educational process.
I don't feel like this rises to the level of Meltdown or Spectre.
What about if you're sleeping?
That said, it's a silly argument. If you don't secure your devices then you're gonna have a bad time. Just a fact of life, it's always been that way. Give a hacker physical access to a box and enough time and they are getting in. I do it routinely if I forgot a root password, boot knoppix, fix the root password on the boot disk, reboot.
Leaving AMT enabled with a default local password when it hasn't been explicitly provisioned is an oversight by the system manufacturers. Expecting users (particularly outside the enterprise environment) to discover the necessary security precautions (without any notable cues) is a problem.
Education may be a short-term solution, but it's no substitute for repairing the user experience, e.g., by disabling unused AMT features (and preventing them from being reenabled without authenticated access to a pre-boot or other system management environment). Save AMT security for the subset of system owners that need to take advantage of the feature.
It is not unreasonable for someone to expect setting up a BIOS password to mean all management functions should require it. Unfortunately, reality is such that, depending on platform, the answer will be, "oh, you meant those management functions, too. Yeah, no, you also have to stick a password there."
So yes, this falls under "documented behavior." It also falls under "unfriendly, annoying complexity that shouldn't be foisted on non-professional users", and possibly worse.
It all goes back to the ME being forced down everyone's throats. It means continued insecurity everywhere; the same deal with AMD means no choice. I'd love to see a foreign competitor - at least then one would be able to choose who sniffs their panties.
[1] Most recently, with a home storage system. I built it some time back, and later, after moving stuff around, switched the network port I had it plugged into. I monitor my own network, including IP sweeps, which is the only reason I noticed the SuperMicro motherboard had grabbed a second IP address and was running a ME webapp with a default password.
Now, on one hand, I should have read the manual. Building a machine from components requires a certain degree of paying attention, and I didn't. On the other hand, this is an absurd default. In 2018, no system should ship out of the box with a giant Root Me Please! welcome mat.