An Open Letter from Brian Krzanich, CEO of Intel, to Technology Industry Leaders
newsroom.intel.com
newsroom.intel.com
So, I take it Intel will be sharing lots of info about the Intel ME, as well as supported ways of disabling it? Or am I getting my hopes up?
For example, where in this statement does it say that Intel is actually going to change the way they design their chips to make them more secure? It doesn't. It only says that they will be more transparent about disclosing vulnerabilities, and presumably that means they will continue to disclose those security holes to the so-called "Tier 1" group, which excludes quite a few projects.
The most interesting thing to me was the subtle shift of responsibility onto vendors and consumers to make sure to patch their broken hardware promptly.
Personally, I'd be surprised if he actually even read this before it went out -- although, in this case, he may have.
I understand this a PR piece, and thus the use of the term "responsible disclosure". I believe the HN community disapproves of this terminology, and prefers usage of the term "coordinated disclosure".
The question that I had was whether Google's project zero team prefers one term over another? Or in general, if you're a security researcher and have involved in reporting vulnerabilities - can you take a stand and emphasize "coordinated disclosure" term in your own articles?
Edit: typos
Sure Intel put a PR spin on it, but any company would do that, but at least the patches were ready from the get go even tho the information started leaking a week prior to the official embargo date.
Would you rather having to wait 2-4 months without any mitigating solutions other than turning off your PC?
People are focusing too much on Meltdown, it's not the worse variant of Spectre, Variant 2 is much worse, and the possibility of future variants is even scarier.
I don't see anything wrong with companies spending 5-6 months on coordinating mitigation and fixes as well as building knowledge that can be used for future research and prevention of similar vulnerabilities.
These vulnerabilities affect nearly every CPU on the planet across all major CPU vendors, this isn't something your disclose immediately to teach someone a lesson or just to watch the world burn.
Do you think Google would want to leave their infrastructure vulnerable for months?
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.co.nz/2015/02/feedback-an...
Ideally there will be a way to safely update BIOS/firmware directly from Intel.
On Linux download the microcode and update it manually.
On Windows use the VMware Microcode installer and download the microcode from Intel and use that to update the Microcode on your machine.
On Windows you'll need to edit cpumcupdate.inf to remove the AMD microcode files if you don't want to download the microcode from both vendors since the VMware tool needs both to work properly.
Microcode update from Intel: https://downloadcenter.intel.com/download/27431/Linux-Proces...
VMware Microcode Installer: https://labs.vmware.com/flings/vmware-cpu-microcode-update-d...
I had been looking at Intel's online driver support assistant with the idea that my machine's cpu update would be available via this service.
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/support/intel-driver...
One note, I did not exactly explain my concerns adequately. By "safe" I meant "tested to not brick a specific model computer". With enough poking about online, eventually I would figure out where and how to update the firmware. I don't however have a test machine on which I could verify the firmware update safe. My laptop is very slightly out of the vendor support window so I'll be doing the update without any vendor support whatsoever.
I suspect that the driver loads to late, that windows has already done it's check to enable support before the driver loads the microcode update and I can't find anything about re-running the check or anyway to load the driver before that check.
Output from Get-SpeculationControlSettings Powershell module
---
Speculation control settings for CVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection]
Hardware support for branch target injection mitigation is present: True
Windows OS support for branch target injection mitigation is present: True
Windows OS support for branch target injection mitigation is enabled: False
Windows OS support for branch target injection mitigation is disabled by system policy: False
Windows OS support for branch target injection mitigation is disabled by absence of hardware support: False
Speculation control settings for CVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load]
Hardware requires kernel VA shadowing: True
Windows OS support for kernel VA shadow is present: True
Windows OS support for kernel VA shadow is enabled: True
Windows OS support for PCID performance optimization is enabled: True [not required for security]
Suggested actions
* Follow the guidance for enabling Windows Client support for speculation control mitigations described in https://support.microsoft.com/help/4073119
BTIHardwarePresent : True
BTIWindowsSupportPresent : True
BTIWindowsSupportEnabled : False
BTIDisabledBySystemPolicy : False
BTIDisabledByNoHardwareSupport : False
KVAShadowRequired : True
KVAShadowWindowsSupportPresent : True
KVAShadowWindowsSupportEnabled : True
KVAShadowPcidEnabled : True