https://hackerone.com/reports/293358
https://hackerone.com/reports/293358
> Oh my God. Are you seriously the Program Manager for Uber's Security Division, with a 2013 psych degree and zero relevant industry experience other than technical recruiting? LULZ (https://hackerone.com/reports/293359#activity-2203160)
> Cute. Big surprise. (https://hackerone.com/reports/293358#activity-2214673)
> So these tickets get assigned to Rob Fletcher with Uber’s security team.
Unfortunately, at least for me, this comes off as public shaming.
I guess, that's how the first part works. There are things you can try, and there are other things. Messing with freelance pen testers is clearly one of latter.
Once they have shadowbanned the author, IMO, any attempt at respectfulness is violated by bug bounty organizers.
Maybe there are things more rude than shadowban, but I'm not aware of such.
Uber has many, many problems as a company, but on this matter I can't say they're in the wrong.
The one they failed to recognize as XSS. If they paid for that one there would be no blog post and no name calling.
No one looks good - he doesn't look good for how he behaved/communicationed, Uber doesn't look good for denying the payout on a valid report, and Hackerone doesn't look good for not enforcing a minimum payout on a valid report.
I don't see this discussion as about whether a corporate PR team is allowed to issue a response. It's about the author childishly lashing out at an individual because he didn't agree with their decision.
Indeed, my belief is that this guy's and Uber's behavior are both not-ok, which is exactly why Uber doesn't get to complain.
#293358: it's not ideal that the certificate isn't pinned, but to exploit this an attacker needs to either install their own root certificate on the victim's device, somehow obtain a private key for a certificate already installed, or have a certificate authority misissue a certificate to them for an Uber domain used by the app.
#293363: an attacker still needs to acquire the victim's X-Uber-Token somehow for this to be useful. It's also somewhat mitigated by the token being invalidated when the victim changes their password.
#293359: as pointed out by Uber, no weaknesses in the token generation algorithm were actually demonstrated, and brute forcing the 2^128 keyspace is infeasible.
Also, the rudeness he displayed was petty and unhelpful:
> given the fact that at least one of your system architects were apparently high when they designed and implemented your bearer token assignment process
> Not completely unexpected though, given the caliber of talent utilized by Uber such as the “security” group that you hail from. You would do well in government security consulting, for sure.
> Oh my God. Are you seriously the Program Manager for Uber's Security Division, with a 2013 psych degree and zero relevant industry experience other than technical recruiting? LULZ
All in all, rather a poor result for this vulnerability researcher.