It may look like that today, but when you pitch investors you sell them on the team, the market and the vision. You paint a compelling picture of how you get from where you are today to somewhere incredibly exciting.
It's just that I remember a time when starting a business meant creating a product, finding a market and people in that market willing to pay for your product.
I completely fail to see any of that in your case. But maybe building a feature for an existing product of a company in the idea of selling to that company IS a viable business model.
And maybe I am getting old...
We do have plans for features that we think people will be happy to charge for. Right now, we're not ready to talk too much about those features, but we think there is real pain we can remove.
We feel validated by the fact that people love the features we have right now so much that many have asked if they can pay for them.
Free is a strategy. We'll let you know how it works out :)
Having said that though, what you have right now is a "nice to have" and it excites everyone for the soft value it adds. But I wonder if the current product can pass the Penny Gap. I know you don't think its meant to, but I am really not sure if the current users will be the ones who would pay for whatever it is that you will build in the future. Xobni is a good example of it. Dropbox on the other end is a great example of a free strategy that sold users on the same product that they expected users would pay for. Basically with a strategy where you acquire a lot of free users thinking they will pay for what they have not seen as yet, can be a dangerous one.
These days just getting people to even try out your product is a major accomplishment. Sure, they haven't built a successful company yet, but for the capital expenditure they've made so far they are way ahead of the curve. What's the point of having a clear plan about how you will make money if it ultimately fails like most startups? You are going to need to pivot anyway, so the focus on users over revenue is totally a reasonable strategy. Even beyond the getting bought exit, the value of an audience is tremendous. Look at how 37signals transitioned from a dime-a-dozen agency to a very profitable company based largely on it's blog reach within the target market.
1. If at every point you're taking what you believe to be approximately right decisions, given all the information you have at that time, then you can ban regrets from your mind. This is a good frame of mind to be in: you can focus on the future. The corollary is to arm yourself with information. For more on this, and more besides, see: http://bhorowitz.com/2010/05/30/how-andreessen-horowitz-eval...
2. Although we face a lot of negativity, it comes only in a few limited forms. Any negative statement, such as "your business will fail because Google will crush you like the tiny ants you are", should only have an impact the first time you hear it. You then decide what you think of the statement, and unless later information convinces you otherwise, your mind should be made. No regrets.
3. I consciously try not to emotionally react to situations. I also try to smile :)
I am curious to know if you are using Rapleaf to get social profiles or if you are doing it yourself (which is tough/only partially possible). If you are using Rapleaf, aren't you loosing money with every lookup?
Even if the sub-20k investment doesn't pan out, YC is going to get good press and goodwill out of this. Other YC companies will absorb some of the buzz around any YC success.
The above all increases Rapportive's chance to flip the company even if only under the Greater fool theory.
Consider all the posts made to HN by users mourning the loss of Etherpad, for instance... and look back at them in light of what's happened. Google fashioned the technology into a proof of concept called "Wave," shipped it, started to build a user base, then - oh, look, a bicycle. I wonder if it's one of the new carbon-fiber Cannondales?
Basically, Google has a severe case of corporate ADD, just like any number of organizations who have failed to capitalize on assets they already owned. Believe me, entrepreneurs can eat very well from Google's table scraps.
User indifference is a much, much greater danger for startups than competitors, big or small. So we advise startups to focus on that. What's going to kill you is the Back button, not Google.
Congratulations and good luck!