Show HN: Breach Insider – Detect a data breach using realistic pseudo-users
breachinsider.com
breachinsider.com
I don't know if they still do this. I haven't seen a physical dictionary in a while. Now with online maps and navigation I don't think map data providers can afford the risk of a navigation system misdirecting someone due to an imaginary place.
But it's possible some of these things took a life of their own. Say someone saw a made up word and started using it because they thought it was real. Or a made up park name for an open area led someone to start using it and others to start calling it that. I don't know if that actually happened but it's possible.
Why should a non-massive company implement this rather than boosting and refining centralized logging and monitoring which can, if done right, provide far more immediate (even real time) notification of a breach? Your Wells Fargos of the world might do it because they can spare the change, and in your position I'd target the whales for initial revenue, certainly, but why should any mid-sized SaaS firm do it?
Not asking cynically. I want you to sell me on it.
For example disgruntled insider admin quietly stole all users data on his last day at work.
In terms of why a mid-sized SaaS should go this route - I would like to think that Breach Insider is a slightly more cost-effective option. To do detection and correlation properly, you’re looking at a SIEM with the right logs and hopefully some well formed rules. However at this stage, I’d argue that to get the absolute most out of this, you’re looking at supporting & monitoring this with at least one dedicated employee, else all those logs will be wasted.
Not enough use of canary passwords people!
Care to shed a bit more light on what you mean here and how to effectively use them?
Rate limiting login attempts for an email address or ip address is all well and good for protecting against brute force attacks, but when the attacker has the correct email and password combination already for the user, and access to massively distributed botnets, how do you block those logins?
But every site still exposes it during the sign-up process ("You already have an account. Login here >"). Hiding it during the login flow is largely security theater leading to a poor user experience making people guess & check which email address they used for your service.
If you cannot do more advanced risk analysis: a) email the user after a few failed attempts, b) lock the account down for a period of time, c) lock that IP out from attempting any logins for a period of time, and most importantly, d) monitor lock outs. If an account is getting locked out frequently, be proactive and reach out. 99 out of 100 times it's the user struggling with things like your password requirements, but 1 out of 100 it might be an attacker.
It can also classify classes of users I.e. new portal users are moving mouse differently from users who are familiar with portal.
To add - by itself it’s not a reliable indicator of yes/no.
But rather another risk scoring input to overall identity detection system.
https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/04/18/deep-learning-with-sp...
https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2017/11/announcin...
Disclaimer: My company have been using Distil for a few months; mainly for detecting and blocking bots, but they provide a range of other security features.
https://resources.distilnetworks.com/customer-stories/accoun...
So you need your system to check every spam email, call and text and decide whether it’s a breach or spam.
In terms of mobile numbers, they are definitely prone to this, and that is why we make them optional - depends if you want to risk any false positive alarms. Some countries are more prone than others - US mobile get reused a lot it seems!
1. The unique email address assigned to the Insider is contacted. We gather forensic evidence of the email along with any attachments. Useful to identify specific attacks against your users too.
2. An optional real mobile number assigned to your Insider is contacted. Again, we store all of the details, including the original SMS details or even call recordings.
3. Your Insider shows up on the Internet or dark web somewhere - we check a number of common sources for dumps, such as Pastebin for any references to the Insider. We currently keep a copy of the contents of the paste, as the original details could be removed at any time. However, we are working on better captures (full page screenshots, entire copy of the DOM etc.)
We are working a few more detection methods too, which we shall reveal soon...
Edit: Bug fixed, really sorry about that! I've sent an email to the insiders address, to give you an example alert.