If guest accounts are enabled by default and a guest account can exploit it, yea.. that's pretty bad.
If guest accounts are enabled by default and a guest account can exploit it, yea.. that's pretty bad.
Not necessarily; this aspect was unfortunately underreported:
"macos 10.13 bug isn't limited to root in all circumstances; via ARD, you can log in as any existing user (e.g. _applepay) and share the screen of the logged-in user. also _uucp is allowed to log in"
https://twitter.com/unsynchronized/status/935656609140711426
So that limits things in terms of who is affected.
> You'd still need physical access to a logged-in machine to exploit it.
Yes it does; if Remote Management was enabled (as is often the case for remote servers or mass deployments), an attacker could login via Apple Remote Desktop using default, pre-existing user accounts (_applepay, _uucp, etc) and a blank password without ever needing physical access.
Just tested again with a new, unpatched install of 10.13.1 on one Mac, connecting via Screen Sharing from another. To be clear, I never logged in as root on the 10.13.1 Mac at all, even via the exploit.
As I mentioned below, this remote exploit did NOT require ever logging in as root, whether with or without a password. This was a much more serious bug than is commonly understood.
You don't. You can exploit it from the login screen after a machine wakes from sleep, you can also exploit it remotely via Screen Sharing.