I'm not sure if this makes sense -- it sounds like security through obscurity. If your address is reachable, it is exposed. Not allowing people to enumerate the devices on your network is one thing, but if you're accessible through your router (internal port forwarding/DMZ whatever), then you're exposed, whether NAT happens or not.
If your router is "just a node" in between (that happens to have a monopoly on the address/nodes it's in front of), it just needs to disallow access to the endpoint that is behind it -- almost like purposefully leaving it out of the routing table. It's not like people are going to be able to guess your IPV6 address easily, and even if they could, the proper way to deal with that is to just ensure you're actually secure (and no ports are open, forwarding isn't being done at all, etc)
Am I missing something here? The way things work now, yes you can't find out what ip addresses are on the private network behind a router, but if any ports on the router are open, you know SOMETHING is responding (whether the router or something else. In the IPV6-no-nat world, the router could just forward all your traffic (pretending the router was the originating computer), and NOT allow any traffic that attempts to hit the IP at the computer past it. Someone still needs to know the internal address before they can try and access that internal computer -- and you can still stop it at the router if you wanted to...
What am I missing? I'm not a networks expert, but from my understanding of networking/nat/firewalls/security/etc, I can't see how ipv6 increases your exposure that much.