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Comment by dbrgn | Hacker News Reader

Does it still store all data unencrypted on the disk? https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-Desktop/issues/1017

Use full disk encryption, or store Signal's database in an encrypted volume. Signal for Android only has encryption due to the litany of issues associated with FDE on android, from wiping your phone when you encrypt it, to accidentally bricking your phone cause your vendor broke FDE in their Android build.

Wow, reading that thread basically made me decide against using Signal.

For an app that is supposed to be the pinnacle of secure messaging, leaving anything unencrypted on the local device is just breathtakingly negligent.

The way moxie ushers people to take the discussion elsewhere doesn't help either. It just reinforces the perception that he doesn't care.

Shouldn’t you instead just encrypt your disk entirely?

That is Moxie's main point, full disk encryption should be used everywhere, and encrypting Signal's message database on Android is purely due to full disk encryption on Android being a steaming pile or bricking your phone.

I should, and do, but a lot of non-techies don't, and this design decision might end up with their Signal messages compromised.

I mean isn't one of Signal's target audience people like journalists and activists?

Yes, but the point is, if those people don't use ecryption, then they have a problem anyway - and if they do, but their system is compromised, than the attacker gets anything anyway. In either case, I think Signal's job is to secure the messages going out and coming in and not protecting the disk.

As someone that doesn't care at all about Signal (I'm in the "no federation & mobile number as ID is unappealing and I can just as well use WhatsApp" camp) I came away with the opposite opinion:

The people in the report (not necessary the original submitter, the "Now I'll go and tell everyone to uninstall Signal! There you have it!" crowd) seemed to be demanding/whining and spammed a bug tracker with random anecdotes and their personal agendas in a rather rude way.

Whereas moxie - again, in my opinion - replied in a very friendly, objective and calm manner and invited these people to discuss the issue further. In the _right place_ for an open debate about design decisions.

Then again, you can't expect Signal's target users (normal tech un-savvy people) to have FDE. But that's not necessarily bad in my book. IIRC Signal's security model wasn't aiming for maximizing security but instead making mass-surveillance harder to execute while offering an acceptable UX.

Also, encrypting files on disk is not actually protecting anything. The Signal app still has to decrypt is somehow, and has to store the private key somewhere, usually on disk, unencrypted..

It is not Signal's job to encrypt your device. It is your OS or device's job. If you care about these things you should already have FDE (Full Disk Encryption) enabled on your device hence Signal encrypting your data on disk would be redundant.

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