[0]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Photosensitive_epilepsy
[1]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dennō_Senshi_Porygon
[2]https://www.epilepsysociety.org.uk/photosensitive-epilepsy
Beyond the fact that unexpected inputs produce unwanted outputs in both cases, I'm not sure I see the connection.
In the DNN case, the network should be able to end up in both states. However, the boundary is fairly sharp and small changes in the input not only push it over the boundary, but make give it high confidence that the new state is the correct one.
The brain, however, shouldn't ever end up in an epileptic state; there are feedback mechanisms that decorrelate neural activity and keep excitation in a certain range. These mechanisms are weakened or defective in epilepsy, which allows very potent stimuli to drive neural activity and kick off positive feedback loops.
The odds that there are adversarial perturbations that reliably push the system into an unstable state between two or more output states is probably quite high. It just hasnt hit the threshold at which it becomes interesting for postdocs to look for yet.
(E.g. Everyone probably has heard about the blind spot at the point where optic nerve 'connects' to retina. But I was surprised to learn that most of the stuff in our FOV is seen very poorly, and only the tiny area called macula is responsible for the high acuity vision. And the macula is capable of covering only a small spot in our FOV at one time: what we'd think as a single view is really constructed in a post-processing step as our eyes move and scan our surroundings. My amateur-level explanation might be a bit off, but the point is, it stands to reason that kind of "dynamic" processing system is more robust (especially to small pixel level "attacks" as in the linked paper) than simply constructing mappings of still pixel grids to outputs, as currently done by CNNs.)
You can cover someones eyes obstruct visual system entirely, and you'll be fooled for a second until you realize it's probably just your friend because you can feel their hands. Did you fool your friend's visual system? Or does it need to be fooled forever to say you fooled the visual system?
So the visual system on its own is not enough as we have many other senses that you'd need to fool in order to fool you entirely.
I think optical illusions is a great way to fool the visual system only, but it doesn't fool you. (all your senses) There are magic tricks for that sort of thing, but even then we know it's just a trick.
As raverbashing pointed out our visual system is more than just a 2d grid of points with a certain color, so obviously that is easier to fool.
When I saw the 32x32 image of the frog with the pixels I wasn't even sure what it was for a few seconds. But I had context, like I know these images are probably things that are easily classified, so it's gotta be some common animal, airplane, car, house, etc. I also knew that I was supposed to ignore the pixels.
If you present the frog image with pixels to people on the street and tell them to classify the image, I'm sure many of them will get it wrong if they are given less than 2 seconds to look at it. More so when they're focused on something completely irrelevant.
Clearly it isn't, but given that animals use camoflage, the visual system is the end product of millions of years of evolutionary arms race against confounding inputs.
The human vision has a natural blur (some more than others), natural temporal integration of inputs, automatic centering of subjects, limited resolution and gain adjustment
Hence one pixel nudged makes absolutely no difference
One is the short-timed "persistence of vision" one
The other is observing a scene multiple times by slightly different angles and positions
If some weird arrangement causes an illusion, changing the position slightly usually fixes that
Also, human data is noisy, I guess augmentation strategies might want to consider that as well
A neutral net does not. That's the missing element - neural nets "need to know how to know when they don't know".
When we do know that there is an optical illusion, it is because of the context we have that the machines don't, like, we can read the title of the article ("These 11 optical illusions will blow your mind").
For more a much more subtle and in some ways (imo) disturbing one, look into the blindness constantly induced by our visual perception during saccades. A malicious attack on that would be... well I don't really have a word for it. Disturbing doesn't really fit. Suggestions welcome!
However, if you look at the images in the article, I think it's telling about how much more sophisticated human perception is. The authors even have a note in the first image along the lines of "look carefully, because you might have trouble locating the aberrant pixel."
I think these types of attacks speak volumes about the fragility of DL optimizations: I think there's more overfitting going on than people acknowledge or realize. My sense from reading in working with some ML things is that this extends to natural language data as well.
DL systems are often highly optimized to a particular test set, and might do well on cross-validation to other exemplars of that test set, but that's not the same as generalizing across different types of test sets.
Maybe I'm wrong, though--I think DL NN models have been fantastic, but there's a certain amount of hype in ML in general.
But in reality the brain is stateful and noisy and works on a stream of images. Even if now and then, by sheer accident, for a short time, your brain might be mislead, it surely wouldn't go like "well I was pretty sure that was an X, but just now Y is scoring higher than X, so I'll just flip my opinion on that in an instant".
Obviously, humans aren't going to have to have this amount of error from small, small changes like these (except for maybe in very autistic people who have dramatic reactions to changes in their environment, but I may also be wrong; I'm not autistic, and I'm not a psychologist), but our innate perceptual biases do play heavily into how stimuli are processed and reacted to.
> This first example of the Berryman Logical Image Technique (hence the usual acronym BLIT) evolved from AI work at the Cambridge IV supercomputer facility, now discontinued. V.Berryman and C.M.Turner [3] hypothesized that pattern-recognition programs of sufficient complexity might be vulnerable to "Gödelian shock input" in the form of data incompatible with internal representation. Berryman went further and suggested that the existence of such a potential input was a logical necessity ...
But we know neural nets are not continuous: a tiny change in input could cause a huge change in output as suggested here.