Protect Your Privacy, Ditch Mainstream Email
antifederal.com
antifederal.com
SCHNEIER: I use an encrypted chat application like Signal. By and large, email security is out of our control
I'd really like to see a focused effort put forth on addressing the failures of email in a novel, and open, standard. After many decades of service, I'm largely convinced that no level of patching SMTP or the various hacks of message formats will be successful.
And proprietary efforts are all but certain to be harmful.
I'm looking at a more comprehensive rethinking.
I've had my own domain name since 2002. Many others here may also do similar. Many may not.
This federates you, and your mailing address. Freedom to change email providers, without inconveniencing those you converse with.
There are two sides to a transaction, however. Your mail may be federated, but the other side likely isn't. I'm incredibly disappointed how stuff like PGP has not been widely adopted.
"The primary opposition to the Constitution was based on it being a centralizing document that risked making the states a mere administrative arm of the central government. States' rights advocates like Thomas Jefferson, George Mason, Patrick Henry, and Elbridge Gerry were wary of the new document. The Federalists were aware of these objections and their opponents. Thus, in trying to head them off at the pass, they adopted the name Federalists to give people the impression, true or not, that they were for a federal form of government and not a national one. This forced those who opposed the constitution to be known as Anti-Federalists, which to the less attentive audience gave the impression that they were against federalism and thus for a centralized regime."
because mainstream media didn't tell people to do it.
That's ... part of the problem, but only a part.
* Mainstream vendors never supported it within their applications.
* Key management remains difficult.
* Given the risk of key exfiltration (any soft key -- password, passphrase, PKI, biometrics -- can be compromised), PGP alone is not sufficient. Even with passphrase-protected keys.
* PGP-encrypted (and signed) email leaks massive amounts of cryptographically assured metadata. (There was a conference preso a few years back concerning PGP metadata leakage via email/Usenet though I cannot find it presently.) Absent some container which includes the message headers themselves (not just body), and the key metadata (sender / receiver), this remains a problem. And metadata are almost always more useful than message data themselves.
Not this preso, though it covers some of the same ground: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zqnKdGnzoh0
* Incorporating PGP/PKI into other authentication, encryption, decryption, integrity, ownership, and related process workflows is at best poor, and almost overwhelmingly nonexistent. The failure to settle on any uniform standards of web-based auth / encrypt / decrypt protocols is a major component of this.
I've been putting increasingly more thought into how protocols and standards are (and are not) established. One realisation is that very frequently it is not the supplier but a large-volume purchaser or consumer who is instrumental in establishing standards. The US Government has often played this role -- the US Bureau of Standards (established under Herbert Hoover as Secretary of Commerce), military purchasing and standardisation (often across multiple providers), the U.S. Navy's role in establishing containerisation standards during a logistics-supply problem known as the Vietnam war, standardised healthcare procedure, diagnostic, and billing codes, and more, all come to mind.
The prospect of the U.S. federal government, a large state government (California, New York, Illinois, ...), or the EU or an EU-member settling on a standard might move things forward.
As for owning your own domain -- that works, somewhat, but pushes a number of problems out into other spaces. Domain registration, ownership, control, payments, etc., are not painless, and even large organisations with dedicated personnel and procedures in place foul this up all the time.
No idea how good it is, or if it does what it says on the box though.