Oroville Dam: Cost to repair spillways nearly doubles in price to $500M
mercurynews.com
mercurynews.com
The blancolirio channel that nraynaud mentioned has a lot of very impressive reporting and flyover footage, and the CA DWR itself has also been posting regular drone footage[1], which I highly recommend for a sense of scale. The spillway is a lot larger than it looks like from most of the overview photos. The closeup drone footage that includes the repair crew shows how massive the structure really is. It's supposed to be able to handle 270,000 cfs outflow (the outflow that damaged the old spillway was "only" ~100,000 cfs).
I'd also like to point out this[2] video from blancolirio, which shows just how close the emergency spillway was to being undercut. Yah, this repair is going to be expensive, but it's good to see that proper repairs are being done. Some things are worth the money; the central valley flooding would be a lot worse.
All projects contain risk. Getting out of bed and taking a shower involves risk, you can slip and fall. The larger the project, the larger the sample size and the more statistical considerations for risk should be managed.
Modern western society has greatly lost all tolerance of risk. One difference that struck me for risk culture, compared to the past, is old footage of the 1955 Le Mans disaster: after the catastrophic crash, bystanders themselves helped carry bodies away from the scene, and clean up wreckage. This calmness and social damage tolerance in the process of a disaster is very different from a modern "evacuate and let the professionals handle it" attitude, and I think this is an example of a clear shift in social tolerance of risk.
I wonder if the Apollo project would have worked today, instead of in the 1960s. At the scale of an infrastructure project of half a billion dollars, we're not talking about something so big that zero injuries safety standards are bad. However, as you get larger projects, it is statistically impossible to keep risk at 0; I'm not sure how willing modern society is to accept that injuries on large projects is inevitable.
Elsewhere in this thread, user JumpCrisscross comments about comparing the cost overrun to the second bid. Following up that comment, the top response is something along the lines of "nobody was injured, so showering the contractor with money is ok". This attitude is prevalent in modern society, and it doesn't really get questioned. Let's pose a hypothetical scenario: If a person has their leg broken, let's say a platform caused someone to fall and hurt their back. Would that amount of damage be worth a $250million additional cost? Think of the amount of social good you can do with $250million. At what level does society overvalue the reduction of risk? This is an important question to ask.
Let's not even talk about minor injuries. Let's say 1 person died. If you walk up to a random person, tell them that they have the opportunity to die; BUT their immediate family would receive $125 million dollars, and $125million would be donated to the charity of their choice. I suspect a very large percentage of people would actually be willing to take that offer.
And yet, giving an extra $250million to a contractor to build something is considered "worth it" to the general public if no injuries were reported. At which point does society overvalue reducing risk?
George Mueller (who was head of NASA during the Apollo program) said that it would be impossible to repeat Apollo today without it being a classified program as Congress has passed so many laws and regulations in the meantime.
Source: https://dominiccummings.com/2017/06/12/the-unrecognised-simp...
What I can't say is whether this is a good thing or a bad thing. There's a part of me that recoils at the thought of putting a price on a life. Then there's another part of me that recoils at the selfishness of bankrupting my wife should I get cancer. That same selfishness recoils at the thought of bankrupting myself should she get cancer.
I'm not looking forward to those decisions.
Historically, the people investing in safety were not the people who were exposed to the risk. That created perverse incentives, where $1 in safety improvements that would save an average of $10 in human health or life would be rejected because the people who would pay the $1 would not be the ones paying the $10.
That’s still true, of course, but we at least attempt to make people do the right thing.
Regulators today aren’t afraid to assign a dollar value to a human life and reject safety improvements that don’t have a positive ROI. The standard value currently is something like $8 million.
I suspect that the parent wasn’t downvoted for callously making a good point. They were downvoted for baselessly assuming that the correct level of safety tolerance would result in injuries or deaths on this project, and doing so callously.
I was objecting to the idea that having nobody dying on a project being a bad thing because it implies overspending on safety.
In fact, people would even volunteer to die for "just" $100million. Just see this reddit thread: https://www.reddit.com/r/AskReddit/comments/4jqfka/what_woul...
This is EXACTLY what I mean by "risk management for large projects". For a small $10k project? A small percentage cost decrease for increased risk of death isn't worth it. For a multi-billion dollar project? All of the sudden, the incentives change drastically. How many people would be willing to work on a project that is a tiny amount more risky, but knowing that their families will be handsomely compensated in case anything happens? If you told me that my family will receive $100mil guaranteed if I die/get maimed, there's very little I'm not willing to do.
Also, to note: $100,000,000 is enough to save around 30,000 children from an excruciating death by malaria.
TL;DR 1 average human life generally isn't worth throwing away $250million. I will literally volunteer my own life on this fact.
That idea was made up in this thread, it doesn't reflect reality.
The cost overrun was explained in the article as due to only scoping out 30% of the project as part of making the bid, and as such underestimating how much concrete they would need:
> Jeff Petersen, project manager for Kiewit, said that once construction workers got on the site they discovered they had to dig much deeper to get down to bedrock than they had expected. That meant they are having to pour almost twice as much concrete this year — 870,000 cubic yards — as the company and the Department of Water Resources had planned.
Who cares if Oroville Dam is in the USA or not. The same thing would still apply if it was in the UK. I'm merely saying the modern public should reconsider spending $250million extra, instead of applauding it simply because no injuries happened.
I would highly doubt that $250mil went into slower progress for the sake of safety. Definitely, there were other costs.
You're supposed to only consider the abstract idea I presented. That's why I changed from $250mil numbers to $100mil halfway through, although I didn't make it fully clear to divorce the concrete numbers from the abstract cultural ideas.
Fuck those construction workers, fuck those miners and who cares about factory workers. After all they're disposable. /s
Workplace safety is there for a reason: to stop white collar criminals from putting a price on human lives and then to optimize for the lowest they can get away with.
Suppose you wanted to reduce risks for computer programmers - everyone gets a personal doctor who sits with them to monitor their vitals, state of the art monitoring device, daily blood tests, screenings for all sorts of diseases. Each person gets a fitness coach, dietician, sleep coach, whatever. Programmers with injuries get oxygen therapy and physios on hand. Basically you treat them like world class racehorses (!). Whatever, hopefully you see the point.
Would that be overkill? No? Well then you don't think programmers matter at all and want to see them all die in industrial accidents. /s
If we can accept at any point that we should, maybe not buy the most expensive chair/table/keyboard/screens, even if there's a chance of injury (eyesight, cardio problems from 20 years of sitting, cut from a sharp edge on a filling cabinet, etc.) then you're agreeing with the general concept of the OP IMO.
Now, in public procurement, should we pay $1000 per seat for a currently $100 app to ensure no programmer ever gets a thrombosis/carpal problem/etc.?
Construction is dangerous, if you are willing to compromise on that then you'll see that you can do even better when you drop that price. And before you know it we're back in the 1930's again.
I'll but the question back to you: how much are you willing to pay to save one additional life? $1 million? $1 billion? $1 trillion? $100 trillion? (That last is more than total gross world production.)
I've got my own considerable problems with numerous elements of evaluating costs and benefits in economics, many of which I've been trying to articulate for over three decades and am only just now starting to get a handle on. I would not argue, for example, that just straight earning potential is an adequate basis. I also don't think that various proposed "market bid" rates for how much individuals are willing to accept under very specific and limited conditions are particularly useful.
But even accounting for community, social, and disruption losses, somewhere between tens and hundreds of millions is likely a reasonable balance.
Part of society involves distributing decisionmaking and risks. And no, not always equally. I don't find the argument that those most adept at accurately and fairly assessing risks are necessarily those who can accomplish the tasks involved.
To put this in a different field: I'd not expect my airline pilot to be the best qualified accident investigator, nor systems engineer, nor aircraft fabricator. And I as passenger bear the consequence of their combined work.
Reality bekons, if you care to heed its call.
The understanding is that 1. society should be allowed to consider increased risk, and 2. in the event something bad happens, the victims should be compensated.
In fact, one of my examples of risk was the Apollo project, where the most notable 3 casualties (Apollo 1's Virgil Grissom, Edward White II, and Roger Chaffee) were highly paid astronauts with engineering backgrounds. I'm not discriminating against construction workers, I'm making a statement on acceptable risk in society in general.
Finding a balance on putting price on human life is simply a necessity. I have a friend who's a petrol engineer working dangerous jobs at a high salary, and it's a risk he's willing to take. However, the modern general public is culturally shifting to people like you who literally hear the words "possible risk" and the frontal cortex of the brain shuts down and start ignoring the costs.
Having worked a little bit of industrial construction in a past life, it's amazing anything gets done at all, if you do follow all the rules. And even then all it takes is one slipup to get somebody hurt.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Value_of_life
Serious injuries are some fraction of that, e.g., ~$1M for a limb. The correct tradeoff between safety and cost obviously depends on the marginal cost to increase safety, which is known to the project leaders but not us, but I'd be surprised if the optimal number wasn't between 5% and 25% of total cost. 5% of $500M is $25M, so for a project of this size I'd expect, as a lower bound, at least one death and a dozen serious injuries.
To be clear: by not making this trade off and by spending huge amounts of money to ensure such tiny injury rates, we are wasting resources that could be spent on saving lives at the rate of $10M/life. Indeed, this number is the key threshold by which the EPA decides which environmental interventions to fund, or the NHTSA decides which traffic safety measure to take.
Out of curiosity, what was the runner-up bid? Is there no mechanism to re-open bidding when the circumstances change? What prevents me from bidding $1 and then busting it to $1 billion after winning?
Those people were using the biggest dry ice making machine in the world to try to pour not too shitty a concrete on schedule, next to a blasting zone, under a leaking gate (yeah, the gate is leaking it just stopped leaking because the water is lower than the gate now), under high voltage power lines, without anyone getting hurt.
It seems unlikely that bad faith is the primary cause. Yes, there are really contractors and owners who do act in bad faith, like the Trump organization, but these are unusual, and highly publicized. Punishing dishonesty seems like the easiest problem to solve, and it's easy to rally around for a quick and cheap victory. But I have seen these run-up bids for decades and no amount of punishment has ever seen to stem the flow of these events; it seems as if every city and state is infected with this problem. Either we are in a system where bad apples are so numerous that punishing a few has no meaningful effect on incentives; or we are in a system where bad apples are so rare that we punish good apples mistakenly, and can't figure out the real cause for our poor planning. Until we move on from the assumption that a few bad apples are to blame, we likely won't be able to discover the real underlying problem.
So, the consensus seems to be Governments would rather get low bids that don't price in unknowns. If unknowns happen, they can dicker over the increase. But if you award a contract that's too fat, it's difficult to claw back.
If the work goes exactly to plan, the contract will come in on budget. But if problems occur, the price usually goes up. Our current system seems to be optimized for lower overall project cost at completion, with the side effect of making it less useful as a budgeting tool.
They don't really want integrity, they want to get a number that won't get them yelled at by their boss. The integrity bit is a pass the buck clause.
So the estimator is in the position of trying as hard as they can to lower the estimate. "Well, if we assume xyz unreasonable assumption, then we can lower the amount by this amount."
And then there are "risk" shenanigans. You itemize all the risk items, declare an arbitrary probability of happening. Then management rolls those up, and declares that they are not going to fully fund the risk and instead "carry" it forward.
Fully funding basically would mean multiplying the likelihood of occurring by the cost, and adding all the items up. Which is already iffy as the probabilities aren't based on much except a w.a.g.
So you win the bid, the risks are realized, and weren't funded. blow out.
Standard practice. And because everyone does it, the honest bidder is the loser. Losers go out of business. So the whole bidding practice is self selecting for cheats.
If you say, "this is unethical, I'm going to do my best to give a realistic bid", you lose.
Austin government did this for its MoPac toll express lanes and got them for way cheaper than what they should have paid: https://www.bizjournals.com/austin/news/2017/09/27/big-settl...
However, the project ran over for two years longer than it should have (it was supposed to be completed in September 2015, and they are only just now wrapping it up). So I guess no one really won there aside from the Austin transportation budget guys, except the populace hates them now for traffic jamming the place up for two years longer than they said they would.
Let alone that we basically award this work one estimated number and the ability to get through a paper work hurdle.
If you start making those rules complex it becomes hard to compare bids to each other, since your bids are likely to become non-transitive based on the scenarios.
Cost plus is the normal way this is side stepped, but unless you have a system that is mostly ethical actors that can break down. And if you have all ethical actors pretty much any system will work...
Why not just have major contractors required to post a bond when they place a bid, and if they have cost overruns they pull those from the bond (ie, their own money)?
Case in point: SpaceX challenging the launch industry's cost-plus culture with publicly-posted fixed prices [1].
Case in point #0: the Space Shuttle (STS).
[1] https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/382045main_19%20-%2020090730.11.STS...
Cost plus percentage gives a very clear incentive to raise costs
Compare the original winning bid for the STS with the actual costs; I think they rose more than tenfold (and the per-flight cost rose more than that), IIRC.And had the competing team won, the Challenger disaster never would have happened, because the solid-rocket boosters would have been manufactured as units and transported to the Cape by barge rather than having to be broken into small enough components to fit on rail cars.
I am not sure if you can implement a system that would work well when your actors are profit driven work that needs to be done can only be done exclusively by one entity at a time, and as a bonus that extra profit gives you more feedback into how the system operates. There aren't a lot of natural negative feedback to keep things under control in that system.
Especially if your goals are to reduce overhead.
I'm criticizing a system that incentives optimistic initial bids that are later revised up. A bad system doesn't need bad actors to produce bad outcomes. A $275 million bid ballooning to $500 million without any competitive pressure is a bad outcome.
American infrastructure costs are higher than production factors, e.g. land, material and labour cost differentials, explain [1]. Our auction mechanics are called out by experts as a big part of the problem.
[1] http://marroninstitute.nyu.edu/content/blog/is-u.s.-infrastr...
If you want separate bidding for separate phases, bid it out that way.
If you now introduce scenarios where projects can have an unknown number of bidding processes all costs will go up to cover the work necessary for multiple companies to prepare bids.
It would just make things much much worse.
Our bid was 1/3rd of the "winning" bid.
The distrust of government and corporations in our society is one of the biggest problems facing us as we go forward in the 21st century. We need to figure out how to restore trust.
The fix is not clear. Can't just drop in agile, every attempt to legislate away corruption fails.
Isn't this why most publicly financed projects have massive cost overruns? Bidding realistically will lose you the contract; bidding low and then running overbudget may have consequences, but they are not as severe as not getting the contract in the first place.
I guess what I'm actually asking is, which country is that promised land? (I have a few candidates in mind myself, but I consider them to be the exception rather than the norm and I don't even know if they are truly as good as I suspect)
Note: I'm not saying the $225 million is unfair. This is a complicated project with lots of unknowns. But refusing to test 9-figure quote adjustments is bizarre.
There is work that is 100% documented in the proposal and in those cases it’s reasonable to hold the winning bidder’s feet to the fire, but this isn’t one of those.
In the absence of time pressure they could have let a contract to fully specify the work, then one to do it. But if they’d done that there might not have been a dam by the time work started.
I agree that in this specific case, had the contractor come back and said "it will be $1 billion more," it would have been worth paying to avoid the destruction of the Central Valley.
The broader discussion is that this is avoidable. Two models abound in the private sector. For less time-sensitive situations, one has changeover processes [1]. For time-sensitive work, companies avoid like death being totally dependent on a single company.
The latter would require large changes in the way contracting is done in America. But it's not like nobody else in the world faces time-sensitive repairs. The defensiveness we, as Americans, have towards our system which shows clear and apparent pricing flaws is surprising.
In commercial projects, this often triggers an arbitration about the overrun. You get experts to challenge the fairness of the price, hopefully using market data. And, of course, there are the courts. In worst case, the buyer can cancel and/or rebid. Not 'competitive,' but adversarial.
http://www.wnyc.org/story/316201-brief-history-64-billion-ba...
As you say, better to wait till its done before getting too excited.
Even as an ethical actor you can only price what is specified. However, you can then use your knowledge about likely the real variances that will be needed and risk profile to place a bid that takes this into account to remove margin or discount the bid price.
When the price change is announced, anyone from the original pool has [30] days to match. First to match immediately wins the work from the existing contractor. Loser pays to move their equipment out; winner should have included that cost when they agreed to match.
This system works for two reasons. First, the first bidder will be cautious about requesting increases if it means risking losing the work. Second, the change-over cost, borne by both the outgoing loser and incoming winner, imposes just enough friction to grant the first winner an incumbency bias. This bias helps keep bidding in the original auction competitive.
It also seems like you are only trying to address the problem of people introducing needless variances as a way increasing profit.
Which is not the case being discussed here and I don't think it is major reason for cost overruns. They haven't requested an increase, they have found out that to satisfy the engineering requirements of the project that more work has to be done.
It's commonly called out as one of the driving reasons behind the horrible economics of American civil engineering [1].
> They haven't requested an increase, they have found out that to satisfy the engineering requirements of the project that more work has to be done
It's both. The change may be merited. If so, it should win--again--in a temporary re-auction. But refusing to market test an 82% cost increase is game theoretically begging to get screwed on pricing. Given American taxpayers get screwed on pricing for public-sector civil engineering (after accounting for land, labour and materials cost differences), I think it's a fair discussion to have.
[1] http://marroninstitute.nyu.edu/content/blog/is-u.s.-infrastr...
I just don't think your incentives would produce better outcomes, from my perspective it would make things worse.
The problems anyone campaigning for auction reform runs into are three-fold. One, it's a boring problem with boring solutions. Two, there are vested interests. And three, Americans suffer from a just-world bias when it comes to infrastructure [1]. The latter is apparent even in this thread. It's difficult to find solutions when people vigorously defend a clearly-flawed system.
I can see how the recommendation you mooted would improve incentives in some procurement domains. Large civil works isn't one of them however.
You really believe the main issue is "getting the old equipment out" and "the new equipment in"?
Your plan sounds like an amazing way to create a tremendous amount of safety risk, shoddy work, or a project that runs forever.
No, I was responding to a specific complaint made upthread.
> Your plan sounds like an amazing way to create a tremendous amount of safety risk, shoddy work, or a project that runs forever
Do you have any basis for this? The change-over requirement for midstream cost adjustments (above a threshold) works well enough for e.g. aerospace subcontractors. It adds delays in the short-term but promotes better behavior in the long.
A delay in this project is a safety risk. They are trying to have a working spillway by Nov 1, so if unexpected rains cause another extreme inrush into the lake they can handle it by releasing >100,000 cfs from the spillway. Without that ability, they are risking failure of the emergency spillway and the flooding[1][2] of a large part of the central valley.
For this type of work, the best process would avoid appointing a single contractor. Unfortunately, that would also require more expertise in the public officials allocating work, a concentration we find politically toxic in America.
They talk about two plunge pools (upper and lower), basically two different depressions in the stable bedrock. They do not have a purpose, but are rather just the result of the disaster.
See table 8 in http://www.water.ca.gov/swpao/docs/bulletins/bulletin132/Bul...
It seems inflation in large scale civil engineering has gone up at least a factor of ten more than general inflation.
Here’s one of the YT channels that’s been following the progress, filming and combining DWR footage. https://www.youtube.com/user/blancolirio
Also, when this thing started falling, they could have stopped it earlier, which would have resulted in cheaper repair, but no...
Sure we would not have awesome drone footages, and I like the discussions on worker's risk and contractor down-biding, but at the end of the day it's a lot of money for something preventable. Same can be said of worker's riks, health care, environment, retirement.
Whenever non-tech posts are put up on HN, they're ruthlessly hounded. What does this article have to do with tech that absolves it? The fact that it comes from San Jose's newspaper?
The H in HN stands for "hacker". I fail to see the connection to any "hacking" here in the article other than maybe "hacking bureaucracy to make a dam", but you must see the incredible lengths to which one must stretch the notion of hacker-related ideas to apply to this article.
There are other non-SWE-related topics that certainly qualify, like overcoming natural barriers in engineering a la the Iceland forest article that was posted a couple days ago.
This news article in OP is little more than a status update about something that affects California's water infrastructure and nothing else.