The real problem is the other stuff they do, like defense against DOS attacks.
The real problem is the other stuff they do, like defense against DOS attacks.
TLS between users and a proxy protects users from lots of different attacks (including the lovely wpa stuff). It's useful, and the alternative is frequently "no TLS at all", not dyi.
Yes end-to-end is better. But you're still going to have to trust infrastructure providers along the way, whether it's at the proxy level or they can just read your disks.
Also I pretty much agree with everything you said about CF ...
Cynical answer: The padlock, the "https://" in the address, etc. A phony sense of "security".
CF's comfort with playing man-in-the-middle should not surprise anyone familiar with the company's origins in examining the content of web traffic. Remember Project Honeypot?
A typical scenario is surfing in public wifi (cafe, airport). Someone could identify a victim and MITM the connection. If the connection is secure to CF, they'll be mostly out of luck.
It won't be quite as fast, but it'll likely be more than fast enough.