And yet, there are still regular posts here about whether static type systems have any merit at all... never mind advanced things like linear/dependent types, theorem provers, TLA+, etc. Just use Go!
And yet, there are still regular posts here about whether static type systems have any merit at all... never mind advanced things like linear/dependent types, theorem provers, TLA+, etc. Just use Go!
The article seems to imply there's nothing wrong with the proof or the statement of the properties to be proved, it's about integration with another component. But if "don't reuse nonces" is a standard security property to verify, then I would think that that is a hole in the verification.
Could someone shed more light on this?
> The 4-way handshake was mathematically proven as secure. How is your attack possible?
> The brief answer is that the formal proof does not assure a key is installed once. Instead, it only assures the negotiated key remains secret, and that handshake messages cannot be forged.