When a bank gets a new regulation on their table, they tend to create a department that compartmentalizes the subject within the organisation. That's how we get the exact opposite of what the Agile mindset is. And that's also how we get organisations where nobody wants to work in, except if the pay or day rates are high enough to excuse any suffering. And that's how bad, bloated software is created.
Yes, I believe that some sectors might be worse than others. There are metrics and tools provided by the Software Engineering discipline to measure quality of architecture or code. However, they have remained mostly academic. There is no standard metric, which is widely accepted to be useful. And even if some rare(?) company might systematically measure their code base, they don't put the results in the their home page and not even in the contract with their customer.
As long as that does not change, it's just more or less educated feeling where the situation might be better or worse than elsewhere.
Alternatively they could wait for in-house IT to take a few years and millions of pounds (add going running over schedule and budget, too) to produce a bug ridden mess that misses.
And more importantly it enables the "money people" and the "1s and 0s people" to work together throughout the software life-cycle. When the people who input the data understand what's going in and the people who read the output know what should come out the black box in the middle is a lot easier to create and maintain.
Of course, the above is a generalization, but I stand by the assertion most tech savy bank workers try to interface with Bank IT as little as possible.
But the worst part was that there turned out to be a single input that completely dominated the final result, and that input was a "gut feel" that the fund manager had about which way the market was going to move. So after all that calculation, the upshot was that the fund investment decisions were being made based on this individual's intuitions, and the entire spreadsheet was just window dressing. Ironically, the audience for the window dressing was the fund manager and his team because the spread sheet was considered proprietary, a closely guarded secret. That's the reason I'm not revealing the name of the manager. I'm probably still bound by the terms of the NDA.
That was the moment that I realized that much, if not most, of Wall Street is a colossal scam.
There are ways to test your tests (in a way that does not lead to an infinite regress), and alternatively you can also prove your tests correct; or just use plain old code review.