Hacker News Reader

I work with a lot of OO code (ORM) that regularly contains references on objects to other objects. How would that "security model" behave wrt the map of reachable objects in relation to the object passed... let's assume by reference. I figure this scenario would be somewhat similar to the problem of "/.." paths in URLs on web servers.

View on HN

The grant model requires you to grant each object individually that you want to pass. That is annoying if you have many objects. In both the caps and grant models you can cut the overhead by thinking of the whole graph as "the object". A typical approach is to allocate graph nodes in an arena and pass the whole arena.

Fine granularity is expensive, which is why the monoliths have one process-granularity. If you have 100,000 graph nodes and want to pass all of them except this one then you will have to pay for the privilege, in any protection model. The Mill lets you pay less.

Reply on news.ycombinator.com