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I sure would like to know how ECC fails to alleviate this. People forget that the standard single bit correction, double bit detection really means, guaranteed single bit correction, and guaranteed double bit detection with a probability of detecting > 2 bits depending on how/where they flip.

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(SECDED.) RH and bitsquatting are two reasons ECC should be the standard, not the exception, in all manner of consumer endpoints, network gear and servers.

TFA said nothing about ECC failing to stop RowHammer. TFA does discuss the cost of ECC (or ChipKill) and the fact that Intel does not even support ECC on consumer kit -- i.e., ECC's availability is rather limited.

to quote TFA.

"ECC RAM can detect and correct 1-bit errors and, thus, deal with single bit flips caused by the Rowhammer attack. Furthermore, IBM’s Chipkill error correction [27] allows to successfully recover from 3-bit errors. However, uncorrectable multi-bit flips can be exploitable [2, 3, 42] "

Maybe that, combined with a lot of weasel words about the effectiveness of ECC muddy the water.

But they did not actually demonstrate any attacks on ECC.

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