But a state isn't conscious
Also, tangentially, New York's sewers aren't that complex compared to even a rat's brain.
>Let me rephrase. No one here said that complexity is consciousness. In particular, AnIdiotOnTheNet, who you replied to, did not say that complexity is consciousness.
Not directly. If not complexity, is it a kind of computation or something physical that makes neurons produce consciousness? Those positoins are more tough to support.
> Also, tangentially, New York's sewers aren't that complex compared to even a rat's brain.
What is the magic measure and what is magic threshold using that measure?
What about a future city's sewer system that is complex enough?
If humans didn't have egos, identities and a sense of "I" and were merely sensory machines, then maybe there could be an equivalence.
That is, if ego and identity are the same thing as consciousness. I'm not sure they are. Frankly, it's a mystery to me, as I think it is to everyone, except for perhaps a few enlightened Buddhist monks.
If you dispute this claim then all you need to do is provide an empirical definition of consciousness that applies to humans but not states. I will note that defining "consciousness" as something like "the human experience" is vacuous and doesn't count.
However, if you are saying that the inability to construct a model of consciousness that does not apply equally well to states and people is a failure of empiricism, I think you have started with the conclusion and are looking for justification.