The call of Kraken, GSM cracking software
lists.lists.reflextor.com
lists.lists.reflextor.com
GSM and GSM security are interesting topics but really hard to touch with your hands because of the difficulty of reading what's passing over the air. The more hackers will have access to equipments, the more secure will be our conversations in the long run.
Even then you would have to get lucky with the hardware, as it is not designed to sniff all the meta data and pass it up for capture. It might do some of the stuff in hardware that you want done in software.
http://everything2.org/user/Jetifi/writeups/GSM
I don't think this is quite as big a deal as it's made out to be, since that A5/1 and /2 were both broken almost a decade ago, and most GSM providers have replaced these two ciphers with others since then. It might still be useful in places outside of Europe and the US though.
It's a motivated attacker attack. You have to be within radio range, and the attacker has to have specialized equipment and knowledge. It's not like an internet vulnerability, where one guy in Russia can exploit every single unpatched system in the world; this requires a bit of fieldwork. I wouldn't be worried unless you work for Apple, or something.
http://events.ccc.de/congress/2009/Fahrplan/events/3654.en.h...
"From the total lack of network to handset authentication, to the "Of course I'll give you my IMSI" message, to the iPhone that really wanted to talk to us. It all came as a surprise -- stunning to see what $1500 of USRP can do. Add a weak cipher trivially breakable after a few months of distributed table generation and you get the most widely deployed privacy threat on the planet."