Now instead of a mindreader, we have a halting oracle, and to make its job impossible we have a test program that is "made aware" of the halting oracle, and does the opposite of what the oracle says. Impossible problem for the oracle. But that then begs the question, how many potential applications of the halting problem will involve test subjects that actually know what the halting oracle thinks? How many test subjects even know about the halting oracle? For instance, how can a program that looks for counterexamples to the Goldbach conjecture know anything about your halting oracle? In these cases, the undecidability proof doesn't apply.
So the answer to your question is conceivably yes.
Hence the work that gets done in this area constrains the problem down to situations in which you can know enough to decide halting, like traversal of lists or trees that are known to be finite. I bring this up because, when it comes to AI, people want more than this.
For starters take a look at the field of program synthesis. It's not AGI but it demonstrates the first thing you misunderstood.
Can you find examples of human program synthesis for undecidable problems?
Yes. There's a whole field dedicated to this called program synthesis. The undecidability of the halting problem does not preclude program synthesis.
> given that even the most cursory subproblem is impossible
What makes you think the halting problem is a 'cursory subproblem'?
Moreover, what makes you think humans can solve the halting problem?