> I did a port scan on the System Control Unit
Is that still white hat? Did they also check to see if the cockpit door is locked?
Is that still white hat? Did they also check to see if the cockpit door is locked?
Particularly if something goes terribly wrong and you're on the plane.
In practice I wouldn't expect the firewalls to be particularly well tested or complete or configured correctly, and it may be possible for an attacker to DOS the firewall and impact the other systems, and possible for the attacker to penetrate the firewall and so on.
Can someone confirm the above post?
Sadly, it seems they usually share wires and are separated by firewalls.
There's been lots of CCC and defcon talks about hacking in-flight systems. Googling "panasonic ife hack" gets plenty of hits, as does "Chris Roberts" who is a hacker who has made some pretty big claims about actually really hacking planes in flight and other stupid things. And there are articles like this https://www.wired.com/2015/04/hackers-commandeer-new-planes-... that talk about how the systems share wires.
Shared wires? That's fact, right?
The IFE is in the Passenger Information and Entertainment Services Domain (as defined by the standard ARINC664 Aircraft Data Networks). A basic assumption regarding the connectivity to more sensitive domains is that PIESD is totally insecure and anything can happen.
Finally to people wondering why aircraft designers would physically connect networks with vastly different security requirements: it's for making it possible to share aircraft/ground communication means (satcom...)
And it doesn't have to be a dramatic life threatening situation to incur a boatload of financial liability. See this for example: http://nypost.com/2017/08/30/unruly-passenger-ordered-to-pay...
The other reply regarding the overheated IFE is another unlikely, but possible, scenario.
Even if in any other dimension it can be possible, it's the responsability of who design the system for protect against this.
I think if you are not specifically asked to do it, it isn't white hat, and I think (but am not 100% sure) the law is like that. I don't know what hat it is, but white it isn't.
I wouldn’t guess they would add double sensors for all that information.
Or did you mean well protected, instead of literal air gap?
Fiber optic connections aren't required, anything with separate transmit and receive lines can be turned into a data diode (as long as the protocols used permit it). RS232 null modem cables with the RX lines disconnected are a classic.
The flight critical systems would be isolated from in-flight entertainment system (IFE). The IFE probably has a listen-only tap to flight metric info on an ARINC databus from the flight computer. I did a quick search and looks like 787 uses ARINC 667, a fiber optic interconnect.
> These special conditions are issued for the Boeing Model 787-8 airplane. This airplane will have novel or unusual design features when compared to the state of technology envisioned in the airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes. The architecture of the Boeing Model 787-8 computer systems and networks may allow access to external systems and networks
[1] https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2007/12/28/E7-2507...
Agree the IFE could crash, but can't see how there is even a remote risk to critical systems, or any risk to the IFE that isn't solved by (yet another) reboot of it.
In the UK for example, the computer misuse act says that using any tool with the intent of accessing a system (without actually doing so, let alone doing so successfully) is an offence.
One of the core apps had a control port that implemented HTTP. Unfortunately, my GET hit a route that didn't exist, and that caused a small memory leak every time.
Nothing too bad happened; the leak was slow, and even though the app stayed up many months at a time, we did notice the leak and figured out what was causing it.
As others have stated elsewhere, I've seen completely 'easy going' TCP connections to embedded devices cause immediate crashes.