Outlawing War? It Actually Worked
nytimes.com
nytimes.com
This is actually a great example of the bullshit quantitative analysis that is sweeping through academia. That something was signed in 1928, and then that the world experienced extraordinary peace after WW2 (the Pax Americana), is NOT evidence that the former led to the latter.
The notion of the U.S. as a global policeman has some credibility, but only going back to the 1990s. Before then the U.S.'s reach ended where the Soviet Union's began, and there were plenty of proxy conflicts.
This analysis seems to suggest we are in a period of relative peace. [0]
My point is merely that there's little reason to chalk up the very recent changes to the U.S. being a global policeman. The more complex truth is all of these things: atomic weapons making World War too risky, increase in global economic ties, increasingly democratic governance, the role of hegemonic powers (including but not exclusively the U.S.), and of course the U.S. as the pre-eminent hegemonic power.
This re-analysis of the effect of the Kellogg–Briand Pact is quite persuasive, but only in the context of the above. Also, see my post else thread regarding the complex cause+effect relationship. A treaty is a culmination of historic events; a culmination with consequences, but not magical in itself.
Even before there is a slight chance of a territory becoming unstable, there will be capital fright and thus all incentive for waging war in the first place will have been snuffed out.
Modern capital (on industrial scale) is extremely risk averse, hence seeing so little foreign investment into unstable countries and territories and capital following the path of least resistance - from least stable to most stable.
It's why Saudi and Russia are investing hundreds billions into foreign markets and not the other way around.
It is damning with faint praise to say that the tremendous loss of life to war in that time is extraordinarily peaceful, but compared to the rest of human history it's absolutely the case. In pre-modern times war was the default posture between states.
After WW2, we had Korea within 5 years, then Vietnam and Gulf War I, all wars of conquest. What ISIS is doing is a war of conquest. Israel was involved in quite a few. It doesn't really matter if the treaty allows them to keep the land legally, the only thing that can stop an invading army is another army.
Treaties and laws don't trump armies. When the rubber meets the road, might makes right, always has, always will.
It will take a while before they will overtake the US in this respect though. Vietnam and Korea were not exactly examples of 'keeping everyone in check' or 'fat uncle Sam doing the job'.
I'd rather point to the massive geopolitical differences that occurred during that time period. The Cold War, decolonization (mostly due to the world wars), the growth of the EU and of the USSR (both of which had no internal wars) all greatly reduced conquests.
> First, some context. Before 1928, countries had the legal right to wage war. If one state claimed to be victimized by another, international law permitted it to use force to right the wrong. International law also gave countries the right of conquest, meaning they could benefit from war by keeping its spoils, territory and, in some cases, people. The right of conquest did not depend on whether the conqueror was in the right. As long as it claimed to have been a victim, no matter how flimsy its argument, the conqueror became the new legal sovereign. It’s easy to see how the right to wage war could be, and was, abused.
First, it's saying prior to 1928, war was OK if the initiator was victimized or it simply wanted to annex a new place. Then it says the victors needed to make up a "flimsy" pretense of victimization in order to keep its winnings. They used to make up flimsy arguments for why they were doing the right thing before 1928, and still do after 1928 (cf. Russia "protecting" its people in Crimea). What part of the "law" actually changed?
It's an interesting notion. However, I suspect the cause+effect is much murkier. Colonialism had all but ended by 1928. Rising powers like the U.S. never had much interest in territorial acquisition. In fact, my naive understanding of world history is that territorial conquest (distinct from cultural/political/economic conquest) was largely a modern European thing, perhaps a consequence of the Treaty of Westphalia which forced European powers to think of conquest in very black & white terms.
The U.S. relinquished the Philippines and other significant acquisitions after the Spanish War. The Monroe Doctrine shows that the U.S. was never much interested in territorial acquisition, per se.
If anything, I'd argue that our concept of territorial conquest is derived from the peculiar historical evolution of European powers. And it's decline is more a reflection of the world moving on from that peculiar history. The further you get from Western Europe--geographically and temporally--the more difficult it is to characterize and analyze conquest in terms of the nation-state--which was, as a distinct and categorical "thing", a European invention solidified by the Treaty of Westphalia.
Thus, I think it's fair to say that neither the U.S. nor China are conquesting nations, but only using the European definition of conquest. The European definition is usually what we use in discourse because it's well-defined and has very specific meanings. If we loosen the term then, yes, I think it's clear that the U.S. especially is a conquesting nation; and to a lesser extent (at least in modern times), China. But loose definitions makes for poor discourse. I think it's enough to recognize the limits of our definitions.
Sure, it sucks, and yeah there has been a coincidental reduction in wars of conquest after these treaty signings, but one does not make a peanut butter sandwich simply by owning bread and peanut butter.
Conquest is down because of a) alliances b) the nuclear deterrent and c) market liberalization, causing an increase in the ability of people to make a living where they are, lessening the relative value of conquest.
Might makes right is a truism, yes, but only under the presumption that somebody is so mighty that everybody else has no choice but to fall into line and internalize the new order. Things are never that cut-and-dry. Vietnam, Afghanistan (now and then), and Iraq should have made it abundantly clear that might makes right is not a concept that has real world application.
What really matters is whether and how everybody will internalize a new political order. Power is a big part of that equation--and relative power is perhaps one benchmark by which many people will choose whether to internalize things--but it's nowhere near sufficient alone.
What about Alexander the Great, the Roman Empire, Genghis Khan? Not to mention the various empires of the Ancient world, from 2000 BC, which had plenty of conquering; the Achaemenid reached 5.5 million km².
Wars that just drag on for years, with no real end possible. This is especially common in the ME.
Sometimes countries need to change in order to relive tension. Make that impossible and it's non-stop war.
Multi-generation wars have been the norm ever since there were two civilizations big enough to fight one.
Sean McFate discuss some of this trend in his book "the Modern Mercenary".
[ed: One might view the use of force in establishing the keystone xl pipeline against native american interests as a microexample of how this might play out not only in "unlawful regions", but even in peaceful, regulated nations, such as the USA]