Credit Growth and the Financial Crisis: A New Narrative [pdf]
papers.nber.org
papers.nber.org
If you were leveraged in 2008 you were more likely have (on paper) a high credit score (with assets far in excess of liabilities). But you were also going to get hammered, and be more likely to hit a cashflow wall. If you had a job, one house, and one loan, you probably weathered the storm.
It's a little odd to frame that as "poor" vs. "investors," though. The anecdote that always struck me from Lewis's Big Short was that toward the end, lenders were pushing recent immigrants to start no-money-down rental empires, because recent immigrants haven't been here long enough to have credit hiccups -- so they start with high credit scores, even at modest incomes. And for every high credit score loan, the CDOs could launder multiple C-grade loans into a AAA security.
The systemic problem was bad securitization math, which led to unsustainable returns in housing investments. A significant element of that was enticing average Joes to over-leverage themselves like "investors."
(The idea that Community Reinvestment Act lending was anything as systemic as the rating errors is totally bogus, as far as I can tell).
"non-subprime" loans aren't "prime" of course unless you're a big bank or megacorp.
NINA - stands for "No Income No Asset".
My lender joked it was "the liars loan". People would just state their income. I had a person who wanted to partner with me and he said he brings in 400k a year. We pulled his taxes and he had only reported 80k! He tried to tell us "I'm good for the 150k buy-in" but we weren't having it. I recall my buddy joking "We aren't lenders. You have to actually have the money you say you do."
Does the "J" have an assigned word? (NINA = No Income J? No Asset)?
Is it a play on words for something Ninja related?
As an example, here's some 2008 discussion of this thesis: http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2008/10/subp...
Here's a 2016 discussion of similar themes: http://ritholtz.com/2016/06/no-cra-not-cause-financial-crisi...
That never matched my understanding, but it was practically an article of faith for them.
Yes, those loans probably made things worse in some neighborhoods. But those loans didn't trigger sudden, widespread foreclosures in the suburbs.
I need to sit and read the paper really, but my initial assumptions going in: growth in subprime lending increased prices, and what made the crisis was how vast swaths of Prime America refinanced at those inflated prices, effectively withdrawing equity it had built up. I'm having trouble squaring a relatively small percentage of subprime borrowers causing a 20 percent decline, so perhaps its time I shutup and read the paper.
Racist actually blame poor black people for the housing crash.
So the argument seems to be that high credit score individuals with more than one first mortgage (flippers) rose from 20% to 35% in 02-07, and that rise accounts entirely for the excess defaults in 07.
It also accounts for the rise in "east" delinquency - people who aren't living in a home are more willing to walk away from it.
It's kind of convincing, but I don't think it lets mortgage fraud from lenders off the hook (i.e. Lax enforcement of scoring and approval etc)
Basic message is don't give commercial investments the same rights or protections as domestic mortgages - but if you are going to adjust mortgage rules the best ones to focus on are again, fraud by lenders.
And of course, reductions in securitisation of opaque assets and the misalignment of incentives of lenders and ... oh we have done this to death. We have not learnt anything.
Working papers haven't undergone peer-review yet, though I'll concede the NBER probably is in a good position to determine the causes of the crisis.
There's an excellent paper by Gudrun Johnson back when she worked at the IMF that captures it in the sovereign insolvency context.
oil prices reached record levels before 2007 financial crash. Then western economies were being forced into recession by the rising cost of energy and responded by hiking interest rates - that then triggered mortgage defaults and over-leveraged borrowers throughout economy collapsed.
We are and always have been reliant on oil - it's not determinisim but it is dependency.
When oil prices go mad, so do we, and if we are over stretched it breaks us.
We are still over stretched (personal credit at all time highs etc)
And oil has very few places to go but up over long term.
Furthermore, I don't think house flippers created an industry that needed an ever-increasing supply of loans for securitization and corrupted lending institutions with that demand either.
Here is pushback against that thinking from 2008! It still has a lot of traction, probably as much as it did in 2008. With a bit of effort I could probably find a similar article from every year between then and now.
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2008/10/subp...
Edit: from 2013 http://www.businessinsider.com/republican-explanation-of-200...
At first, the encouragement was tied to home ownership programs that pre-screened applicants and provided training for owning a home. My dad ran one of these for a few years, and they were remarkably successful at transitioning section 8 recipients to homeowners and often homeowner/landlords.
Later, they decided that wasn't fast enough and they skipped the education and screening and just wrote loans.
However, with their typical junk rating they're a small portion of the market, interesting only to investors with an appetite for risk.
The systemic trouble started when instead of junk those loans were rated AAA, which then opened the door to pension funds and institutional bond funds.
I have money invested there because I feel it's a better social use than gambling on the stock market. I see good solid 5% returns. Most of the loans are repaid quickly.