Harpy, a “Fire and Forget” autonomous weapon drone
iai.co.il
iai.co.il
Every nation has these and most aare air launched. Not much different than an IR missile like our AIM-9 in that it's a "fire and forget" system. That is compared with active guides guided missiles like the AMRAAM.
It's like watching a drivers ed video from the 80s that kills terrorists
https://paste.pound-python.org/show/L3Yhf3vJ8rMuiO4OWLOm/
That looks pretty obfuscated to me.
I'm guessing what you're seeing is the html that's generated from that somehow. Or maybe it's serving up different html to different clients/IPs?
Maybe someone who's more familiar with web development could explain.
My best guess is that it's picking up the wget user-agent and serving up some bot counter-measures?
Then I tried wget and got the same weird obfuscated stuff I pasted above, and got it again when I wgot it again.
Right now, we're running the whole response through something like an optimizing compiler stack (Webpack, with lots of plugins and some custom modules). It renames everything to the shortest possible name, eliminates code that will never execute, inlines CSS into the <head> and <body> to reduce HTTP requests, splits the code into large bundles that can be cached forever and a small bundle that will be updated nearly every workday, stuff like that.
I'm afraid we're at the point now where a modern HTML response requires advanced tools in order to make it legible to a human. For that, I apologize, no sarc, we are aware of the loss of culture that is happening. There is some pushback happening, in the form a ruthless minimalism (plain HTML, no css, no JS), but good luck demonstrating the beauty of that to the UX team.
If it's any consolation, these advanced tools are built into FF and Chrome; just right click, inspect element, and look for associated JS handlers. The browser can clean up the code formatting for you, although the names will still be arbitrary. Set a breakpoint on an interesting statement, trigger (or manually fire) the action you followed to get there, and explore the values that are in scope at that point. Watching the values change will often tell you more than reading the code itself, when the names are meaningless.
As for the inconsistency mentioned by my sibling, that sounds a little broken. One of the things we do with the Webpack stack, is specialize the code for known browsers, by eliminating the browser-specific stuff that isn't needed for the current visitor; w3m and wget are not high priority targets :/
Do "De-Obfuscators" not exist yet?
The second line looks like it's setting something equal to a Base64 encode, but it just decodes to garbage for me. Can anyone else try decoding that?
You can choose "interactive renames" in the settings if you want, and go through and fix bits up as you go. But it does a remarkably nice job already.
https://blog.shapesecurity.com/2015/01/22/detecting-phantomj...
If the properties are defined, it doesn't do anything, otherwise it reloads the page.
It is obfuscated but that seems to be what's going on anyway.
Importantly, how will we ensure an individual is accountable rather than the corporation being at fault.
The "system" is already an excuse. Example the Tarnak Farm Incident where a US pilot killed 4 Canadian soldiers: "... as much as the F-16 pilots bear final responsibility for the fratricide incident, there existed other systemic shortcomings in air coordination and control procedures, as well as mission planning practices by the tactical flying units, that may have prevented the accident had they been corrected."[5]
Despite the fact he "flagrantly disregarded a direct order", "exercised a total lack of basic flight discipline", and "blatantly ignored the applicable rules of engagement". He was merely fined $5,700.
[1]: https://theintercept.com/2015/11/19/former-drone-operators-s...
Yesterday I posted a compilation of Apache gunships blowing up black and white silhouettes of people and massive expanses of land. I don't buy for a second that the US military or their contractors really know anything about the people they are killing, beyond the fact that they have identified with certain groups for reasons that could range from nationalism to just plain self-preservation and a salary. It is undebatable that most of the 1,000,000s of people who died in the Middle East in the last 15 years were not guilty of any crime, and even if they were the US consistently provided no proof before incinerating them extra-judicially.
Obviously, this makes great training data for ML algorithms.
History suggests no-one:
http://legaciesofwar.org/resources/cluster-bomb-fact-sheet/
See also: land mines.
The moral hazard of autonomous and remote controlled weapons isn't that there is no responsibility, but that the threshold for use is lowered.
When that happens I'll be scared.
The general design is to combine AIs and humans in what they call "centaurs", utilizing the strengths of each in a team. At least, that is what is said publicly.
But autonomy already is deployed. For example, in ships, the last line of defense against incoming missiles are basically large, autonomous machine guns; a human could never act quickly enough against supersonic incoming missiles. Computer system attack and defense ("cyber") is expected to be run by AI, simply because humans can't keep up with an attacking AI. Autonomy also is necessary because you can't depend on having secure, effective communication with your drones; that would be a huge vulnerability.
But autonomy is much trickier to define than it first appears: If you shoot a 'dumb' artillery shell at a target, you lose control of the shell the moment after you pull the trigger. If a group of children subsequently enters the target area, that 'autonomous' shell is going to kill them and you can't stop it. (An AI weapon might be safer in that kind of circumstance; it can change course.) Is it different to shoot a dumb shell to kill everything in the target area than to send an AI-operated drone to the same target area with the same instructions?
Nitpick: The children would have to move very quickly to get there during the time of flight of the shell (a few seconds). The interval during which you can intervene is actually the time from the forward observer (remember, arty gunners don't see their own targets) making the call for fire to the time at which the shell is fired. If the notional target is assessed as a high priority (target priorities are pre-assigned), and you trust the forward observer to have checked for collaterol damage, this could be a very short period.
If loitering munitions are used instead of conventional arty, and they can accept targeting updates in-flight, then the interval could be as long as you like (within weapon endurance constraints).
[Edit - clarity]
Double nitpick: 155mm artillery rarely has a time of flight of a "few seconds" - as they usually call "splash" 5 seconds before the anticipated impact in order to give the forward observer a heads up. A TOF of a minute isn't unusual - in that time a lot can happen.
Yes. The use of drones by western forces has coincided with operations in which the west has had total air supremacy. The larger weaponised drones (Predator, etc) have never been flown in a hostile air environment, against a peer force that has serious anti-air. I would be reluctant to fly my drones in such an environment. Smaller throw-away drones are a different issue.