Students who cheat on a simple task are more likely to prefer public sector jobs
aeaweb.org
aeaweb.org
The link title: "Students who cheat on a simple task are more likely to prefer public sector jobs", implies that this is a global phenomenon.
One might expect that the nature of the public sector in a given location might have an influence over the kinds of people it might attract.
In a place where baksheesh is commonplace, and a small fortune can be amassed out of "facilitation payments" by a low-level civil servant, it would come as no surprise that such a position would be attractive to nefarious individuals.
In a place where public sector workers earn marginally less than their private sector counterparts, and have no means of topping up that income, other than by taking a second job, one might imagine that such a position would be less attractive to cheaters, and more attractive to people who value mission over money.
If I let the assumption of good faith slip, I would say that the link title has been deliberately crafted to cast aspersions on all public sector employees worldwide, or, at least in the OP's home country.
Students in India who cheat on a simple laboratory task are
more likely to prefer public sector jobs. This paper shows
that cheating on this task predicts corrupt behavior by civil
servants, implying that it is a meaningful predictor of future
corruption. Students who demonstrate pro-social preferences
are less likely to prefer government jobs, while outcomes on
an explicit game and attitudinal measures to measure
corruption do not systematically predict job preferences. A
screening process that chooses high-ability applicants would
not alter the average propensity for corruption. The findings
imply that differential selection into government may
contribute, in part, to corruption.
The OP believes the distribution of human capabilities and preferences is independent of national or racial origin, and understands the appeal of government positions to people who like to have power over others without being accountable.
The OP has misinterpreted my comment as a racist attack on Indians.
My point was that corruption (or perception thereof) in an organisation, sector, or industry breeds (or at least sustains) corruption, as corrupt individuals are attracted to it. Conversely, an apparently "clean" organisation, sector, or industry is less likely to attract corrupt individuals, and is more likely to stay clean.
Looking at Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index: https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_percept...
In (e.g.) India, Turkey, Serbia, one would expect the test cheaters to be attracted to the civil service. In (e.g.) Russia, Iran, Mexico, even more so. In (e.g.) Denmark, New Zealand, Finland, one would not expect them to be attracted to the civil service.
In those countries with less government corruption, one would expect corrupt individuals to be attracted to different sector.
Why? The theory is independent of racial or national origin:
Economic theory predicts that civil servants often shirk
responsibility or take bribes because it is difficult for
central governments and citizens to monitor and subsequently
punish these bad behaviors ( e.g., Banerjee 1997, Shleifer and
Vishny 1993, Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2004, and Olken and
Pande 2012) . This implies that variation in the ability to
monitor or incentivize civil servants may drive the observed
differences in corruption across countries, across agencies
within a country, or even across the types of tasks for which
public servants are responsible. However, not all civil
servants engage in the same level of corrupt behavior, even in
the same position or role. Besley (2005) and Prendergast (
2007) posit that this may be potentially due to different
government workers having different preferences over engaging
in corruption. As such, it follows that the types of
individuals that select into government may help explain
variation in corruption levels.> This implies that variation in the ability to monitor or incentivize civil servants may drive the observed differences in corruption across countries across agencies within a country, or even across the types of tasks for which public servants are responsible.
> As such, it follows that the types of individuals that select into government may help explain variation in corruption levels.
As I stated in my comment on this, where bribery of public servants is the norm (with this statement comes an implied "and typically goes unpunished", otherwise it wouldn't be the norm), one might expect corrupt individuals to be attracted to those roles where they can pocket the most bribes.
In countries (or agencies within a country) where such bribery is rare, and dealt with seriously if it does occur, what would be the attraction for a corrupt individual?
It could well be true that test-cheaters are attracted to the public sector, regardless of how corrupt that particular public sector is, and only exercise their naughty side in countries/agencies/positions where they can get away with it, but supporting evidence for that assertion (against the assertion that test-cheaters are attracted to positions where they can exercise their naughty side) would only be found in places where they are less likely to get away with it.