How about an “urban wealth fund”?
marginalrevolution.com
marginalrevolution.com
All the public transit systems I've rode in Europe and Asia have lots of infrastructure (especially stores) built into their train stations. I found them to be a welcome convenience rather than a distraction - and the many travelers in the stores indicates that others did too.
If private shops in the subway is the price we pay for efficient public transit, then please, may I have some more?
That said, I believe the shops in the entrances are actually leased from private landlords who constructed those entrances when building new highrises.
And it most certainly doesn't make any sense placing those stores on stations that are outside of the Beltway (there's simply not enough demand there, and stations that are farther out are almost deserted by the standards of EU cities)
Which ones do you use that has shops?
- 53rd Street Metra (bicycle/coffee shop)
- Randolph Street Metra Station (~8 or 9 shops of various kinds)
- Merchandise Mart Brown Line (attached to a mall)
- Clark & Lake CTA in the Loop (entered via 2 different shopping centers or the street)
- Randolph/Wabash CTA in the Loop. No shopping at this one as it is an old, small elevated stop. That said, in the little space it does have available there is vending so it has been commercialized.
The red/blue lines are good examples of what I mean by not having space. Where would you put shops that would generate enough revenue for the work of putting them in to be valuable? The 95th street station used to have a newstand in it but doesn't anymore, I assume because they couldn't find tenants.
Obviously there is also the pedway at Lake St, and merchmart, etc but that's not really what we're talking about.
I'm from Chicago, and I was a bit surprised when I went to NYC for the first time and saw stores on the opposite side of the turnstile. I know this is quite common throughout the world, but it is relatively uncommon in the United States.
As far as I know there are not any stores in Chicago that can only be accessed by paying a fare.
To answer the question of the 5 stops I use most 4 of them have shops. None of them are on the platforms, but the platforms are very small. All 4 of those that have shops have been completely remodeled in the last 15 years to make the shops more appealing or to add shops that didn't exist.
One day, over brunch with a friend in real estate, we did some back-of-the-envelope math on one of the neighbourhood's housing projects. If the city (or, in the case of Penn South, the coöperative) simply sold the ground floor of housing to retailers, they'd generate enough cash to build an entirely new structure somewhere uptown.
This never happens because nobody is politically incentivised to do it.
What the "Urban Wealth Fund" idea would do is essentially have that property put into a pool of property with ... for instance ... the State's property. And then give out shares based on the value of the property the city put in.
I can understand why someone holding real estate would not want to do that. Especially if the city is putting in something in Flatiron... that may not be very valuable in price, but can be leased for FAR more than any of the property that the state might put in. (Even though the state's property may be more valuable in price, as some of it includes Beaux Arts buildings, but can't be leased for as much.)
It's far smarter for the city to just go it alone in that instance. (Well, I guess "smarter" is too loaded of a word, so maybe I should just say that the city would derive far more profit from just leasing the space on its own.)
And that's just the single instance you mention. It gets even more complex when you talk about the city kicking in an asset like... say ... Central Park.
Primarily I'd guess related to the fact that the costs of running a city of a given size are basically entirely fixed costs, rather than being marginal. Especially when you add that most of the essential services a metro-area government provides are revenue negative.
Trying to make (for example) the health department "pay fair market rents" means you either have no health department or a drastically less effective one.
The department therefore does not get cheaper, it just looks cheaper on paper since the real costs are hidden. The reduced transparency is what stands in the way of creating democratic or market based decisions on the departments funding.
If the health department is not paying the actual
price, someone else is paying the difference.
Obviously there's an opportunity cost from not closing the hospital - close the hospital and you could save on the running costs /and/ sell the building! But "Government finances can be improved by cutting public services" isn't a new or surprising idea.
The tax-payers that invested in real estate in a city centre land x time ago.
Most public goods are public goods precisely because a majority of people will purchase them under the former conditions but not under the latter. There are a wide variety of public services which you personally would not be willing or able to purchase for the total cost of providing the good, but would happily go in on if the rest of a large population could be made to pay their fair share.
A number of die-hard libertarians believe this is theft, which it is in a way, but relatively few of them are willing to move to a remote location and live off the grid to avoid this. Perhaps this is because they know that the alternative is also theft (or worse), because the common defense and the legal system are also public goods, and so you have no way of enforcing your property rights without relying on taxpayer-funded systems.
They're against public services because once created they never go away, become entrenched, have no incentive to shrink their budgets or run more efficiently and every new one tends to become an immovable leach on society.
Just as an example...think about garbage pickup for a minute. It's a public service that a lot of people would probably pay for (and many do in areas outside of city limits)...but what has it enabled?
If everybody didn't have trash pickup would people be less inclined to throw things out and buy replacements? Would society in general be more inclined to learn to make repairs?If recycling pickup was free because it generated money, but trash pickup was not because it didn't...would society be more sustainable by default?
If a business made investments into equipment to offer trash pickup as a paid service and then a recycling pickup as a free service came along...the trash company would go under. If a city makes investments in trash pickup as a taxed service, would it ever be a big enough line item to even have the conversation?
Just one of many well intentioned public goods.
Yes, democratic and market-based decisions are two different processes. If you review my comment you'll notice that I did not claim both to be the same.
Both, however, despite their structural difference, depend on the availability of information. As you normally do not want your decision making process to be a gamble you really need to try to know as much as reasonable about the actual costs and benefits of your potential decision.
Your description of what makes a democratic decision is wildly off.
There is a small group of thinkers (mainly highly abstract process based direct democrats) that does agree that the defining factor is about a majority of people agreeing upon something, however, this is far from an usual position. Most add a bunch of constrains (think everything between Aristoteles, Locke and enlightened constitutionalists) some abolish the necessity of an election (like, for example, Rousseau).
This is why a contemporary analytical approaches would probably start off by marking a decision as democratic as soon as it is validated through the available (democratic) institutions. There are of course also purely output based approaches on legitimacy that claim to be justified through democratic theory, but I guess that is less common.
Those decisions can be anything within the scope of the constitutive purpose of the democratic body in question. Other than you suggested this does not have to do anything with redistribution.
Your description of what makes a market-based decision is wildly off as well.
In situations in which market based decision making processes are proposed, they are universally seen as a sum of heterogeneous and fractional individual decisions dependent on their specific market frame.
A public good is a term that describes non-excludable and non-rivalrous goods. Think of it as the oceans, the atmosphere, classically lakes, rivers, etc.
I'll leave out the part on libertarians; political analysis is not a football game, you don't always need to side with or against someone to make an argument.
My claim is purely systematic and in itself does not affect the ability to redistribute.
However, I wonder: If you fear that a specific redistribution might stop as soon as people get aware of it, does this indicates that you believe people would not appreciate the specific redistributional effect if they knew about it?
A land/property value tax that was applied equally to public and private land would achieve the article's goals but also ensure that government was properly incentivised to produce value for those in the city, by rewarding them for property value increases with increased tax revenue.
A land value tax would also put the onerous cost on citizens nearby and make rents and property cost even more. Then you would probably see a stream of subsides come in to support low income renters.
It seems like it is a much more intrusive government solution with a lot of downside.
Well, no tax system is immune to people arbitrarily raising the tax rate.
> A land value tax would also put the onerous cost on citizens nearby
It means the costs are shared in proportion to the benefits rather than everyone in the city paying for improvements that only benefit one area. (And if the city builds a prison or incinerator in your backyard that harms your property value, then at least it lowers your taxes).
> make rents and property cost even more
It should lower the cost of property (since property now comes with a tax liability) and encourage putting land to productive use (i.e. building houses rather than "land-banking") or selling it to people who can use it, which would lower rents. What it penalizes is using property as an investment.
(Land value tax is not just some random idea I came up with; it was advocated by Adam Smith, Ricardo and others. Look at the writings of Henry George, and look at SF property prices today and tell me he was wrong: gains in economic productivity are captured by the rentiers who own land rather than going to those who produced them).
It would drag down property values because making owning something a liability strangely enough makes people want to own it less.
Rents would probably go down as land that was previously hoarded unproductively would hit the market.
Added to which city budgets would start overflowing with money which could be used to build additional housing for low income renters on land that has been yielded by hoarders.
Land owners - especially people with generations of wealth - would go nuts, since their license to tax people for using their land will have been revoked.
Do you want to fast track privatization of all public infrastructure for pennies on the dollar? Because that is how you get it.
So there is an example of how something like this could work - if you have the assets to leverage. I think the obvious risks can be easily mitigated with safe-guards around selling assets and debt limits.
A large portion of the land's value comes from its proximity to public transportation service, so it makes sense that the public transportation service would be directly funded by collecting rent on the land value that it created.
In the UK surplus value from land next to public transport is usually captured by private landlords while train tickets have gone up and up and up.
A: City owns an office building with a $1MM/yr fair-market rent, which it uses for administration.
B: City collects $1MM/yr rent from their office building, and pays $1MM/yr to rent out a different building for their administration to use.
If you net out the imputed rent in situation A, then it looks like the administration is $1MM/yr cheaper than it actually is.