On Password Managers
tbray.org
tbray.org
There are four issues that I'm currently aware of with 1Password:
1. They've converted from flat to subscription pricing.
2. They're pushing people to a 1Password-managed cloud sync system instead of the a la carte sync they were doing before.
3. They're promoting cloud vaults and hiding local vaults, and the Windows version of 1Password has apparently never used local vaults.
4. Now that they have 1Password.com, first-time enrollment in 1Password requires you to interact, once, with 1Password.com.
Of these, only (4) is a serious security concern. Their last release further eliminated the native app's dependency on 1Password.com. I'm confident they'll get all the way towards decoupling them, but I'm not them, so grain of salt.
I have no relationship with 1Password other than as a happy customer and as someone who does research in the field they work in. Having said that: I strongly recommend that you be very careful about what password manager you choose to use. The wrong password manager can be drastically less secure than no password manager. I recommend 1Password, and there's currently no other commercial password manager that I recommend. I'm sorry I can't go into more detail than that. :(
Apparently someone commented below that is a documented "feature". Wow.
I would prefer a tool that works for teams if anyone has suggestions. I care about how my team manages and shares their passwords. Looking for something that works across devices, and where I can share access but not necessarily share the actual passwords if I can avoid it. I really like LastPass, it's a shame about some of their issues.
Disclosure: happy user of pass, but haven't tried encrypting to multiple identities.
This is just fear mongering.
Boo hoo. Did I say it's a bug? I said it's a security issue. It's also an exceptionally stupid thing to have as standard behavior without warning. It demonstrates poor priorities and ideas about safety on the part of LastPass.
Perhaps this is a case where a feature that makes some sense in some cases was added, the problem is, outside that scope it's a really bad idea. But then someone said "We'll make it optional..." and the rest was history?
What would I do? I'd probably set up a second Chrome user and the LP for that user/browser would be auth creds for only stuff I'd need offline.
That would allow the main LP vault to have it disabled. This mitigates exposure.
1Password v6 for Windows doesn't work with local vaults, it requires 1password.com
However, on my Surface Pro 4 I use Edge, because it supposedly uses less power than Chrome.
If I've understood the 1Password forums correctly, the Edge integration that they are working on will only be in the subscription version. Those of us staying on 4 will be stuck with manually looking up passwords in 1Password.
Enpass doesn't seem to support multiple vaults at all though...
https://discussions.agilebits.com/discussion/comment/340062/...
Sounds like there's something about to blow?
> "I know about some security flaws (or behind-the-scenes issues with the dev teams) in other products, but I can't reveal them publicly because of NDAs, etc"
But there is also:
> "I know enough to recommend this product, but I don't know enough about the other products -- not necessarily because I lack the skill, but because I haven't spent the time -- to endorse/recommend them."
Are there any open source password manager products that you would recommend?
The DOD defines software commerce as anything available to the public and used for any non-government purposes.
http://dodcio.defense.gov/Open-Source-Software-FAQ/#Q:_Is_op...
So to take your comment one step further, for some organizations, the definition of commercial also has nothing to do with whether you sell it or give it away for free, even though many people reasonably assume commerce==sales.
I use Keepass. Reasonable security but ugly gui in linux due to mono. Has plugins. Completely offline.
+ kpcli for TTY use, keepassdroid for android, sync to owncloud, voila.
If you are extra concerned with security after storing your file remotely, you can have it use an addtional external keyfile in addition to the which you manually copy to 'authorize' devices
How has your experience with it so far?
Other than that it has better gui if that is your thing (Keepass is ugly). It is mostly a fork of keepassx which is still usable but KeepassXC merged all pull requests and fixed a load of bugs in keepassx after the maintainer stopped maintaining. Try it. It works. It also has mutilple releases (snap, appimage etc.).
I can't yet wean myself off of LastPass though, just because it's synced everywhere and is more reliable when doing form fills on websites. For example, KeePass and its variants don't have a concept of equivalent domains. For "equivalent domains" I should be prompted with the same lists of auto-fillable credentials, such as:
* youtube.com/google.com/gmail.com
* bing.com/hotmail.com/live.com/microsoft.com/msn.com/passport.net/windows.com
* apple.com/icloud.com
LastPass gets this right, but I sadly haven't seen any other password manager that does. I think there's an open issue with KeePassXC to address this but it's not merged or production ready.
The problem is that they can't deviate from the official KeePass database format, so adding something like aliases requires hacks like the above.
KeePassXC doesn't support KDBX yet, but they'r working on it[2].
It is absolutely rock solid.
I'm not sure that KeepassXC can be considered unmaintained - their last release was in June, this year - https://keepassxc.org/blog/ . Also note the monthly tone of the updates - even the koolist of kool dev kids kant complain that is slow 8)
I've been working on the marketing a bit, and the sense I get in this space is that, like home security, password security is a series of trade-offs. One size doesn't fit all; different situations require different needs, and everyone tries to balance the safety they want to feel with convenience that they desire.
So, in our case, there are a couple of good options. You could operate on a hosted service and get the cloud-based benefits without needing to worry about infrastructure or updates, or you could self-host and trade a bit of hassle in exchange for trusting the host and verifying that the updates will do what they say they're going to do.
[0]: http://passit.io
My favorite thing about it is that it uses standard tools I understand, and I can back it up and version it with git.
I recommend website-based password managers to my non-technical friends because they're easiest to use and therefore most likely to actually BE used, and the security vulnerabilities noted in the article are very small compared to not using a password manager at all.
It bothers me when people point to other password managers as alternatives to 1Password because of packaging and pricing issues. It's easy to find other commercial password managers that have attractive packaging and pricing! That's not the hard part!
I happen to like 1Password as a product, but that's not why I recommend it.
What I can see is that 1Password is pushing users towards a model that's fundamentally insecure. Their web-based products require a level of trust in 1Password (the company) that none of us should be willing to place in any company. What we've learned from Snowden is that any cloud provider can be secretly made to bend to their governing body's will. Running closed-source software on our own computers involves a level of trust in the authors of that software. That's just a fact of life when software isn't open source. But when code is pushed out into the world, it can, at least, undergo some scrutiny/testing by people outside the company. This is not true of software running on the company's servers. In so much as the security of 1Password requires executing a single, line of code on servers controlled by 1Password, the product is insecure and fundamentally unauditable because that line of code can be changed at any time without users being made aware.
The other point that should probably not get lost is that we're dealing with levels of security. In advocating for password managers, the interface absolutely does matter. Most computer users haven't adopted any password manager yet. When comparing a secure but difficult to use password manager, a potentially insecure password manager with an easy-to-use UI and a combination of insecure passwords, post-it notes and all the other terrible ways that users have of "managing" their passwords, the middle ground is likely to come out ahead for all but the most technically adept users. Need proof? PGP/GPG passes security reviews but has terrible UIs...what percent of emails are PGP/GPG encrypted? We shouldn't let the perfect be the enemy of the good. There can be different classes of security products for those that need protection from state-level actors and those that don't. Because people who are worried about that level of attack are generally willing to undergo a lot more pain to stay secure than your average user is.
I'd really like to know this as well.
I'm aware that LastPass doesn't have a perfect security record, but because of its prominence it gets lots of attention from hackers and security researchers, security issues tend to be well-reported, and the responses to them seem to be reasonably transparent and proactive.
In contrast, Enpass appears to be a side-project of a small app development house in India. Did a miss a memo where Security Expert X said Enpass is better than LastPass?
1Password is an incredibly complex, solid and polished suite of software products that provides an essential security function. It absolutely boggles the mind that people get up in arms over the idea that they would be forced to pay $36 each year to use it.
It boggles my mind that people are so quick to support a company that's making changes solely for their own benefit to the detriment of their customers. I want AgileBits to succeed too. That's why I bought the software despite having access to a license from work. But try this for math...if they release a major update to their software every year and charge, say, $36 to update, it costs the same exact amount to stay on the latest version. As a bonus to them, they get the money all up-front and get to collect what little interest you can get these days. The main difference is that I don't have to worry about their company imploding and taking all my passwords with it. My software will work in perpetuity without any cloud service they provide. That's piece of mind that I need when it comes to my passwords.
1Password 4 for Windows uses local vaults just fine - I'm using it right now. The new 1Password 6 for Windows does not support local vaults.
That's not a statement about 1Password; it's about the fact that the security models are different on the two platforms, and I'm very familiar with how 1Password works on macOS and less so on Windows.
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms995355.aspx
At that point you should probably be about as (in)secure as access to the platform is. I don't know how you could improve much on that (assuming secureboot and bitlocker encrypted disk).
Is there some magic going on the MacOS side that somehow improves on this?
The hard problem is getting the passwords out of the encrypted store and into form fields in your browser.
They also support copying the password to your clipboard (which they then clear after a few seconds). There's also the automated entry system which basically emulates keystrokes.
1P4 for Windows was the last version that was "buy once and forever", but they weren't providing good browser integrations for that version.
I am happy to support them though, and gladly used their products.
I definitely don't want to have to unlock my vaults on their website though.
[1]: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/store/p/1password-alpha/9nbl...
That's true - but playing hide and go seek with the non-subscription version is uncool.
I got a marketing email about a week later from Dave Teare and replied expressing my disappointment that publicly they're saying the stand-alone model will continue indefinitely but privately, they're "moving away" from the "lesser product" that they couldn't in good conscience sell me any longer. No reply.
The actions of Agile Bits are not matching the words in my experience and that's a big deal given the type of software they sell.
But Steve Thomas, who I also respect, has a lot of specific bad things to say about it.
I don't think it will destroy you. But it is not my first choice.
> ...
> there's currently no other commercial password manager that I recommend.
> I'm sorry I can't go into more detail than that.
Hmm. OK. Well. How about this?
Without getting into specific products, can you list the top 10 things a good password manager must do, offer or implement in order to secure the recommendation of someone doing research in the field?
Windows had local vault, I used the local vault version synced via dropbox for years.
>3. They're promoting cloud vaults and hiding local vaults, and the Windows version of 1Password has apparently never used local vaults.
1Password has absolutely used local vaults since its inception. They STOPPED supporting them in the latest version which is ridiculous, frustrating, and feels like a bait and switch. Had I known that was going to be their tactic going forward I never would've bought version 4 for Windows.
And no, I don't want to hear about how "version 4 still works just fine" - version 4 has all sorts of bugs, on windows 10 frequently hangs for minutes at a time when unlocking the database, and in general looks like it was written as an after-thought.
It makes it maddening trying to get on a website, and having to wait for the vault. Input queues up in the meantime, meaning I can't click or type on other things. Then suddenly, my mouse will shoot around the screen and my characters will get typed to wherever I was.
Yes the UI is "classic Windows" not "modern UI"[1] but written an afterthought seems a bit harsh.
I don't mind a recurring fee, its just that I want a native (cloud-free) password manager.
It's crazy that it isn't clear.
I've been considering just going back to LastPass, but it all seems like a hassle. Why am I even paying for these companies if I can't rely on them? I should be paying because I don't want to deal with this shit. Which is ironically why I've toyed around using ownCloud and KeePassXC
You can switch again to a homerolled solution like you are suggesting, but you're not going to "no deal with this shit", you are now your own IT for this shit you homerolled.
But since now 1Password is changing their subscription model if I were the use Lastpass, what would happen if one day they would shutdown their services? At least with 1Password I have (or had) my local vault in Dropbox/iCloud/whatever and I could still use it.
So next step beyond that would be to roll "my own" (obviously using software written by actually smart people) password management system which used open source and self hosted parts. That way I factor in upfront the "I have to deal with this shit" part and it doesn't come as a surprise years along the line when the company I'm relying on goes belly up, or changes their business strategy or whatever. Obviously it's not perfect, but I have to consider things. It's not wise to just rush into things.
(You can no longer use other clouds than their own...?)
AgileBits has also used dark patterns, if I may call them so, on the website to hide or obscure what's available but not considered favorable by the company, and prominently push what's considered favorable by the company as if that were the only option available (one visit to the home page in the last couple of years is adequate to get this). This ought to be shameful for any software company, especially one that claims to care about the users.
When it was originally created and stabilized, 1Password was a great solution, almost like Dropbox in simplicity and value. But the focus has been sorely lacking on other platforms, like Windows (and of course, nothing on Linux). There doesn't seem to be a lot nowadays to justify what the end user gets from the subscription when there are other options out there (that didn't exist several years ago).
Ever since I started using Linux, I've looked for solutions and have been trying Enpass once in a while. [1] It's free on all desktop platforms and has browser integration.
Edit: Of course, it's also been quite sometime since I started using Keychain Access and Safari on OS X/macOS/iOS.
Edit: Here's the link to buy the standalone license [2] which is hard to find on the site now.
In a post from the founder one week ago [3] he said, "We know that not everyone is ready to make the jump yet, and as such, we will continue to support customers who are managing their own standalone vaults. 1Password 6 and even 1Password 7 will continue to support standalone vaults."
[1]: https://support.1password.com/sync-with-dropbox/
[2]: https://agilebits.com/store
[3]: https://blog.agilebits.com/2017/07/13/why-we-love-1password-...
If you want to edit entries or delete you have to use 4.x, which did not seem to support OTP.
They have made no commitment for bringing windows support for local vaults to feature parity with the mac client.
edit: I thought it was, but not sure.
Also see: https://discussions.agilebits.com/discussion/comment/316463/...
Yes, this is correct. So if you want to share items or share a vault with a family member, you are obligated to store and sync with 1Password servers.
They now just recommend using their 1password.com service for sharing.
It was only by trying to activate an additional family account did I discover the change in the business plan.
Maybe time for an open source password manager?
- both products will continue to be supported
- your master password doesn't sync to their cloud
- your vault doesn't sync to their cloud unless you're using the subscription version and when it does sync, it's encrypted
At which point I will migrate away. I love the apps (use it on MacOS and iOS), but local-only storage and non-cloud sync are my hard requirements. I'm willing to pay a monthly rent, but will not 'cloudify' my passwords.
For a lot of people here, not remotely storing the vault is such a core foundational feature.
Saying something like "we will never force users into cloud storage and sync" when talking about a product like this just isn't that hard, unless that's exactly what you plan to do. Many software vendors have corrected misperceptions when changes seem to point in a direction some users don't want to follow.
This is not a case of misperception. The way they've talked about this make it quite plain that's where they want to go, and the careful phrasing ("at this time", "yet") makes it obvious that they intend to.
The killer feature of 1Password (on Android at least) is that it comes up as a keyboard and can type long passwords into any apps. That seems like exactly the sort of fussy integration that would be really hard to build and maintain in something without commercial backing.
[1]: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.hanhuy.and...
I love 1Password, but I hate their move towards being a service. There are alternatives that, while possibly not as good/polished, will allow me to continue to manage the password storage the way that I currently do and will continue to work, as is, for as long as I choose to use the software. Using them is a compromise I can make. Having a subscription password manager is not a compromise I can make.
I'd even encourage it, I'd like AgileBits to be a long term viable business.
1Password 6 for Windows has been out for a year, and it still doesn't support local vaults. I'm going to consider my own and others skepticism of their commitment to local vaults completely valid.
On windows there's some bug with a qt library they're using that, of all things, messes up network connectivity. It does polling of the network interfaces every 30 seconds (I believe) which causes traffic to completely stop for a couple of seconds.
On Android at least, it is EXTREMELY slow. Search works about 10% of the time, and the other 90% of the time you have to kill the app and relaunch it.
I work on a Qt powered project and we had the same bug
I have it on all my Macs, my iPad and iPhone and sync via Dropbox has been flawless so far.
Additionally, managing your own password vault is a lot like managing your own email server. There's advantages but I feel that the disadvantages are substantial. For one, the likelihood that you, one person, are going to do a better job of securing your stuff than a dedicated team is optimistic at best. Keeping your password vault safe is literally this companies full time gig and they have entire teams dedicated to it. Do I think they are infallible? Of course not. I'm not an idiot. But I think they are going to do a better job than me at keeping my stuff safe. I happily will pay for that every month.
The authors point about the 1p web portal is a good one. I don't use it out of similar concerns. Besides that, I really could not be happier with 1p as a password management solution. They have a good track record (no hacks that I am aware of) and I want the company I trust with literally the keys to my kingdom to be profitable and motivated to keep improving.
As someone who actually does both, this is IMHO backwards. My "password vault" is a GPG file I open in emacs and cut and paste from. It's trivially copied and maintained, extends cleanly to "non-password" secret info (e.g. credit cards, my kids' SSNs), involves no third party systems beyond the operation of the software, is trivially backed up via straightforward file copies that I do all the time anyway, and just in general works better than the rather complicated ecosystem of commercial offerings.
Works poorly in a phone, though.
It's hard enough to convince people not to use the same e-mail and password combo, and instead use something like 1password or last pass, making them use your proposed "solution" would be a massive step back.
Why can't the existing solutions in the market retain that triviality when translating to the consumer? Why must we be inflicted with bad crypto, cloudification, pervasive over-integration, lack of just-edit-the-text extensibility, etc...?
The 1Password workflow on iOS is more similar to what you describe because there is no browser integration, and I strongly dislike the experience. I often will abort doing things on mobile so I don't have to bother app switching and copy pasting.
I'd switch from Lastpass, if Apple made it easier to autofill and autogenerate passwords and added support for sharing / teams.
Or are you sharing one master password among multiple employees?
]
Create as many or few of these as you need accordingly.
1. Money, and
2. Significantly reducing complexity and maintenance burden. Supporting cloud-only vaults is a lot simpler than also supporting local vaults plus multiple different third-party sync mechanisms.
Given that vaults contain secrets, and data shared with third parties is not secret in any legally compelling way, that effectively neuters the product.
The data isn't shared with AgileBits. They only have the encrypted vaults, they don't have the keys to open them. So it's no more shared with a third party than using Dropbox to sync a local vault is shared with a third party.
Most negative comments here imply that 1password severely compromised (a), to the point of making it useless, in exchange for incremental-to-zero gains in (b). For most people here, using a third-party sync service is probably more convenient than avoiding whatever mass-market-cloud-thing 1password is trying to move everyone to.
(I haven't used 1password, but am planning to switch to some other password manager, and this article just knocked 1p off my list of candidates).
Using 1Password's service is actually far more convenient. It Just Works™, whereas other solutions like Dropbox are prone to creating conflicts.
TBH I don't know why anyone who was using a third-party sync service like Dropbox would dislike the 1Password sync service (beyond the fact that it's subscription pricing instead of a one-time license fee). It's only the small subset of users who used Wi-Fi sync that seem to have a legitimate complaint here.
> this article just knocked 1p off my list of candidates
Why? Unless you were planning on using Wi-Fi sync, then you shouldn't have a complaint. Tim Bray makes a lot of noise about web sites being insecure, but you don't need to use the web interface for 1Password (well, until today you needed to use it to create new vaults, but 1Password 6.8 can now create cloud vaults directly in the app). And his comment about if you use Dropbox all they have are the encrypted password file applies just as well to AgileBits, because you need the combination of your secret key + account password to decrypt anything, and at least the secret key (and maybe the account password too, not sure) is never sent to AgileBits.
If you're interested, they also have a white paper on their security, which you can find linked at the bottom of https://1password.com/security/.
>Why is AgileBits doing this? · For the same reason that Adobe has been pressuring its customers, for years now, to start subscribing to its product, rather than buying each successive version of each app. A subscription business is much nicer to operate than one where you have to go out and re-convince people to re-buy your software.
It is the part (common to many other software vendors) where they stress the "I am doing this for your own good" that irks me.
You want to change your business model? Fine.
Do you believe that this new one is better? Fine.
Do you want to convince me that you are changing the "old" model (which BTW you used until a nanosecond ago) becasue it is better for me? Hmmm.
https://blog.agilebits.com/2017/07/13/why-we-love-1password-...
But bugs and vulnerabilities? On a years old, widely tested and used "static" (or almost "static" ) product?
How many possible ones they are introducing by completely changing the tool to be on the "cloud"?
[0] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=88...
* I have no problem with subscription pricing, software that is maintained needs to be sold in a subscription model, period. Anyone who thinks otherwise is deceiving themselves.
* I do have a problem with entering my password (that is used to encrypt my data) into a JavaScript environment.
Give me native apps, charge me in a subscription model, don't force me into a web site version, and all will be fine.
When I sync with iCloud, Apple can't read my vault--even though it's on their servers, it's strongly encrypted with my passphrase, and the encryption/decryption happens on my devices.
When I sync with Dropbox, Dropbox can't read my vault--even though it's on their servers, it's strongly encrypted with my passphrase, and the encryption/decryption happens on my devices.
When I sync with AgileBit's own cloud... doesn't the sentence go exactly the same way? Quoting from their own current web page: "Every time you use 1Password, your data is encrypted before a single byte ever leaves your devices."
So even if the vault is on AgileBits' own servers, isn't it _no more and no less secure_ than the third-party syncing solutions they offer? Maybe that's not the case, and things actually function differently--but I haven't seen anyone describe why that would be the case. Again, maybe I'm just missing it. But I keep missing it. And it's not in Tim Bray's article, either. He's fine with putting it on somebody else's server if that server is run by Dropbox, but not if it's run by the company that he's trusting to encrypt it against people hacking Dropbox? How is this is materially different than using iCloud, Dropbox, or any other solution that puts a copy of my vault on someone else's servers for syncing purposes?
If the real argument is that there should always be a way to use a password manager with _no_ cloud-based syncing solution, I'm on board with that; it'd be a requirement for some businesses. But that doesn't seem to be the argument that's being made. And if the real argument is that you don't like subscription pricing models, that's fine. I don't like them, either. But that's not an argument about security--it's an argument about pricing models.
1. Accessing 1password.com's from a browser is less secure than using an app. You can choose never to log in but it makes it harder to recommend 1Password to journalists, political dissenters, etc. The most paranoid people need a local vault option.
2. The 1password.com can change to work differently from Dropbox at any time. 1Password for teams already allows recovery without your master password. They can add this to the normal subscription at any time.
[0] https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/09/07...
[1] https://venturebeat.com/2012/08/01/dropbox-has-become-proble... child-of-cloud-security/
[2] https://venturebeat.com/2011/06/21/dropbox-files-left-unprot...
Compare that with the app. Sure it has an updater, but you can use it offline. Don't trust it in day-to-day affairs? Block network access. You can reliably not trust it, and trust that it hasn't exposed your password behind your back (minus on-disk, but that's a risk either way, and it's more audit-able / third parties can build against the format to verify it independently).
Threat models aren't the same person-to-person - this probably won't happen to you (the grandparent), but embedded journalists / people trying to overthrow a corrupt regime depend on this stuff to literally keep them alive.
Another fairly common possibility, and one that affects damn near everybody: they can get hacked and have their source code modified. This happens with some regularity, and it can affect apps too: https://www.macrumors.com/2017/05/07/handbrake-app-security-... but in a browser this happens silently and unpreventably. Apps don't (usually) update invisibly just because you launched them.
It's true that you still have to trust the software vendor with your data -- that they won't just send themselves your secrets in the clear -- but I think the secrets are safer if the software isn't supposed to send _anything_ to the vendor than if you have to rely on what it does send being properly secured.
The browser plugin requires the machine you're on to have the 1Password app running in the background, which is how it gets its data from the local (and synced) vault. But there is no 1Password ChromeOS app (and I don't think it's really even possible for there to be something like that in ChromeOS), so the browser plugin does not work in Chrome on ChromeOS devices.
A while back, I think the 1Password synced vault files would also have an HTML file you could load up in a browser, which would then communicate locally with the encrypted vault to gain access to your passwords, which was a workaround on ChromeOS. I'm not sure of the security implications of that process, but it isn't supported anymore.
I really like the locally synced vault with browser plugin functionality, but the fact that there isn't a solution on ChromeOS has been a sticking point for me. I've gone the route of having Google store 1Password generated passwords via Chrome's password features, for sites that I regularly access via ChromeOS, which works, but feels excessive.
Only works because you run the Android app on your Chromebook, not supported everywhere.
It is possible, but it is being deprecated[0]. Signal uses it currently, so it is viable to run a 'heavier' app.
[0]: https://blog.chromium.org/2016/08/from-chrome-apps-to-web.ht...
Plus, it's true that you end up storing other sensible things that are not passwords, such as API or recovery keys, because it's acts like a vault.
I think this is one aspect that gets often overlooked. Keepass especially is pretty flexible for storing all sorts of small things that you feel like needing extra security and want to carry with you. Any entry in Keepass can have arbitrary key-value pairs in addition to the common fields, and if that is not enough you can also embed/attach files into the entry. For Windows especially Keepass also can store ssh-keys and function as half-decent ssh-agent.
The device can be backed up, and the cards can be backed up too (since unfortunately it's not doing the crypto on the card, the card is just a verifiable pin-protected way to store the AES key) and it's an obscure enough looking device that it's not yet an easy theft target.
I'm not affiliated with them, it's just I never see them on HN compared to mainstream applications like LastPass, 1Pass, OneLogin and such.. and I think their services are better. Plus their support is great.
On the other hand, if everybody starts using it maybe it'll become a bigger target for hackers. so don't tell everyone :)
Firefox Sync has a similar property; everything is client-side encrypted.
[0] Words mean things. They are dealing with encrypting passwords, after all, so I hope they're truthfully representing the technology behind their system:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zero-knowledge_proof
Maybe even:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zero-knowledge_password_proof
My money's on some corporate bullshit, however, for example:
Isn't the real problem auto-updating code with access to a network? 1password.com is certainly another vector that fits this description, but if you don't trust AgileBits to manage 1password.com securely, why would you trust them to manage the app on your machine securely? Or the auto-updating Chrome plugin?
I'm not denying that there's more surface area by creating a login, but I think it's a false dichotomy to say that the app is "offline" and the website is "online". They both have network access, and if AgileBits or a random hacker can change the app's code, they'll do that. That change will be mindlessly delivered to your computer, and the bad guys will have all your passwords.
At least in theory you can sandbox an app so that it does not have (unlimited) access to the network.
If you have gone through the process of being charitable-first, instead of dismissive-first, then you would notice that they have explicitly spent engineering hours on this exact problem by using an SRP-based session key exchange for mutual authentication (and additional session encryption, in addition to TLS). [1] [2]
It's not easy to engineer for both security and usability, so I especially appreciate it when someone spends the time to accomplish both.
[1] https://blog.agilebits.com/2015/11/11/how-1password-for-team... [2] https://1password.com/files/1Password%20for%20Teams%20White%...
Authentication is not done by sending them your encryption password, but instead the derivation of an SRP static secret (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_Remote_Password_protoco...) from your password (PBKDF, XOR'd with HKDF of the entropy-boosting pepper that they call the "Secret Key"), and performing a session key exchange handshake, basically like a (non-ephemeral) Diffie Hellman. They then encrypt all future communications (inside of TLS) with the transient session key.
This gets you three things in one swoop:
- Authentication of user
- Authentication of the server (if the remote server doesn't have the stored RSA counterpart of your derived SRP static secret, the exchange can't complete)
- An additional encrypted tunnel independent of TLS, so transport security isn't reliant solely on TLS (Cloudbleed, etc). (The contents being moved around are encrypted yet again)
And:
- User doesn't have to remember a separate password.
- The password and pepper never touch the network, only (non-reversible) session tokens do.
- Having access to traffic inside of TLS (corporate or malicious TLS endpoint interception, for example) still gets you nothing.
There are valid criticisms of 1Password, but you're literally criticizing them for something they've gone out of the way explicitly spent engineering hours solving in a way that not many services have even bothered thinking about.
I'm not mad at the subscription. I'd pay them the few bucks a month happily for what is an excellent application cross-platform. I AM mad at the forced cloud sync.
My current plan is to keep using 1PW 4 on Windows as long as possible and then re-evaluate when I absolutely have to. KeePass is a close alternative, but nowhere near as polished at this point.
The story of a lot of open source projects.
Anyways, there is a more stylish web UI for Keepass: https://keeweb.info/
Small things, but "polish" nonetheless.
Have used KeeWeb and it's great.
Unfortunately, it seems that many companies these days are more interested in developing services rather than deftly solving specific user problems. Whether or not this is financially sound, it's an ongoing assault on my workflow. I can't live in fear of every utility on my system pivoting to a new business model! Fundamental software needs to be stable, and there's a good reason why most of our essentials (compression, video playback, web browsing, etc.) are free and open source.
Going forward, I hope we discover more ways to collectively fund open source software projects, large and small, because everything else is just an IOU for another future shakeup.
EDIT: Found: https://support.1password.com/sync-with-dropbox/
How could that possibly happen? Local vaults can't just silently turn into cloud vaults, and you need a subscription license to use cloud vaults anyway.
Why not, all they'd have to do is copy the local vault to their cloud service and you'd never notice until you discover that the local file you're syncing somewhere else no longer contains your new passwords.
I'm not saying they've done this, but they could.
Their terms of service appears to specifically allow this:
You agree to grant AgileBits, Inc. a license to store, retrieve, backup, restore, and otherwise copy Your Data so that we may provide you with the Service.
I don't understand why you're doing this though, unless you're trying to intentionally create FUD around 1Password.
That way, your password manager would show a "login" button on the browser's toolbar when you visited any page in a site, you'd click it, and you'd be logged in (or possibly be asked for a two-factor code or be redirected to a two-factor page) immediately and certainly.
Is there anyone here who's working on a password manager who'd like to develop this with me? I've been wanting to write a spec and Django/Python implementation of it.
No, No. We shouldn't send credentials to anywhere. We should be using things like client certs or SRP. We need to solve the UI and UX problems and actually create better systems, not keep patching over the same broken system.
Also, "marginal improvement that many people might use, or a perfect system that nobody will?" is a false dichotomy. I'm saying we should make better systems (not perfect ones) easier to use.
Me neither, that's why I proposed a system that will allow your password manager to log you in automatically with a single click instead, with a trivial change to the server (a file with some information).
> I'm saying we should make better systems (not perfect ones) easier to use.
Having seen how little adoption Persona, which was pretty much perfect, got, I don't think the problem is usability.
The problem, I think, is that every site wants to own the web, and doesn't want to give up anything, let alone login. Facebook and Twitter and Google all want to be the auth providers to the net, but then you have to trust them in a much more elevated way than you should, and their motives are more around building a profile of you and where you go on the net than being a secure auth provider. If Facebook started supporting U2F (they may, I don't know), Yubikey sales would explode tomorrow and the web may be a safer place, who knows.
But my biggest fear that I have is; if my laptop was ever pwned in some way, due to some noval 0-day etc - is that everything stored in 1Password could be compromised. But more importantly - the hackers would have an address book of banks, servers, databases etc that I have access to.
I dont know if there is a solution - but I feel it is like putting all your eggs in one basket.
I don't see Dashlane spoken about much in these conversations (I have no affiliation).
I'm comfortable (in a I have no choice sorta way) that there is always some risk. Therefore, my next best choice is to mitigate that risk as much as possible. Obviously nothing is perfect, but it seems that using a Yubikey (or similar) raise the bar pretty high.
Yes? No?
p.s. Does anyone know of the legal implications of a Yubikey? That is, can a court order you to turn it (and PW) over? Or is there some protection from such things?
Note: I'm not doing anything nefarious. I'm just wanting to lower my sec risks, as well as maintain a respectable level of digital liberty.
And I am a current 1Password customer and had been for years, but that post doesn't inspire confidence in me.
[1] https://blog.agilebits.com/2017/07/13/why-we-love-1password-...
Actually, you don't. When you click the 1Password button in your browser, it sends a request to the 1Password app on your computer via localhost, which then opens a pop-up for you to enter your password. You're entering it in the 1Password app, not in Chrome.
command-line, encrypts passwords with gpg, synchronises using git and by default only copies the password to the clipboard and automatically wipes the clipboard after a minute
For backup, I use duplicity to encrypt my .password-store and all other private files. I have it spit the output to my dropbox folder so it syncs automatically.
This keeps what sites I have passwords for hidden from the outside world.
I've looked a little into keeping the entire .password-store folder encrypted locally until I try to use it, but I guess I'm not paranoid enough for the hassle.
I use Dropbox to sync the file through multiple computers including my Android phone. I don't fully trust Dropbox for sensible stuff, but since the passwords file is encrypted by KeePass, I consider that if Dropbox ever gets compromised, they won't be able to access the contents of the file right away without a lot of work.
The passwords file uses a long password, one of the few passwords I still have to remember, plus I use a keyfile for encrypting the file. That file is not allowed to be uploaded to the cloud. I have a copy of the keyfile in my laptop, another one on my Android phone, and another one on a Veracrypt partition in my thumb drive.
It is not a perfect setup, because I still have a few issues that I haven't considered, such as how should I proceed if my phone or laptop bag ever get lost or stolen; but it's convenient for me at this moment.
I use Mac for work and Windows/Ubuntu at home. Enpass is the only solution I found that works for all three OS perfectly.
$ ./pgen.py foobar.com foobar.net foobar.org
Password?
foobar.com: Aa0$d8~04h4W}Oj-MWA5 Aa0$eaxxF4XzaDaOnx5o
foobar.net: Aa0$q;7uc=@(4nSS5PIF Aa0$pG5+6ekXTONYJXrE
foobar.org: Aa0$%YY$Dle*&(egUuL1 Aa0$y4AhSpO64xF+Aa/lBeyond the not-insignificant risks of them screwing up, despite the best of intentions, there's nothing that prevents a change of company direction/priorities that could greatly increase the risk of a significant security breach. New senior people get brought in, crises happen that lead to poor decisions for financial or other reasons, and companies get sold to people who may well have completely different priorities.
I am not too sure how to do that but would value comments from people who have used open source password managers, or even read the code!
Shall we?
My assumptions for this list of recommended apps is at minimum:
- a single file in a well-known format is stored on a cloud service, and can be read / updated from different devices and platforms
- as this is encryption, we prefer open source code and trusted binary makers
My experience:
I use pwSafe on iOS (binary from some random guy). This backsup to dropbox.
I have a python script based on pypwsafe3 that can read the file on Linux. I have not yet tried BI-directional
I know pwSafe is based on Schneier's windows version, but frankly I have not tried to find the code or validate the binary.
So - is it worth building some kind of knowledge base here?
So, if your wallet gets stolen or lost, you'll have to go through every site you use and change all your passwords, quickly, and hope that whoever has that notebook hasn't taken over your accounts in the interim?
Also problematic if you travel, and don't particularly want to make that list of passwords available.
1) I used practically exclusively my desktop at the time, so the password slip stayed home
2) My home was relatively safe place; I didn't really have guests or other people mingling around and bulglary was basically unheard of in the area. My threat model did not include defending against law enforcement.
3) Paper is literally unhackable (with software), and it is trivial to understand that. I considered keyloggers to be a game-over situation anyway.
4) I always used secure password generator to create the passwords
5) I felt at the time that paper was more safe against catastrophic data loss (either due software or hardware failure)
6) Paper works universally crossplatform without needing any syncing. Multibooting and reinstalling different OSes etc did not impact my passwords
7) I wasn't confident in my ability to evaluate software password managers and especially establising secure usage patterns for them
With these points I still feel like the decision to use "paper under keyboard" was pretty well justfied and reasonably secure. Most importantly it enabled me to make the huge leap forwards from previous really insecure methods. Of course there are many reasons why you wouldn't want to use paper, some of them implied in above points.
I would never carry my password-slip with me on a regular basis, that seems just foolhardy, so that is the main difference between past me and OP.
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/06/write_down_yo...
I've performed a cursory search to see if any OSS password manager comes close to EW on features, but didn't find anything:
* Supports CAC encryption/decryption
* Allows you to store contacts public certs
* Allows keys to decrypt
* Generates passphrases
* Allows multiple keychains to be opened at once
If anyone is looking for a (probably not profitable) OSS project/business, I would pay probably upwards of $100 for a perpetual/source available license for an Encryption Wizard clone with a mobile client & some built-in support for syncing.
The DB used is a flat, sorted, text file so it can be stored in a version control system.
https://chiselapp.com/user/rkeene/repository/hunter2/
I'm interested in taking you up on your offer for an app-ified version. How should I proceed ?
Besides password reuse being not recommended, the main issue is: most websites don't give a eff about whether they store your password correctly or not
It's a trust asymmetry, they ask you to provide a password (and most ask one with a lot of BS restrictions) THEN md5 it and put it on the database, or worse
And as said by the article (and implied by the above paragraph), there are better ways of obtaining someone's password - pwd managers are not the weakest link, at least not now
Nobody store your password it's pure stateless, you can access the software by the official website, your website, web plugin, the terminal
see this blog: https://blog.lesspass.com/lesspass-how-it-works-dde742dd18a4
I use it and enjoy it. Most of the complaints have to do with there only being 1 master password and being able to crack it if one of your passwords is compromised which doesn't bother me since I use a sufficiently long master password.
I feel like we need to be talking about this more. For all the hullabaloo concerning password strength and encryption key length, MANY of our secret key entry methods would be quite easily defeated by a common webcam and a pair of human eyeballs.
That's kind of scary! It's not about to make me stop using passwords, but it is going to make me stop and think before I log into anything in a coffee shop.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Acoustic_cryptanalysis [2] https://www.sigmobile.org/mobicom/2015/papers/p90-aliA.pdf
Forget breaking strong encryption, far easier to use a camera, key logger, or other means of "spy craft".
The browser can verify who am I, likely in a more rigorous way than a password.
The browser can already handle interaction with the server on behalf of the user.
Sure, the user flow would need to be sorted out (e.g., to confirm the user's intent), but it seems much better than the current system we've been using since the days of .htaccess.
Anyone know of a good alternative to 1Password or LastPass for teams?
Those are the only two that I have used with teams. I like both of them; certainly having a password manager is better than not having a password manager... LastPass gets so much right for teams. It's still what we use at work as a result. It's not perfect, but I'm not willing to move my team off it for something that is marginally better in one area, and less good in 4 others.
Waiting for a clearly better solution and haven't found one yet.
Anyone have a recommendation for a good CLI client that isn't `pass`? (I don't want to deal with GPG)
Have you ever considered using a keepass database as the store? Would give you mobile / gui / etc clients. I'd definitely use it :)
IMO, this will end badly.
A password manager is good<>great [the] most<>majority of the time. By drawing attention to yourself in a manner as small as this or as largely as describing my exact setup and process, I should start to worry for myself and my digital security. By stating that locks are meant for honest people I should be able to draw in some agreement by readers of this comment. Any and all of these points will raise me out of the 'crowd' of password manager users and paint me some shade of a target to malicious activity.
However, I believe that notwithstanding the above information, the average user is 99<>100% safe using a password manager in best practice settings.
And I definitely don't like the business incentives subscription models generally create when it comes to standalone software development (as opposed to a server-based service), and so far the major moves to them I have experienced (such as Adobe's) have reinforced my concerns. While in the short term individual personalities can of course do whatever, I think in the medium to long term it's very hard for development direction to stay divorced from whatever the direct economic incentives of the business model are. In turn thinking about that is one of the more important factors in thinking about to what degree a company can be depended on over the years. Because:
1. Humans have a strong tendency to favor the status quo unless there is a disruption (HN crowd likely deals with this frequently, such as with the immense power of defaults in UI design).
2. Low constant noise triggers less consideration then occasional larger spikes, even if the former adds up to more in the same time period.
3. There is direct loss associated with stopping.
4. Lock-in increases.
subscriptions are well known to be a lot stickier and less sensitive to stagnating software, pricing changes, etc., then per-version purchases are. Companies can put out "being able to focus on the longer term!" but fundamentally subscriptions remove a significant form of customer-oriented hard discipline and incentives. Some devs might be able to continue the same without it, but many clearly cannot. And I want to emphasize that this isn't at all necessarily because of any maliciousness or even greed, no "haha now we have them where we want them". It's just that a lot of humans will lose focus without some sort of hard-to-subvert, reasonably fast outside feedback loop. Subscriptions also encourage feature development and testing towards a single vertical ecosystem, even if other approaches would be perfectly viable.
AgileBits says they're keeping standalone licenses, but I see nothing about reasonable feature parity. I also agree that one of the best ways to assuage concerns is full honesty, including acknowledging obvious conflicts of interest, and in that light I agree it would have been valuable to see at least something about how this boosts their revenue, and how they're aware of the risk of making standalone licenses second class citizens and will watch for it. They've been a solid company and made a solid product overall however, so I'm willing to give them the benefit of the doubt here for now. It'd be a shame if they ultimately do go sub-only at some point, even if data can be trivially dumped to other programs.
Maybe by that time though progress will be made on finally getting websites away from password authentication entirely and in turn PMs can be rendered mostly a historical artifact.
As as an aside, though I think this blog is aimed at a general audience there are a few misunderstandings that are significant, since they're not that complex but feed misunderstandings. For example:
>In the 1Password app's sync model, however, one assumes they use the pretty-secure HTTPS-based APIs for each of these products, machine to machine, no JavaScript in the loop.
The author himself correct states that in 1Password's (or KeePass or any other client based encrypted database setup) case they're using purely offline-app endpoint encryption, and part of the entire point of that is that the transport mechanism is irrelevant. There is no need to trust anything beyond what exists on the endpoint. This matters because it relates to some of the other concern points he raises, not just cloud storage location but for example "backdoor code in a future 1Password app release that sends the goodies to the enemies". An endpoint password manager that allows abstracting sync from the application itself, at least optionally, in turn can be isolated from any net access (and/or any attempts monitored) which reduces that threat profile as well.
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1. Effectively a mediocre reimplementation of public key auth on top of 90s-era website authentication practices that have proved sticky.
My point is that having a single point of failure maybe theoretically isn't as good as having a bunch of passwords, but in practice nobody has the discipline to actually maintain good security hygiene, and thus it is practically more secure to use a password manager than it is to have a bunch of different passwords that are either the same or closely related.
People should be aware that password managers are just glorified notepad file with one password. And after attacker compromise password manager, he not only gets your passwords (lesser evil), he also gets all information about your accounts (huge problem). This is a pretty big deal. He doesn't need to search where you are registered, manager will tell him everything he wants to know. Possible damage is massive. Even if you reuse one weak password everywhere (worst case of password security), he doesn't get that amount of information after successful attack.
And I really doubt you actually need "200 unique passwords/passphrases each with 100+ bits of entropy". Btw, do you know why password needs to have high entropy? It's not to stop attacker from brute-forcing login page (nobody is doing it in 2017), it's to make it harder to crack password hash, in case he gets it. There is no point in using extremely strong unique passwords on accounts you don't care to lose. Even worse, by using 200 unique passwords with passmanager, in case attacker gets your one master password, manager will tell him about every single account you have. By storing a lot of info there, you are just increasing amount of damage you will receive after being compromised.
The whole system security is as strong as the weakest link in the system. It doesn't matter, if every single password is unique with 100000+bits of entropy. All it's around your one master password.