> I don't see why not.
That's not a constructive argument. I don't see how they could make it work?
Even if they somehow solve the problem of giving these devices domain names and even if they generate separate private key for each unit, the key and cert are going to be embedded in the firmware and a sufficiently sophisticated attacker will just extract them and become able to impersonate some Philips device.
How the user of another device is going to tell whether he is connecting to his device or to malicious neighbor impersonating neighbor's device to establish Philips-signed HTTPS with the victim and then another connection to victim's device and MITM the victim?
You would have to make all users install a trusted certificate authority tied to their individual device. Which is a UX disaster in current browsers and also a security disaster, because if this becomes a norm, sooner or later somebody will sell you a toy device bundled with a CA crafted to give him the ability to impersonate any website. And you'll trust this CA because you want to play with the toy.
This maybe could be made to work with some improvements in browser UI. Make it easier to add new roots of trust. Make it easier to learn and/or limit what websites these certs will be authorized to authenticate. But nothing like that exists now.
> The fact that your browser warns you about insecure communication happening from that web page, that's a good thing. [...] The simple fact that you accept some insecure traffic, doesn't make it secure.
True. As somebody pointed out elsewhere in this thread, this warning will become another EU cookie banner nothingburger.