Also, there are obvious downsides to panopticons.
But none of that matters, I guess. We will have the cameras and the fakes.
Even better: what good is video evidence if few care?
Consider officers shooting black people. There are several videos of that, but does it show any sign of stopping? They even walk off without any repercussions at trial...
And, conversely, when people do care, no extra evidence is needed.
A dozen high-quality TLDRs and you've got the local, state, national and global scoop, as well as the latest dirt on politicians and movie stars.
I think that people would gobble that eagerly.
So a million little cameras = automated news.
however as a society are we willing to give up that much privacy the moment we step out the door, where anything and everything could be a recording device. then again if we are drowning in being observed do we in turn find more freedom?
I just reread The Light of Other Days by Arthur C. Clarke and Stephen Baxter. Basically, they argue that group consciousness is the best option where there is no privacy.
Eventually the science fanatics (empiricists) will realize this or get defunded of their jobs.
In which trial was it unambiguous that the police broke the law and also demonstrated institutionalized racism, and faced no repercussions?
I'm all for police accountability, but when we do have video evidence it often ambiguous on if the officer was in the wrong in using force. And when it isn't ambiguous, the officer goes to jail.
It's easy to "fake" news, and has been since cameras were invented - just choose the way you frame the image, or the moment you press record. No-one will doubt the video evidence of police beating protestors, and no-one will believe the claims that just a few minutes earlier they were throwing petrol bombs, after all where's the video?
That basically sounds like the dream world of DRM people, though.
(Canon had a "trusted" model as such. It was broken, IIRC by elcomsoft, shortly after release).
The important point is " making it harder " - but how hard is hard enough depends on the party in question, and for many important ones, the simple answer is "not hard enough".
Maybe also cross-linking chains of trust with nearby devices. So devices corroborate each other.
Look at the TLS x509 PKI, its a total complete mess.
This is not a workable solution.
Works for a fair few countries.
And who tags the NGOs? Of which a great many are sponsored from other states...