I strongly recommend that we stop inventing new implementations of a very flawed concept. Derived passwords from a seed is practically and operationally worse than a encrypted password database.

This keeps popping up lately, and every suggested implementation has objectively worse security, scalability and integrity than 1Password, KeePass, Dashlane or Lastpass.

Some simple problems that means this cannot work for me:

* Many password context's dont have a 'site' to derive from, now need to remember the IV for some random non-internet password (my luggage combo lock PIN, was the seed 'luggage' or 'travel bag' or 'samsonite'?)

* Might need multiple passwords per site; Multi users (need to remember all these shuffle codes)

* passwords are compromised all the time, now I have to remember the nonce/shuffle value for every one that gets leaked? (how do track this?)

* Storing non password data, like 'secret questions' or 'PINs' (not a generic secret store)

These same issues come up with every seed derived password scheme.

The only place this concept works is a very specific and metadata less context, such as HD derived cryptographic keys.