I imagine it might be some particular part of a golden handcuff / golden parachute deal, but making it work for everyone involved sounds super hard...
I imagine it might be some particular part of a golden handcuff / golden parachute deal, but making it work for everyone involved sounds super hard...
Selling a call does not allow the buyer to hedge. Buying a put would but not selling a call. You are describing selling a call.
One common version: Many sells come with some sort of earn-out. Meaning that the company has to perform at some level over some amount of time in order for the buyer to be on the hook for the full amount of the sell price (or some other bonus).
It is not uncommon to attach a buy-back clause to the earn-out. If you fail to hit the earn out, you have some ability to buy back the company and/or it's assets (there are many different versions). It's a win-win clause. If the company fails to perform under its new leadership the buying company has some hedge against it. It gives the seller a chance to effectively hedge at least some of the risk that they won't be able to fully earn-out the purchase price due to management issues at the new company.
I've been on the executive team for five company sales. Two of them had exactly this clause. Both during earlier stages. We never exercised them.
Net neutrality is supposed to help small- to medium-sized internet companies do better. Taking a stand on net neutrality is therefore not incompabitible with maximizing profit in the long term. It is, however, usually incompatible with maxmimizing quarterly returns for myopic investors.
My idea is to, either as terms of the sale or in a contract with a 3rd party, guarantee the company will continue doing a specific thing. If it's a contract, the company should be able to do with without much cost and get benefit in return for consideration. After the sale, they're still obligated to do what they said they would do. At the least, they could be sued. Maybe put the amount in the contract to be whatever profit they made for every year they were in violation so controlling company knows ahead of time non-compliance might cost them a lot of money.
So, this is a person that just took a college class in business law a long time ago brainstorming a solution. Needs peer review by more qualified people but that's how I'd at least attempt to do it. Probably in charter, contracts, and terms of sale altogether if I can get away with it.
At best, adding such conditions will mean you getting less money for more dilution in every funding round. At worst, at some point near the end of a runway you'll get an ultimatum to drop the condition or not get the next funding round at all.
Instead, to win a shareholder lawsuit you usually need much more of a smoking gun, things like being able to show that the CEO pursued a certain deal because his brother owned the other company, or that a group of controlling shareholders are having their chosen board take certain actions that deliberately screw over minority shareholders, that kind of thing.
This is not true, and never has been even a little bit true (in the US). It's a commonly misquoted trope.
Assuming your company happens to be public (the only way this matters) - you still can do whatever you like as controlling CEO short of outright fraud or negligence. If you decide to switch your Fortune 500 company to it's sole goal being charity - you could definitely do that without going to jail or being liable for anything.
You might lose your job though.
If you own a private company you started yourself and own the equity? You can do everything up to and including burning the building down.
That's what I was trying to get at. I didn't mean to make it sound like you'd go to jail.