There’s a constitutional right to use social media, US Supreme Court says
arstechnica.com
arstechnica.com
"Social media allows users to gain access to information and communicate with one another about it on any subject that might come to mind... By prohibiting sex offenders from using those websites, North Carolina with one broad stroke bars access to what, for many, are the principal sources for knowing current events, checking ads for employment, speaking and listening in the modern public square, and otherwise exploring the vast realms of human thought and knowledge. These websites can provide perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard."
This answers a frequently-heard claim that restriction (or abstension) from use is any more a reasonable choice.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=139661
The FCC has some guidance on free speech as pertains to broadcast (television, radio) media:
https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/fcc-and-freedom-speech
"Individual radio and television station licensees are responsible for selecting all broadcast matter and for determining how their stations can best serve their communities. Broadcast licensees are responsible for choosing both the entertainment programming and the programming concerning local issues, news, public affairs, religion, sports and other subjects to be aired by the station."
The EFF's issue centre on free speech is conspicuously silent on the specific matter of major private-platform provider rights and/or obligations:
https://www.eff.org/issues/free-speech
The Net Neutrality debate touches on this question in part, and the pro-net-neutrality argument generally contradicts your viewpoint:
https://www.aclu.org/feature/what-net-neutrality
Much of the question revolves around the definition of "common carrier", and who's included. By one argument, a constitutionally protected service providing common access to billions of people, might just conceivably fit that definition.
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/11/business/defending-the-op...
Yes, they do; they don't apply against private actors, including private property owners, because free speech rights are limits on the actions of government.
But it's the actor, not the space, that is at issue.
From the perspective of the speaker, free speech rights do not extend to such spaces. The mechanism and dynamics are somewhat arbitrary.
The fact that the government might act, by proxy, to enforce the wishes of the property owner strikes me as an interesting aspect of this rationale.
The exact same free speech rights exist in those spaces as in any other spaces. The scope of those rights, irrespective of the space, extends only to freedom from content-based restrictions imposed by government. They don't include freedom from having private licenses you may have been extended withdrawn based on speech acts (such licenses can be withdrawn whether or not you are exercising them at the time of the speech act.)
Say, for instance, you don't like that someone is advocating neo-Nazi causes in a public space and choose to withdraw a standing invitation you had previously extended to them due to that conduct: this is legal private content-based discrimination for speech on public property. It doesn't mean free speech rights don't extend to public property, it just means that private discriminstion was never within the scope of what those rights protect against.
We're discussing different aspects, and implications, of the law.
You also appear to be studiously avoiding acknowledging my point.
Cheers.
I'm actually trying to get you to clearly articulate your point by avoiding false descriptions; descriptively, there is an issue with private actor impacts on pragmatic free speech, but it's not equivalent to free speech rights not be existing in private physical spaces; it's both bigger (private discrimination can have an impact on expression anywhere, and isn't restricted to speech occurring in private spaces) and smaller (in that free speech rights are, in fact, in full legal effect everywhere, including private spaces) than that.
But I don't know if the point obscured by your inaccurate description is merely to point to that general fact or to make some deeper point based on it.
Since the Supreme Court reinforced the state-action doctrine in the early Seventies and ruled that privately owned shopping malls could not qualify as a public forums under the First Amendment, efforts to protect free expression at privately-owned public gathering places have shifted to state courts.
That is: privately-owned, publicly-accessed spaces "do not qualify as a public forum". As a consequence, "courts must now consider the constitutional obligation of private communities." This includes, for example, privately-owned condominiums -- people's homes: "In a case involving a high-rise condominium, the court held that once the condo association opens a forum for some speech, it must allow access to opposing speech."
You might argue that Prof. Askin is misrepresenting the state of law as of 1999. That may be the case -- I read and follow some legal discussion, but haven't formally studied law myself.
I find your characterisation of my descriptions as "false" exceedingly uncharitable.
And with that I'm dropping this thread.
If you look to court decisions, you'll find that the strict literalism you and others are following is often tempered by a pragmatic consideration.