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(A hypothetical example: consider a company with 1 billion in salable assets, but no hope for future profits based on existing business due to union costs. The best way to create shareholder value is to shut down the company and sell the corporate assets. The current CEO probably likes his job and doesn't want to be "the guy who killed BigCo". )
>The line-item vetoes are usually subject to the possibility of legislative override as are traditional vetoes
Edit: This article contains a barely legible image describing the process: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/03/03/89797/heres-how-reconc...
I understand almost no one owns those kind of proportions today, but what would be the incentive today if everyone seeks diversification. This would create an incentive, would it not?
If they squander money on the CEO's salary and fail because of it, that is their onus. If they succeed, then why should we intervene?
But the free market is an ideal which is easy to game. CEOs hand picking the board, and the board then turning around and deciding on the CEOs compensation is an example of the free market being gamed.
It's a bit more complicated then that, it requires the government enforced and defined legal entity that is a corporation, but it's still market inefficiency, mostly agency risk.
So in a way, it is the public's concern to remove market inefficiencies.
If the company can succeed with the inefficiency, then it's not that big an inefficiency.
It's a much more difficult argument to say that it is the public's concern to eliminate every inefficiency. God, imagine the employment opportunities for fixing poorly designed enterprise software... But no one is arguing that we do that. It is so easy to agree to not let an individual get rich from an inefficiency.
This is not to say I don't agree that it's a terrible, idiotic practice. But it's not my decision to step in.
(Or we could get rid of them, but we can't really do that without getting rid of the corporations, and even then we're looking at something that probably is not really as good an idea as it might sound.)
I want to own stock in such corporations. (Seriously. None of the "good governance" stuff has ever correlated with the thing that I want out of a stock, namely, return on my investment. I've no objection to you investing in companies to feel good about yourself, but I'm in it for the money.)
If you think that a given company's CEO compensation is wrong, don't own the stock.
This assumes good competition among CEO compensations. But when I say "game", I mean that there's essentially a cartel of CEO compensation among all publicly traded companies, so that you can not just invest in a company which does not overpay the CEO.
Oh really? Google and Apple's CEOs make $1.
Forbes regularly profiles companies whose CEOs make significantly less (and more) than what you claim is the only game in town.
And if you think that other countries do it better, you can buy stock in many of their companies via ADRs. (IIRC, Japan's CEO pay works somewhat like you'd like.)
I note that you didn't acknowledge that CEO pay practices don't have investor benefits, so why do you care? More to the point, since you can easily choose companies that work the way that you'd like, why should my choices be limited?
There's more info in this Motley Fool article: http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2010/06/18/dont-let-wa...
Even huge pension funds typically hold no more than 0.3% to 0.5% of large and medium-sized companies, so it's impossible to picture that happening very often.