A scheme that would be less effective if not for The Intercept's demonstrably deficient opsec in protecting its source in this affair.
Anyone who is thinking about leaking anything classified only needs to spend thirty seconds typing "Snowden" into Google to find out what happens when the federal government identifies the leaker. They then decide if it's worth the risk and how much time they will spend on covering their tracks. In this case (if true) it sounds like Reality Winner decided that they simply couldn't cover up their leaking and threw in the towel.
Much has been made of the watermarks on laser printers, we've known about those for a long time. Not everyone is aware but it's the sort of thing you can find out about if you put in time to do the research. After doing my own research, it doesn't seem like these watermarks really came into play; the NSA simply looked up everyone who had accessed the document and inspected their workstations for clues.
Bear in mind, The Intercept is likely more aware of anti-leaker strategies than most of the people they are hoping will leak them data. If they're going to encourage the act, they should do everything possible to help their sources protect themselves, and do diligence on anonymizing everything they get even further.
They do if they want to keep their jobs. It's not a moral point, it's a Darwinian one. No one talks to journalists who burn their sources.
The Intercept's literal genesis was as a clearing house for leaked data. This is... really bad if they want to be known as a safe place to send leaks.
The FBI doesn't mention the watermark in their affidavits, but they do mention that The Intercept gave away that the document had been printed and mailed from Augusta, GA. That allowed them to quickly zero in on Winner. The only "clue" on her workstation was that she had e-mailed The Intercept asking for a podcast transcript months before. In other words, she knew The Intercept existed. The Intercept burned her.
There really isn't much you can reasonably conclude about this. Is the government lying? Is The Intercept incompetent? The only thing you should remember is that if you are going to leak documents you need to do as much as possible while they are still in your control to hide your involvement. Once you send them off, your fate is in the hands of others.
Massive incompetence and amateurish stuff on part of the leaker and The Intercept. Yellow dots have been known for ages.
> Armed with this evidence, the NSA was able to quickly determine who had printed the document by checking audit logs.
So no I see exactly _zero_ evidence in that article that this was the method used. If you have any other article that has such evidence, I'm all ears.
Of course you're correct that The Intercept should have taken more care in this matter, but that doesn't mean that this was the reason why the leaker was found. The leaker should also have been a bit less amateur (e.g. not communicating with The Intercept on a _work_ computer).
There's plenty of evidence The Intercept's actions caused her to be found. It's documented in the FBI's affidavits for arrest and search warrants. https://www.buzzfeed.com/stevenperlberg/a-federal-government...
To wit: 'The Reporter told the Contractor that the Reporter had received the documents through the mail, and they were postmarked "Augusta, Georgia."'
So the FBI looked up who printed the document and of those six, who lived in Augusta, GA. Open and shut. Thanks, The Intercept!
The images have clear fold lines in them.
In that situation, I'm sorry, but the responsibility for protecting your identity is on you. Anonymize the data. Do not leak something that only you would have access to. etc, etc.
Because unless you're leaking to Infowars, you have to expect that a legitimate journalist will present your data to the organization from which you leaked it to, and request comment.
Snoweden did everything right, and it still wasn't good enough.
If removing well-known, uniquely identifying printer microdots isn't a best practice, it should be.
> If removing well-known, uniquely identifying printer microdots isn't a best practice, it should be.
Very true; where is the evidence that they did not do so?
You can read the search warrant at https://www.buzzfeed.com/stevenperlberg/a-federal-government..., which is more complete than the arrest warrant. Just read paragraphs 12-19, which cover the relevant probable cause. If the FBI don't know how it leaked (printed) and from where (Winner's home town), the case becomes extremely difficult. Instead, they had so much that she just confessed when they showed up.
> Snowden's identity was made public by The Guardian at his request on June 9, 2013.[97] He explained: "I have no intention of hiding who I am because I know I have done nothing wrong."[20] He added that by revealing his identity he hoped to protect his colleagues from being subjected to a hunt to determine who had been responsible for the leaks.
But Snowden's whole strategy was to be a public figure. He fled the country and had a documentary filmmaker record the handover of the documents. It looks like Winning was hoping to remain private and had no idea what she was doing.
It was game over at that point. Nothing they could do would have fixed that.
I've worked at far less security concerned companies that monitored all network traffic going and out and logged it and continually were looking not only for internal nefarious behavior but for possibly viruses, worms, etc.
She signed up for an email subscription from her personal gmail, on her work computer.
That would certainly have been enough to raise her superiors' hackles when discovered, but the result would have been her getting fired, not indicted.
The bottom line is having a personal subscription to the Intercept was not ever going to be enough to build a case against her. You repeating that claim is victim blaming, and more importantly, wrong.
I think that really depends on whether you perceive the leaker as a perpetrator or a victim. Valid arguments can be made for either side.