Also, because terrorists are rare and are not exclusively members of any one profile, you are more likely to miss one if you shift focus onto one group in particular.
http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2009/02/02/0813202106.abst...
The question is whether this effect is stronger or weaker than the gains you get from profiling.
The middle solution: Anti-profiling. It's not about going after certain groups, it's about ignoring certain groups that are harmless.
We don't need to focus on: -70-year-old British grandmas -4-year-old children -Chinese women -etc.
Obviously this doesn't preclude someone slipping something into their bag without their knowledge, so bags would still have to be checked.
But at the end of the day, there's a lot of simple things you could do to make the whole process faster and easier for everyone, including 23-year-old Arab men with congenital overactive sweat glands.
That is still profiling.
Given four groups, A,B,C,D with a property of dangerous/not dangerous.
If I say only A,B and D are dangerous then I'm saying C is not dangerous.
If I say only C isn't dangerous then I'm saying A,B and D are dangerous.
It's the profiling part that's the problem- you can determine through trial and error if you are likely to be interviewed, and adjust your resources accordingly. As noted in the paper, the 9/11 hijackers appeared to do exactly that.
Completely random interviews can't be gamed the same way.
calling a country "civilised" is difficult because youre implicitly calling other countries uncivilised.