Human biology, and by extension human minds, follow a myriad of rules that are a result of biological processes being played out. Likewise "machines" also follow the rules laid out by their physical design. There is no fundamental difference in this regard, there is no new set of information-theoretical rules that comes into play when you switch to a carbon-based machinery.
> What formalism, if any, is the human mind subject to?
In the context of this argument, the mind of the human mathematician would be subject to the rules of the formal system. Since Gödel we know that such a formal system cannot be proven true inside the system itself. However, an entity that views the system from the outside can potentially see it's true. There is no fundamental difference between a human mind and a hypothetical machine mind as far as the capability to come to the same conclusion is concerned. That's why Lucas took special care to specify upfront that the machine mind is prohibited from coming to that conclusion, by confining it to live within the formal system only. Yes, their argument is really that circular.
> Isn't our current conception of a machine that it will bound to some formalism in terms of reasoning? Are we so bound?
We are not, and neither would a generally intelligent machine. The burden of proof is on Lucas/Penrose to show that a generally intelligent machine would still be bound to that formalism, at which point it would cease to be considered generally intelligent. They seem to argue that their postulate is true because the individual components of such a machine are bound by those rules, but then again so are the individual components of our brains.