The Sinking of HMS ‘Victoria’ Led the Royal Navy Astray

I think of this every time I hear, "XXX is irrelevant in this age of asymmetric warfare." Sure, maybe that system or doctrine is not useful when fighting 1,000 militants blended into a city of 1,000,000. But what happens if/when we get into a shooting war with an adversary that has a real army, a real air force, and/or a real navy? Will it look like Desert Storm? Or will it look like the Bay of Pigs invasion? And could the US in 2040 look like France in 1940?

Betty's taking the initiative the way he did without telling Jellicoe what he faced or where he was going could have cost Britain the battle, as Beattie sailed into the German trap. Scheer's about turn when his T was crossed saved the fleet, so you could say the superb manoeuvring discipline of the German fleet saved it. You could also say that prioritising speed and heavy gunnery over armour (German ships prioritised armour) in the British battle cruisers didn't help them when they came up against German battleships. Or that the German gunnery was superior, or that the British munitions appeared to malfunction (or was that the German armour). There was, however, at least one instance in which faulty signalling from Beatty's flagship was very costly.

I think I understand the point the author is trying to make, but I would need a much clearer account of what he thought went wrong at Jutland to appreciate or agree with it.

The synopsis / review this book offers is a good one but it could, perhaps, be generalised. Though Gordon doesn't make it explicit as such, the lesson I ended up taking away from the book is that cultures tend to go through alternating periods of encouraging initiative or obedience. You can see this in armies (perhaps the classic example is the Prussian / German army: it started off with Frederick the Great as an army of obedience; became (at the top levels at least) an army of initiative under von Moltke the Elder; and (in the West, at least) went back to an army of obedience for most of WWI), technology (look at any well known company's research lab culture), and even wider society. If I had to briefly summarise the consequences of this, it tends to come down to when two broadly equal organisations square up against each other: if one uses obedience as its model, and the other initiative, the latter will tend to win; if the two both use the same system, the outcome seems to be mostly random.

[That said, Jutland isn't a great example of this in my opinion, as it was so protracted and its outcome so muddy. Poor ship design and some sloppy practises with explosives meant the British came off worse in terms of casualties, so arguably the Germans won the day. However, the (smaller) German Navy realised that it had only survived through luck, and basically stayed in port for the rest of the war, whereas the British were out sailing in force less than a week later and continuing the blockade of Germany. The Germans eventually thought the only way to win at sea was unrestricted submarine warfare, which turned out to be perhaps the biggest PR disaster in history. I was astonished to realise that the German Navy's inferiority complex from Jutland persisted into WWII: the German Navy stalled shamelessly when asked to help invade Britain, as the lesson they learnt from Jutland was that the British Navy could never be defeated, so what was the point of trying? So Jutland had complex long-term effects that defy easy classification. Which is, perhaps, why it's so fascinating.]

While most modern safety advice recommends empowering line workers to report safety failures, this also extends to engineering quality. The quintessential example of devolving power down to individuals is Andon[0], the most recognisable feature of which is a little cord any line worker in the factory can pull to stop the entire line.

0: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andon_(manufacturing)

For a serious discussion of how much initiative is too much or too little, read MCDP 1, "Warfighting", the USMC manual on how to run a battle. Good military forces work hard at that balance.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inchmickery

Reminds me of a fiction quote:

> The general was only warming up. [...] "You infants who've come up in the past decade and more have no concept of combat. These long periods of unbroken peace weaken the Service. If they go on much longer, when a crisis comes there'll be no one left who's had any real practice in a crunch."

> Miles's eyes crossed slightly, from internal pressure. Then should His Imperial Majesty provide a war every five years, as a convenience for the advancement of his officers' careers? His mind boggled slightly over the concept of "real practice." Had Miles maybe acquired his first clue why this superb-looking officer had washed up on Kyril Island?

(The Vor Game, by Lois McMaster Bujold)

The vehement disagreement is almost repulsing me to RTFA.