A Theory of Consciousness Can Help Build a Theory of Everything
nautil.us
nautil.us
Anyway, there's certainly no evidence to suggest that consciousness requires anything more than our current understanding of physical laws. This article was pretty interesting with its topical exploration of self organization and a more math-based approach, but once it got into quantum physics it started to delve into the realm of pure conjecture and pseudo-science.
An experience people would label "conscious" exists in the sense that many people would label their state of mind with it. A scientific explanation would involve describing why people are attracted to this position and might or might-not involve describing actual brain states could be considered "consciousness states". There's no reason to think such an explanation would be "subjectively satisfying" - that it would make people lean back and say "oh, now I understand".
But the problem is the "theory of consciousness" folks want to create a theory that is both scientific and "subjectively satisfying" and indeed they sort of start their argument with a unit of that thing that's subjectively satisfying and try to go from there. That seems like recipe for non-science.
One fundamental reason why this is such a controversial and confusing topic with a wide range of opinions is that consciousness is meta-physical phenomenon. I.e. it's out of the scope of science in a way. But the concept that there's something beyond science is completely unintuitive to many people (by "beyond science" I obviously don't mean BS like spirituality etc., it's from a purely rational perspective). So trying to understand consciousness with science only will inevitably fail.
So, what would be a mirror for consciousness? Is there one?
I don't know if this is what the parent meant, but I interpreted that statement to mean that the concept and explanation of consciousness is beyond our current scientific frame of reference.
Think about past frames of reference which "science" attempted to utilize, to some effect and failure. I put quotes around science for a reason, because I have a specific example, to wit:
Think about alchemy. To a certain extent, a form of scientific process was used by these early - for lack of a better word - proto-chemists. They pondered, came up with ideas, experimented, took notes, compared results, etc. They discovered new substances and compounds we use to this day; they created the prototypes of some of the lab equipment still used. Their methods ultimately led to our current "scientific method" of inquiry.
But despite their successes and failures, despite their best attempts and experiments, in many ways they were hampered by the framework of "science" they were investigating. For instance, they knew little to nothing about atoms or elements - instead grouping things into the "classical" elements of earth, fire, water, and air (and in some cases "spirit"). They still had a mindset of "like for like", meaning that their experimentation led to them using substances or similar that had some nature which was like what they were attempting to perform or gain the result of.
I won't belabour this point - only to say that because their framework of reference limited them, they couldn't make the "giant leap" forward that was needed to really understand and do what it is they were trying to do (let's not dwell on the philosophical/spiritual aspects of the so-called Philosopher's Stone quest).
So perhaps that's where we are today, in regards to science and trying to explain and understand consciousness? That isn't to say we won't eventually be able to explain and explore the topic; our nature of asking questions, trying experiments, coming at the problem from a myriad of different angles, and the collaboration between these disparate fields will likely lead us to the knowledge (and also it will open up many more questions, as it always has and does). As noted in the article, we are taking more steps even today - and I am also pleased to see that there is a greater collaboration going on between the fields and people who deal with this at a basic level - the physicists, the neuroscientists, computer science, biologists, etc. This kind of cross-fertilization is absolutely needed in order to understand this problem.
There's a good word which describes that sentence: 'faith'
Conscious is a subjective experience. There's no clear definition of it in terms of measurable and repeating phenomena however much a given person feels sure they experience it (go head, give a definition that's subjectively satisfying for consciousness. Notice the whole "philosophical zombie" schema rests on nothing about consciousness being measurable or verifiable). Psychology, linguistics or neuroscience may indeed come up with one at some point.
But as far as I can tell, the argument of the article and of theories of this sort, is that since consciousness is "real", it should be taken as a building block of one's model of the universe. The problem here is that using an ill-defined thing as a building block makes exact science impossible - unless your basic model is itself predictable, you cannot actually say whether your experimental results follow the model or not.
It's not simply that an approach like this may be wrong - science is wrong all the time. It's that an approach like is injecting an atom of "anything-you-want-tium" into the mixture, a situation that let's you claim any result verifies your theory ("God does it all" would satisfying Occam's Razor for the simple "explanation of everything" if we let the inherently unexplainable into the competition).
So in this sense, scientists have every reason to keep approaches like this entirely outside the realm of "legitimate science".
This may sound positivist and one may say that a lot of science is looser than a pure positivism. Sort-of but every serious scientific discipline has to boil down to verification of predictive models by experiment specifically because it's easy for things to move "in the clouds" for periods of time and the verification is needed to weed-out models without predictiveness at all (string theorists have speculated a long and gotten kudos but the call for predictiveness is there is getting louder - but with string theory, things may be abstract however no "unexplainable" is taken as a given).
I was not discussing consciousness per-se, I was discussing the theory and the sort of theory discussed in the article - the claim that a subjective experience needs to be added to the scientific process to explain various supposed problems.
I have no objections to exploring subjective experience - believe it or not, I mediate, practice Qigong and Tai Chi and enjoy Eastern philosophies like Taoism.
A text like the Tao Te Ching is more applicable to the immediate problems of living than a text book on physics but that doesn't mean subjective intuitions can be uncritically applied to physics. Science is a particular discipline, applicable in a limited but important level of reality, specifically intended to benefit from limiting the use of the subjective messiness of most human reasoning - not that this subjective messiness isn't highly useful elsewhere.
What kind of tools would you suggest?
Leaving aside the specific ideas being outlined here, and the specific reasons for disdain some people have for it....
...while we may not know the truth regarding this topic, there may be demonstrable flaws in people's ideas and hypotheses! Flaws in there reasoning, or empirical flaws, or whatever.
I disagree with the claim that "pseudo-science" as you call it is used to discredit the establishment. Rather it is exactly the opposite, the establishment uses the label to discredit outlandish ideas. Every scientific theory starts off as hypothesis and maintains falsifiability, to accept it as dogma is worse than not exploring other ideas.
That's simply outside the reach of science. Science is not a tool that can answer that question. I'm sure someone will tell me that my question is meaningless to begin with - ironically I think the answers to the questions scientists seek about consciousness are permanently beyond the event horizon of that very meaningless they accuse my question of.
If we can't even get a solid consensus on what consciousness is we're not going to have a theory for it anytime soon.
Every time this comes up we have a split between actual neuroscience and everyone's subjective interpretation of consciousness.
That is what the damn problem is.
This is like saying since we don't understand gravity full, we should not study it.
How can we test the existence of a wholly subjective/interior experience? This seems to relate to, for example, if it's possible to measure and quantify pain (or pleasure I suppose) objectively.
https://beyond.asu.edu/workshop/unsolved-problems-gravity
We don't go around declaring that "No talk about gravity till we know everything about it and have solved all open problems."
Conjecture!
That fact makes objective investigation very hard. If I don't know whether a person is a p-zombie, I cannot know whether any objective events cause his consciousness. And if it's my consciousness we're talking about, I cannot be there to investigate the objective causes of it.
This is what differentiates consciousness from all other phenomena. Gravity may or may not "really" exist; all I seek to explain is why objects appear to attract. On the other hand, consciousness certainly exists (you can test this out by trying to doubt it, in which case you'll have a conscious experience of doubt), and the only phenomena I can explain it with are objective and thus may themselves not really exist.
We can also note that your argument that "consciousness certainly exists" (which actually only applies to my consciousness) does not validate any particular belief about it.
And do you agree with naasking's claim above that it is meaningful to refute your own consciousness?
But when you say "consciousness exists", you mean something different than when you say "cars exist". We both know cars don't really exist, fundamentally, but if you believe in irreducible subjectivity then you believe that consciousness fundamentally exists in the same way that quarks and fields exist.
So I do walk around and claim to be conscious just like I walk around and talk about the drive to work every morning, but I always know in the back of my mind that these are merely convenient labels, not things that actually exist. They are merely shorthands for a very complicated description of objective reality.
Does it seem to you that anything at all is happening (e.g., that there seems to be a world around you, or that you seem to be having a thought)? Perhaps you're mistaken and it doesn't "really" seem, but only seems to seem. Nonetheless, it is that very seeming that I'm calling consciousness.
If I may ask: do you have significant experience with meditation? I suspect this conversation becomes easier when both parties have spent considerable time in the space between thoughts.
Requiring experience to acquire knowledge is a completely unnecessary assumption. Only sensory perception and an automaton are needed to generate thoughts, at which point we can simply ask, how do we know we are not exactly such an automaton?
This is why I ask: does it seem to you that anything at all is happening? Your answer cannot tell me whether you are conscious (or a p-zombie who is lying), but it may help you see what I'm getting at. If you ask me to be more precise (about "seem" or "happening"), I cannot. I can only trust that you are able to understand me.
If it does seem that something is happening, that is consciousness. If you answer that it's an illusion, and it may not really seem, but only seem to seem, that's still good enough.
So I can't tell you "how" I can be certain that something seems to be happening, and I cannot prove it to anybody else, but it certainly does seem.
I simply do not understand what it means to doubt or deny that it seems like something is happening (though it's perfectly clear to me what it means to doubt that something is actually happening). When I see (and even accept) a proof of it, will I say "well it sure seems like something is happening, but I'm wrong, so it doesn't really seem like anything is happening?"
Perhaps my imagination is limited. I thank you for trying!
When direct perception implies a false conclusion, that's an illusion. What else could "seems" actually mean?
So now we're down to the meaning of the word "perception". I hope you also agree that there's no need to imbue some subjective subtext into this word, so where else can subjectivity hide?
I am not sure that your second question accurately represents naasking's views, but I will say that while things like mood changes and drugs raise questions as to how well I know even my own consciousness, I don't really question that there is something there (I will get to the 'really' bit presently.) That self-knowledge on my part does not, however, extend to your consciousness (or anyone else's.) It has belatedly occurred to me that you are trying to draw a line between everyone's consciousness, as being something that you say certainly exists, and everything else, that might not "really" exist. If so, then you cannot do it: any argument that distinguishes knowledge of the external world from your self-knowledge of your own consciousness puts other people's consciousness on a par with the rest of the external world. As far as I can tell, that makes the position indistinguishable from solipsism. My take on solipsism is that you cannot prove or disprove it: it stands as a demonstration of the limits of reason, and for all practical purposes, you have to take the methodological assumption that it is false simply in order for the conversation to continue - anything we conclude is, at best, only true up to solipsism (or up to being in a simulation, which I think we both agree is, for all practical purposes, equivalent to solipsism in this regard.) This, by the way, is why I included 'really' in "I don't really question that there is something there."
I recognize your point about solipsism. I am not certain (except for practical purposes) about anyone else's consciousness.
Perhaps it would help if I describe what seem to be phases of belief about consciousness (or perhaps it will merely sound presumptuous and not help at all...). One way this progression can happen is through meditation, which I see as the process of consciousness becoming increasingly aware of itself.
1. I can doubt my own consciousness. How do I know I'm not an automaton? This seems to be naasking's position. From past experience, I trust that it's not merely rhetorical. There is genuine uncertainty about any consciousness, and proofs of its nonexistence can be satisfying.
2. "Oh, THAT!" It is no longer meaningful to doubt my own consciousness. I may be wrong about its details, but the sheer fact of experience is indeed a fact and not an assumption. Attempting to doubt my own consciousness is nonsensical, because I recognize that (my) doubt occurs in consciousness.
3. Various features of conscious experience are exposed as illusory. I've never actually experienced the passage of time; it is always now, and a present memory and anticipation only suggest something called "time." I've never actually experienced a self; it used to seem that monktastic was recognizing consciousness, but now it's clear that consciousness is recognizing monktastic (monktastic is, after all, a conglomeration of memories, bodily textures and sights, etc.; whereas consciousness is that which experiences those). These are not merely intellectual understandings.
4. ...
It's remarkably hard to have conversations across these sorts of boundaries. Perhaps naasking is right, and what I am calling a progression is actually a regression. I'll leave that for each to decide for him/herself.
All I mean to say is that in (3), it is not satisfying to objectify consciousness. Yes, we may identify (seemingly) flawless correlations between objective phenomena and consciousness, but they do not constitute any sort of "explanation" for consciousness.
Perhaps all I am really saying is this: we both recognize that any objective explanation of consciousness is only true "up to solipsism / simulation," but for me, that asterisk is a showstopper and not just a curiosity that we can punt on. Not that we should stop exploring these things (and taking them seriously for practical purposes) -- any more than we should stop painting or dancing.
They may perhaps show that our previous expectations for an "explanation" were nonsensical. Compare this debate over consciousness against the history of vitalism. The same progression of ideas posed to justify some special ontological category for life, but where are all the vitalists now? In retrospect, do their arguments seem at all reasonable? How do they compare to present arguments about consciousness? In retrospect, will future people find these perspectives just as wrong?
Time, space, matter, objective reality: these are all inferences that rely on your not paying close enough attention to a remarkable sleight of hand your consciousness is pulling on you. Once you manage to do this, it indeed becomes nonsensical to look for "explanations" of consciousness in terms of the very things it abstracted into seeming existence.
So while I can't refute Last Thursdayism, given it's ontological commitments, it has such a low probability on the scale of possible explanations for reality that I need not concern myself with it (see Solomonoff Induction for justifying this logical ordering of hypotheses).
As for the "feeling" of time passing being some kind of ontological test, I honestly don't know what you think this proves. This "feeling" is just the competition between signals from your perceptions and signals from your memory of your perceptions. Such a comparison is trivially present in any feedback circuit, which entails that something time-like does indeed exist.
If you are truly seeking enlightenment, rather than satisfaction, you probably should avoid a priori positions that rule out a whole class of possible answers from consideration.
Taking a few steps back in the conversation, the reason it seems so silly to doubt that there's an objective basis for consciousness is that we've found an objective basis to basically everything else we've bothered to investigate. I claim that this is a false analogy. Though I'm apparently not good at communicating why, it amounts basically to this: you can be certain of your own consciousness, but of nothing else. Your consciousness and everything else are not on equal metaphysical footing.
That fact doesn't necessarily entail that it cannot be captured objectively. So your conjecture is that our apparent subjectivity is irreducible, that we must simply accept subjectivity into our ontology, and that's a stretch.
In a dream, you may similarly find that certain "objective" phenomena correlate near-perfectly with consciousness. Does this constitute consciousness being "captured objectively" by them? If not, why is the situation any different here, where we cannot be certain we're not in a simulation? (Notice that my argument does not depend on the likelihood of the simulation hypothesis, but just the possibility.)
I think guys like the Buddha were right: for that, I have to sit down for a good long while and allow consciousness to become more fully aware of itself. And if it cannot be communicated to others, that's perhaps just how it goes.
This is a pretty shallow interpretation of your perceptions I think. A Cartesian cogito argument doesn't prove that you exist because it assumes the conclusion (and so does not prove subjectivity exists).
A non-fallacious cogito argument is, "this is a thought, therefore thoughts exist". Where does the subjectivity arise in this proof?
At best, you can prove "this is a thought asserting the existence of subjectivity, therefore thoughts asserting the existence of subjectivity exist". This clearly does not entail that this belief is actually true.
So in conclusion, I dispute your certainty that consciousness exists. Many things seem certain at first blush, but turn out to be false upon closer inspection.
And if you want something more concrete to chew on, I recommend reading [1], which is a neuroscientific theory that attempts to account for our apparent experience of subjectivity.
[1] http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00...
Ultimately, either your meaning of "subjectivity" can be captured by an objective description, in which case you and I agree on the nature of subjectivity, or it cannot be so captured and you agree with the meaning of subjectivity in the philosophy of mind.
Finally, the mechanics of metacognition merely require an additional level of indirection, no magical secret sauce like subjectivity is required. We can even perform metalogical reasoning of a similar sort within basic formal systems like arithmetic via embeddings. I don't know why you think a whole new category of cognition is necessary.
http://m.nautil.us/issue/47/consciousness/we-need-conscious-...
> In fact, even our sensation of the present moment is a construct of the conscious mind. We see evidence for this in various experiments and case studies. Patients with agnosia who have damage to object-recognition parts of the visual cortex can’t name an object they see, but can grab it. If given an envelope, they know to orient their hand to insert it through a mail slot. But patients cannot perform the reaching task if experimenters introduce a time delay between showing the object and cueing the test subject to reach for it. Evidently, consciousness is related not to sophisticated information processing per se; as long as a stimulus immediately triggers an action, we don’t need consciousness. It comes into play when we need to maintain sensory information over a few seconds.
[1]http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799
"But let me end on a positive note. In my opinion, the fact that Integrated Information Theory is wrong—demonstrably wrong, for reasons that go to its core—puts it in something like the top 2% of all mathematical theories of consciousness ever proposed. Almost all competing theories of consciousness, it seems to me, have been so vague, fluffy, and malleable that they can only aspire to wrongness."
I'm super impressed, as in, the internet is actually better than I thought! ;) I would really recommend to anyone interested in that discussion to take the 3-4 h it takes to read through it all.