I always felt, perhaps uncharitably, that the point of containers was "those other programmers are idiots so we need to encapsulate everything for the sake of defense"
Modern package management systems like APT spend a lot of effort installing and removing files, and they don't do it completely; any file created by a program after it is installed will not be tracked.
You could accomplish the same thing in other ways (as Apple's sandboxing tech does), of course.
Well, there /is/ another way to do it.
STATIC LINK ALL THE THINGS
Which would work if licenses and copyrights didn't exist.
Managing internal dependencies (like libraries) is another concern entirely. But containers are good for that, too.
I don't think it would.
Dynamic linking allows a library to be patched once and have the patch apply to all the programs using it. If every program was statically linked, you would have to update each one individually.
Not to mention the waste of space.
I'm guessing much of that is moot these days, but IMHO it's still something to aim for.
The benefit of that goes away with containers anyway, you don't share libraries, every instance gets its own install.
We're at the point in the hype cycle where it starts getting fashionable to dismiss that as an overkill, but the reality for most of us out there is that most software is way more complicated than a single executable and containers make it easier to deploy complicated software.
On the other hand, deploying stuff is dead easy now. You just tell the hoster "deploy this Docker package, expose port X as HTTP, and put a SSL offloader in the front" and that was it, no more "we need <insert long list> to deploy this" or countless hours spent with the hoster on how to get weird-framework-x to behave correctly.
If it's actually useful we'll find someplace for it to live (or just in containers if that's all that's needed). If not, finding that out was cheap.
Heads up, you're talking about a different thing. You want to run these things as normal operations, but gunnihinn was talking about deploying an application to check if it is of any value. Chroot is just enough to make a mess as the application's developer instructed in INSTALL.txt without the need to worry about cleaning up afterwards.
And by the way, you seem to be confusing containers and Docker.
And I'm not confusing containers and Docker, I'm just speaking a bit imprecisely. In my experience, conversations about "containers" are rarely about raw containers, but rather some specific containerization scheme and tools (e.g. docker). I suspect everyone in this entire subthread means "docker containers" when they says "containers."
Yeah, some newbie forgot to mount-bind a necessary directory like /proc or /dev, didn't provide sensible /etc/resolv.conf, or messed up host's and chroot's paths, either in request or in configuration. Nothing that would render chroot unviable. Is this what you meant?
I don't like Docker, but I think it does some differential compression with the layers when you are modifying the image. So you don't have to re-do this install from scratch.
You may also run into issues with user IDs and various system config files in the chroot. Configuring the service with flags, env vars, and config files is a bit of a pain.
Docker is essentially a glorified chroot... I've essentially tried to rebuild it, and it is unfortunately a lot of work.
I just sometimes wonder if the cart hasn't gotten in front of the horse on the whole container front. The fact that the term "bare iron" has been hijacked to mean "not under virtualization" made me start to think that something is seriously fucked up.
There are several capabilities in that list to address your problem. Since your question is concerned about memory you can search for "memory" in that page and note the exact capabilities you will need.
OpenBSD has even more features (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OpenBSD_security_features) alongside the capability model.
My gripe is that instead of learning how to properly use their tools and platforms people have started looking for golden hammers like docker and now we have a mess like RancherOS. If someone can explain to me how isolating the system services in docker containers (which by the way are not isolated since they are privileged) does anything above and beyond what capabilities and the security features in OpenBSD provide then I'll concede the point. My guess is there are no advantages and people are jumping on bandwagons they know nothing about and since the previous generation of tools was not utilized to its full extent neither will all the new docker hotness. People are hammering square pegs into round holes.
My point was more about the "developer UX" of needing to isolate things that way. Containers have the semantics of isolating a group of processes, but not performing any internal isolation between the processes in the container. This is almost always what you want—you want "your app" to be able to have multiple processes, and to not have any security boundary between the parts of "your app", just between "your app" and "other apps" or the OS. In other words, you want to have a single "process"—from the OS security subsystem's perspective—whose threads happens to be composed of multiple PIDs, multiple binaries, and multiple virtual-memory mappings. You want to fork(2) + exec(2) without creating a new security context in the process.
Sandboxing would make perfect sense if single processes were always the granularity that "apps" existed at. Sometimes they are. Sometimes they're not, and people do complex things with IPC-capability-objects. And sometimes, when they're not, that fact pushes people toward avoiding multi-process architectures in favor of monolithic apps that reimplement functionality that already exists in some other program in themselves, in order to bring that functionality into their platform/runtime so it can live in their process.
Containers let people avoid this decision, by just applying things like capabilities at the container level, rather than at the process level.
> If someone can explain to me how isolating the system services in docker containers (which by the way are not isolated since they are privileged) does anything above and beyond what capabilities and the security features in OpenBSD provide then I'll concede the point.
Completely apart from the above, my understanding of Rancher is that it's the Docker part of "Docker container", not the container part, that provides the benefit there. Docker is a packaging and service-management system; that its packages use containers is frequently beside the point. Rancher's system services are Docker images (i.e. Docker "packages"), and so you use Docker tooling to create, distribute, manage and upgrade them. If your own application on such a system is managed through Docker, this provides a neat solution to unifying your operations—you just do everything through the docker(1) command.
That is a complex mix of services running on a machine, some sharing the same flavor of VM, and you're allocating fractions of the total available resource capability to different components. If you cannot make hard allocations that are enforced by the kernel you cannot accurately reason about how the system will perform under load, and if one of your missions is to get your total system utilization to be quite high, you have to run things at the edge.
Agreed. What I find so odd is that this problem was simply and elegantly solved in BSD with 'jail' and everyone went about their business.
I do not understand why (what appears to be) the linux answer to 'jail' is so complicated and fraught and the subject of so much discussion.
I am not sure that containers and their build scripts represent the $huge_profit_potential that people think they do ...